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Abstract
This thesis examines incidences of violence in Mexico related to the trade in
illegal narcotics from the election of President Felipe Calderón in late 2006 to
the election of his successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, in mid-2012. The thesis,
which  is  arranged  methodologically  as  a  single  case  study,  begins  with  an
examination of  the  state  of  literature  on  violence,  crime and warfare.  The
theoretical  basis  is  specified  by  subsequent  inquiry  into  the  role  of  illegal
narcotics as a driver of violence, and together, these theoretical chapters form
the basis of the hypothesis, that under certain circumstances, the drugs trade
can create a market of violence, in which non-political actors are incentivised
by their constraints to engage in acts of violence not normally associated with
criminals. 
The next three chapters comprise an empirical examination of the hypothesis
–  the  first  on  historical  inflection  points  in  Mexican  history  and  the
US/Mexican relationship along with the geographic and historical challenges,
as illustrated by the border region around Ciudad Juarez and the violence in
Guatemala, the second on the divergent structures and strategies of selected
Mexican drug trafficking organisations  as  a  window into  the nature  of  the
overall  conflict,  and  the  third  on  the  effects  of  Mexican  and  American
governmental strategies to control the violence. 
The thesis concludes that while drug violence in Mexico does have the overall
shape of  a market of violence,  developments toward the end of the period
studied give some hope that the constraints will change and markedly reduce
the incentive for violence. Policy ramifications and the overall future of drug
violence  given  the  uncertain  future  of  prohibition  are  considered  in  the
conclusion as well.
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I. Introduction
Illegal drugs,  crime and violence are linked at a basic level  in popular consciousness and
policy discourse. The very term “drug trafficker” connotes a dangerously illicit type of lifestyle,
defined in equal measure by brutality and glamour. While the reality is usually much more
mundane, there is a real and lasting correlation between drug trafficking and violence. The
production  of  drugs  fuels  insurgencies  from  the  Andes  to  Central  Asia;  drug  trafficking
disrupts peace-building and society building from Central America to West Africa; and drug
violence plagues inner cities from North America to East Asia.  In the broadest sense, this
thesis represents an attempt to elucidate the relationship between organised violence and the
trade in illegal narcotics. But while the broad linkages between violence and the drugs trade
have  been  widely  remarked  upon,  there  remains  significant  definitional  confusion  about
specific instances in which large outbreaks of violence have been tied to narcotics trafficking.
Much of the blame for this confusion lies on Richard Nixon's widely known shorthand for
government counter-narcotics efforts: the “War on Drugs.” The rhetorical simplicity of this
phrase and its  appeal to common cause and shared sacrifice in the face  of  an implacable
enemy served a distinct political purpose in 1971, but in the intervening decades, the same
rhetoric has been used to explain and justify a vast range of military, paramilitary and law-
enforcement activities worldwide. 
As  discussed,  drug violence tends to cluster  around the three stages  of  the “life-cycle”  of
narcotics: production, transit and distribution. By its nature – specifically, that the production
of most of the world's commonly used narcotics relies upon agricultural processes – the first
stage correlates heavily with insurgencies and other forms of irregular but organised conflict,
and  as  a  result,  has  increasingly  been  treated  as  a  military  problem.1 The  violence  that
accompanies  distribution  to  end  users,  on  the  other  hand,  is  also  tailored  to  its  scale  –
atomised, localised and therefor largely considered a law enforcement or domestic security
problem, rather than one requiring a military strategy as a counter.  But the violence that
1
Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010), Ch. 2.
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accompanies  transit  markets  lacks  such  defining  characteristics  and  is  more  difficult  to
classify.
This thesis represents an attempt to shed some light on this particular aspect of organised
violence and the drugs trade. Specifically, it situates the global market for illegal drugs within
two critical  trends:  the existence of  an extremely restrictive,  all-encompassing prohibition
regime and a globalised economy that makes the effective control of illicit international flows
virtually impossible. These two trends are further combined an unequal distribution of wealth
and state coercive resources, which enable narcotics to be produced cheaply in poor countries
unable to provide compelling economic alternatives or execute full control of their territory,
and shipped internationally for sale at  huge profit in rich consumer countries. This thesis
argues that the incentives created by these trends has led to the formation of a singular type of
conflict, which I call the  Market of Narcotic Violence. This type of conflict is distinct from
small-scale  criminal  violence,  as  in  end user markets,  and from the types  of  insurgencies
which can accompany large-scale drug production. Normal criminality does not seek to unseat
state  power,  and  accordingly,  uses  violence  relatively  sparingly  to  avoid  overwhelming
retaliation. War has fewer limits on the scope of its power, but is defined by a political or
ideological struggle. The Market of Narcotic Violence is distinct from both types of violence.
This is a uniquely topical discussion, as organised violence is, by most accounts, undergoing a
transition. The 20th century saw the most destructive conventional wars in history give way to
a  series  of  national  liberation  movements;  while  the  21st has  seen  those  insurgencies
transform into a variety of hybridised conflicts, with a multitude of participants, unclear battle
lines and mixed motivations.  In that context,  greater definitional  clarity is  essential.  Both
academic and policy discourse need to acknowledge these distinctions and arrive at a better
understanding of how these conflicts differ.
II. Case Selection and Hypothesis
Rather than constructing a hypothetical circumstance, this thesis uses the single case study
method to illustrate and examine its claims. Per John Gerring, a case study comprises “...an
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar)
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units.  A  unit  connotes  a  spatially  bounded  phenomenon—e.g.,  a  nation-state,  revolution,
political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over some delimited
period of time. (Although the temporal boundaries of a unit are not always explicit, they are at
least implicit.)”2 In this instance, the selected case is contemporary drug violence in Mexico,
with a specific date range of 2006 – 2012, eg. the term of President Felipe Calderón, who
oversaw the Mexican government's most aggressive approach to drug trafficking to date, and
whose  term  has  coincided  with  a  massive  uptick  of  drug-linked  violence.  The  case  was
selected  on several  grounds:  that  Mexico  is  inarguably  a  transit  state,  producing  a  small
quantity of heroin, a moderate quantity of marijuana and a moderate but increasing quantity
of methamphatamine,  but largely serving as a transfer  point for drugs produced in South
America and destined for consumers in the United States;3 that the violence in question can
be studied in relative isolation, given that there is no other large-scale concurrent conflict in
Mexico; and 3) that the violence in question is attributable to specific groups with identifiable
operational and strategic profiles. 
Given the relative newness of the conflict, Mexico has not been subjected to the same extent of
academic  scrutiny  as  older  conflicts,  such  as  the  drug-linked  insurgencies  in  Peru4 and
Colombia,5 which date from the 1970s and 80s. This has several connotations for the research
design. Thanks to the relative paucity of academic work on the subject, this research relies
heavily on news reports, studies compiled by non-governmental organisation (NGO), policy-
focused  research  institutions  and  documentation  from  the  Mexican  and  American
governments, and interviews with knowledgeable observers of the conflict. These sources are
collated and assessed in qualitative fashion to test the hypothesis. As Melissa Dell has ably
2
 Gerring, John “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2004, p. 342.
3
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012, (Vienna, United 
Nations, 2012), pp. 28, 44, 80.
4
 Ron, James, “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation,” 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 5, 2001.
5
 Mejía, Daniel, and Gaviria, Alejandro, Anti-Drugs Policies in Colombia: Successes, Failures 
and Wrong Turns (Bogota, Universidad de los Andes, 2012). 
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demonstrated,6 a  quantitative  survey of  the conflict  is  both possible and demonstrative  of
trends  which  illuminate  specific  dynamics  of  the  violence.  But  while  both  the  Mexican
government's statistical arm, INEGI,7 and independent groups such as México Evalúa8 have
compiled  detailed  statistics  on  the  discrete  incidents  of  violence  in  Mexico,  the  intrinsic
danger  and  difficulty  of  collecting  such  data  makes  certifying  their  accuracy  difficult.
Furthermore,  given the emphasis  placed  here  on both  the structure of  a  rapidly-evolving
system of criminal groups and the political  responses  of  two bureaucratic  governments, a
qualitative approach allows for a clearer and more comprehensive narrative without undue
complexity.  In short,  the combination of the available  data and the purpose of this  thesis
necessitate a qualitative approach.
This hypothesis of this work, then, has two parts:
1. That the passage of narcotics through transit states under a condition of general
prohibition can create a Market of Narcotic Violence. 
1a) That such a marketplace, once established, is resilient and decentralised –  the
conditions  of  such  a  marketplace  endure  regardless  of  the  success  or  failure  of  any
individual or group within it.
1b) That violence is not simply incidental but instrumental for the functioning of
such a market.
2. That the conflict in Mexico from 2006 to 2012 is the paramount example of such a
violent  market,  but  that  the  conditions  that  created  it  are  singular  rather  than
6
 Dell, Melissa, “Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War,” 2011. Accessed from 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/dell/publications/trafficking-networks-and-mexican-drug-war on 13 May 
2013.
7
 Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Accessed from
  
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/proyectos/continuas/vitales/bd/mortalidad/Mortalid
adGeneral.asp?s=est&c=11144#, 13 May 2013 (in Spanish).
8
 México Evalúa, “Índice de Inseguridad ciudana y violencia,” accessed from 
http://www.mexicoevalua.org/descargables/d15292_Indice-de-Inseguridad-Ciudadana-y-
Violencia.pdf on November 15, 2011 (in Spanish).
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unique.
III. Literature Review
In terms of the broader question, this study aims to fill  a key theoretical niche between a
number  of  disciplines,  including  international  relations,  conflict  studies  and  criminology.
Again, given the newness and difficulty of studying the Mexican case, the quantity of directly
relevant literature is a relatively small, if rapidly increasing. The following literature review is
therefore not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to focus on the pieces which have been
most relevant to the development of this work's hypothesis.
The first point of reference is the enormously broad body of literature on the study of conflict,
war and organised violence. The hypothesis of this dissertation is based on numerous sources,
but the central concept owes the largest debt to John Robb's book Brave New War.9 Robb's
argument  endorses  the  somewhat  controversial  “Fourth  Generation  Warfare”  thesis
propounded by a group of scholars and soldiers affiliated with the U.S. military,  William S.
Lind,10 and T.X. Hammes11 chief amongst them. The theory argues that certain conflicts are
better explained not as Clausewitzian contests between competitive political actors,  but as
evolutionary  networks  of  individuals  “superempowered”  by  modern  communications
technology and weaponry in such a way that they do not need a centralised structure to be
capable of challenging and even breaking the power of the state. The most important part of
Robb's argument to this thesis is the notion of the “bazaar of violence,” his term for a dynamic
in which individual actors are free to offer their specialised violent services to the highest
bidder,  rather  than  being  beholden  to  a  single  employer.  Compared  to  a  hierarchical
structure, a bazaar of violence is incredibly difficult to break apart, as it becomes entwined
with the economy of a conflict zone. Robb argues that under the right set of circumstances,
defeating such a network is effectively beyond the power of a state. As a result,  either the
9
  Robb, John, Brave New War (Hoboken, John Riley and Sons, 2007).
10
 Lind, William S., et al. "The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation." Marine Corps 
Gazette 73.10 (1989).
11
 Hammes, T.X., “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,” Strategic 
Forum, No. 214, January 2005.
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circumstances must  radically change or the state must  be  willing to simply  “manage”  the
violence rather than fight its way to a complete victory. 
The generational theory of war has come in for a fair amount of criticism, however. The bulk
of this criticism has to do with the charge of selective history. This critique is well-summarised
by Lawrence Freedman, who writes, “the activities covered by 4GW are best viewed not as an
evolution from earlier, more conventional types of warfare but instead as aspects of a separate
process,  reflecting  strategies  that  the  weak  have  long  adopted  in  conﬂicts  with  superior
military powers. These activities,  and their interaction with regular forms of warfare, vary
considerably in their size and scope, and in the underlying politico-military assumptions that
inform them.”12 This critique is echoed by a variety of other writers;13 the primary complaint
being that the idea of 4th generation warfare as a chronological ordering system ignores the
long history of  conflicts  between asymmetrical  forces.  This is  the great weakness of  4GW
theory – it assumes that the developments in contemporary military history are unique or
new,  without  properly  contextualising  them.  Nor  does  it  offer  any  explanation  for  the
motivations of those taking part in contemporary conflicts, preferring instead to argue that
such inquiry is irrelevant to the understanding of war. To understand conflicts without an
obvious political motive – those which fall in between violent crime and war – 4GW offers
some useful ideas about categorising organised violence using operational and organisational
qualities, but its inherent ahistorical qualities belie a lack of nuance which severely limits its
value as an analytic tool. It, along with other organisational models such as netwar do have
some descriptive value even though wars and insurgencies with a small number of parties and
traditional organisational structure are still better understood by traditional models of war;
conversely, most criminal organisations are not so violent that the traditional models of crime
are insufficient.14 
12
 Freedman, Lawrence, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation: A Comment on Thomas X. 
Hammes,” in Contemporary Security Policy, 26:2, 2005, p. 254.
13
 Evans, Michael, “Elegant irrelevance revisited: A critique of Fourth Generation Warfare,” and 
Echevarria, Antulio J., “Deconstructing the theory of Fourth-Generation Warfare;” in Terriff et. al., 
2008.
14
 See Sullivan, John P., “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence,” Small 
Wars Journal, 2009. Sullivan uses the phrase 'criminal insurgencies' to describe criminal 
organisations which have evolved to a level of violence that threatens the state. I prefer to avoid this 
13
A closely-related thesis comes from David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, whose conception of
“netwar,” first published at the turn of the 21st century, has been enormously influential to
subsequent  applications  of  network  theory  to  the  study  of  war  and  organised  violence.15
Arquilla and Ronfeldt usefully categorise the different types of network 'shape' that can be
adopted by violent actors, ranging from centralised 'hubs'  to 'chains'  in which each 'node'
(individual  or  specialized  group)  only  has  access  to its  immediate  neighbours.  While  this
typology is useful, it is – consciously – a notably broad categorisation of groups that can range
from  terrorist  and  insurgent  groups  to  nonviolent  actors.  Other  writers,  however,  have
applied network theory to specific conflicts. Particularly relevant here is Michael Kenney, who
describes  how  Colombian  drug  cartels  reorganised  into  'flatter'  networks  following  the
government's successful decapitation strategy against the highly centralised Medéllin and Cali
cartels, personified by Pablo Escobar.16 There have been some previous academic attempts to
describe Mexican drug violence in network terms, but most are relatively short and do not
focus exclusively on the Mexican example.17
More broadly, this thesis makes reference to the ongoing debate over the future of warfare.
Despite the contention of this thesis that the conflict in Mexico amounts to something that is
not  definitionally  a  war,  the  literature  on  irregular  violence  conflict  is  suffused  with  the
language of war. Indeed,  there is  a large body of literature that uses the word “war” as a
starting point for a category of contemporary conflicts wherein at least one side is composed
of  irregular  combatants.  These  conflicts  are  variously  referred  to  as  “new  wars”  (Mary
terminology since the use of “insurgency” - a word with specific political meaning – confuses the 
meaning of criminality.
15
 Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David, Networks and Netwar (Arlington, RAND Corporation, 
2001).
16
 Kenney, Michael, "Turning to the 'Dark Side:' Coordination, Exchange and Learning in 
Criminal Networks," in Kahler, Miles, ed., Networked Politics: Agency, Power and Governance 
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009). 
17
 Garzon, Juan Carlos, Mafia and Co: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia 
(Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, English Edition, 2008).
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Kaldor),18 “wars  amongst  the  people”  (Gen.  Rupert  Smith),19 “War  2.0”  (Thomas  Rid)20,
“hybrid  wars”  (Frank  Hoffman)21,  or  “netwars,”  (Arquilla  and  Ronfeldt).  While  there  are
substantial differences between these conceptions at both the practical and definitional levels,
they are all  grappling with the same concept:  that the vast majority of  modern organised
violence is less like the Clausewitzian metaphor of two wrestlers using comparable exertions
of  force  to compel  the other  to give  way,  and more of what  Herfried Münkler defines  as
asymmetrical  combat.  Münkler's  conception  differs  from  most  notions  of  asymmetrical
warfare in that not only are the means of warfare asymmetrical between the combatants, but
everything  else  –  the  strategy,  intentions  and  most  importantly,  ends  – are  as  well.22
Extending Münkler's analogy to Mexico is particularly apt, as the goals of the major forces
(the  Mexican  government,  the  American  government,  and  the  various  drug  trafficking
organisations) are fundamentally different from one another, as are the means by which they
seek to achieve their objectives and the decision-making apparatus they use to make strategic
and tactical decisions. 
Writers such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger have taken an opposite approach to the questions
of  unconventional  warfare.  Enzensberger  describes  modern  civil  wars  as  “molecular  civil
wars” which are similar to the Hobbesian conception of a “war of all against all.”23 Robert D.
Kaplan famously advanced a similar argument in his 1994 article “The Coming Anarchy,” in
which he used the example of contemporary West Africa to portray a future in which roving
gangs devoid of apparent political aspirations would become the most powerful force in much
of the world – essentially arguing that the 'roving bandit' model would become the prevalent
18
 Kaldor, Mary, New And Old Wars (Cambridge, Polity, 2006).
19
 Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Vintage, New York, 
2007. 
20
 Rid, Thomas and Hecker, Marc, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (London, 
Praeger Security International, 2009).
21
 Hoffman, Frank, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies, December 2007.
22
 Münkler, Herfried, The New Wars (Cambridge, Polity, 2005).
23
 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, Civil War (London, Granta, 1994) pp. 17-19.
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one for irregular armed forces.2425 One issue with this thesis is that it relies on the utter failure
of the state, or at least the state's decline to a point where its armed forces are effectively
indistinguishable from the groups operating in opposition to it. Mexico, which is by no means
a failed state,26 demonstrates that resilient armed conflict does not necessarily rely upon utter
state  failure;  states  which are  fragile  rather  than  completely  failed  are  also  vulnerable  to
widespread organised violence – although certainly the more powerful a state is, the more
likely it is to be able to manage and mitigate such violence. Still, in order to be analytically
useful, state weakness is best thought of as a continuum rather than as a binary of failed and
functional states.
A larger issue with the “anarchic violence” theory of modern conflict is that it makes it far too
easy to dismiss the possibility that actors in such an environment have interests, strategies or
much in the way of agency. It imposes upon those actors a framework designed for highly
structured  violence  carried  out  by  states  in  a  basically  ordered  political  and  social
environment. Doing so fails to adequately consider the massive structural differences between
war  as  an  international  or  internal  endeavour27 -  or,  indeed,  of  the  differences  between
international wars,  fought  between  states,  and  transnational violence  occurring  without
regard for established international borders.
In a similar vein, but on the other side of the spectrum of organised violence, is the model of
organised crime that challenges  state authority.  It  is  worth pointing out at  this  stage that
organised  crime  is  a  category  which  includes  gangs,  but  the  two  are  not  necessarily
coterminous. Organised crime, as a category, includes a variety of groups which are not gangs
24
 Kaplan, Robert D., “The Coming Anarchy,” in The Atlantic, February 1994, accessed May 3 
2011 from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/4670/. 
25
 It is worth noting that the most common interpretation of Kaplan's article – that there was 
nothing that could be done for the Third World – was not the author's intention. See Garfinkle, 
Adam, “The Sky is Always Falling,” in The New York Times, March 19, 2000, accessed from 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/03/19/reviews/000319.19garfint.html on May 3 2011.
26
 Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index 2012,” accessed from http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-
2012-sortable on May 14, 2013. 
27
 Kalyvas, Stathis N., “Civil Wars,” in Boix, Carles and Stokes, Susan C., The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Politics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).
16
per se and whose activities may not even be violent. A group of computer hackers illegally
accessing personal data are engaging in organised crime, but the absence of physical violence
makes them distinct from a gang.  
With  that  in  mind,  the  most  relevant  model  here  is  that  used  by  Max  Manwaring,  who
classifies the evolution of gangs into three stages. Stage one gangs are relatively small, weak
entities  mostly  concerned with immediate  survival  and avoiding confrontation with more
powerful  entities,  including the forces  of  the state.  Stage two gangs   can engage in  more
profitable and complex criminal enterprises, and have begun to broaden their geographical
focus. Stage three gangs are large, horizontally- and vertically-integrated entities active across
a wide range of economic activities (both legal and illegal), and have acquired the means to
directly  challenge  the  state  in  some  instances.  In  Insurgency,  Terrorism  and  Crime,28
Manwaring makes the case that the failure of governments to provide adequate  economic
conditions to their people leads to a competition between various types of armed non-state
actors (including classical insurgencies and evolved gangs) for the loyalty of the people and
the  attendant  power.  The  description  of  stage  three  gangs  is  highly  consistent  with  the
situation in  Mexico today,  although the political  awakening Manwaring describes  has  not
visibly  manifested  itself.  While  Manwaring's  analysis  is  in  large  part  consistent  with  the
approach of this thesis, it is important to note the particular circumstances of Mexico, which
complicate the application of his thesis: economic conditions in Mexico are not the sole cause
of the supply of apparently unlimited manpower for the cartels. The proximity and wealth of
the United States, and its massive, unceasing demand for narcotics plays a more pivotal role
in the shape of and motivation for the violence. 
While  this  body  of  literature  provides  useful  signposts  for  understanding the tactical  and
operational aspects of conventional war, a deeper understanding of resilient and decentralised
conflict depends upon the linked questions of motivation and sustenance. While much of the
28
 Manwaring, Max, Insurgency, Terrorism and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for 
the Future, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).
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foundational work here was done by Mancur Olson,29 the most relevant point of reference is
the work of David Keen, who proposes that ongoing unconventional war be understood not as
warfare in the classic sense, but as “an alternative means of profit, power and protection;” in
other words, that the persistence of civil conflicts is not due to the inability of one side to fight
through to victory, but because under some circumstances, it is seen as more strategically
beneficial  to  remain involved in  a  conflict.30 William Reno,  drawing on late-2oth century
conflicts in Africa, makes a related argument: that ostensibly weak “shadow states” benefit
from long-term disorder and violence on the grounds that those conditions permit extremely
profitable forms of corruption.31 There is perhaps no better example of the phenomenon of
violent conflict enabling otherwise forbidden economic activity than the drugs trade, which is
subject to essentially universal prohibition and aggressive enforcement by most governments,
backed by the United Nations. The particular influence of drugs on conflict economies and
ongoing conflicts across a variety of milieus has been studied by scholars including Svante
Cornell,32 Peter Reuter,33 Vanda Felbab-Brown,34 and Paul Rexton Kan.35 In general, however,
most academic and policy examinations of the nexus of drugs and armed conflict have focused
on drug producer states. Mexico's drug conflict, by contrast, is defined by its proximity to the
United States and its deep-pocketed customers. It is the implications of this relationship, not
Mexico's domestic drug production, which define the conflict and make it worthy of study on
its own terms.
29
 Olson, Mancur, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, 
(New York, Basic Books, 2000).
30
 Keen, David, Complex Emergencies (Cambridge, Polity, 2008).
31
 Reno, William, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
32
 Cornell, Svante E., “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications," Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, 2007.
33
 Reuter, Peter, "Systemic violence in drug markets," Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 52, 
2009.
34
 Felbab-Brown, 2010.
35
 Rexton Kan, Paul, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, (Dulles, Virginia, Potomac Books, 
2009). 
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IV. Thesis Outline
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the next two are
largely theoretical in nature, and serve to lay out the general theoretical argument that the
case study serves to examine. Chapter Two examines the question of how organised violence
is defined. It examines the basic definitions of organised violence  starting with Hobbes and
moving to more modern sociological and anthropological ideas, before moving on to examine
the two predominant forms into which violence is classified: organised crime and war. Based
on  an  understanding  on  organised  crime  drawing  on  Edwin  Sutherland's  differential
association theory and the idea of coercive orders originally propounded by Hans Kelsen, it
determines that organised crime is inherently a form of violence that is self-limiting in order
to extract profits, while war is an unlimited form of violence in support of a political objective.
It concludes with an examination of the “metaphor” of war as a model of shared sacrifice and
unifying  political  purpose,  contrasting  the  War  on  Terror  with  the  War  on  Drugs  and
examining  the  similarities  between  the  two  abstract  concepts,  as  well  as  the  significant
differences  between  a  war  against  a  violent,  political  ideology  in  the  form  of  non-state
networks, and a war against an inanimate object effectively used as a consumer product by the
state's own citizens. 
Chapter Three examines the theoretical issues around narcotics as they relate to organised
violence. It starts with a history of the international narcotics prohibition regime and moves
into  the  contemporary  history  of  state  counter-narcotics  policies,  particularly  following
American  President  Richard  Nixon's  declaration  of  a  “War  on  Drugs”  in  1971.  It  then
examines the rhetoric and policy of American counter-narcotics, largely summarised by that
phrase.  Having  established  the  characteristics  of  drugs  and  their  historical  and  practical
linkages  to organised violence,  this  chapter lays  out  the theory of  the Market  of  Narcotic
Violence, which is defined by a set of external constraints and in which violence serves as a
product, a service and the market regulator.
Chapters Four, Five and Six provide a detailed examination of the thesis's core case study, the
drug-linked violence in Mexico from 2006-2012. Chapter Four lays out the argument that
history and geography are determinative of the constraints on such a market of violence. In
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order to present this argument, it examines the history and geography of Mexico, focusing
especially on a number of historical eras that defined the Mexican government's relationship
with its people and with the United States. To explain how geography and history affect the
market  of  violence,  it  examines  two  separate  regions  and  their  roles  in  the  conflict:  the
“border metropolis”  of  Ciudad Juarez,  Chihuahua and El  Paso,  Texas, and Guatemala,  on
Mexico's southern border. Rather than a cross-comparison, examining these separate regions
illustrates the ways in which geographic and historical factors – particularly national borders
and a history of violence or corrupt institutions – can contribute to the creation of a Market of
Narcotic Violence. Using this combination of historical and geographic analysis, the chapter
concludes with a list of the common factors of such markets.
Chapter Five examines the drug trafficking milieu in contemporary Mexico. The chapter is
broken  down  into  three  sections,  which  examine  three  notable  Mexican  drug  trafficking
organisations and the models they each represent: the Sinaloa Federation, whose business
model follows those of traditional cartels and is largely transactional in nature; the Zetas, who
are termed an “anarchic  franchise,”  with a hard core of  extremely violent former military
officers  and  a  much  larger  group  of  affiliates;  and  the  (now  mostly  defunct)  “narco-
insurgents” of La Familia Michoacána, who combined a territorial approach with a pseudo-
Christian ideology. While the early days of the drug conflict saw a proliferation of unaffiliated
minor groups,  the last  few years have seen a process of  polarisation,  with smaller  groups
either  declaring  allegiance  to  Los  Zetas  or  the  Sinaloa  Federation  or  losing  territory  and
becoming less and less powerful and relevant. Chapter Six details the Mexican and American
policies that have attempted to cope with the upsurge in violence. Using Bayliss Manning's
conception of  “intermestic”  policy  as a framework,  this  chapter demonstrates  that neither
country's  government  has  managed  to  craft  policy  that  accounts  for  the  combination  of
domestic and international factors that have created the storm of violence in Mexico.
The last  chapter  concludes  the thesis  by  returning to the question of  the extent  to which
violence in Mexico from 2006-12 constituted a Market of Narcotic Violence, and what that
implies for the Mexican and American governments. It subsequently considers the question of
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drug regularisation (popularly, if somewhat inaccurately, called legalisation) and what effects
such a policy might have on the emergence of future instances of drug violence.
In essence,  the  thesis  concludes  that  the violence  in  Mexico  from 2006 to 2012 had the
characteristics of a Market of Narcotic Violence, and that Mexican and American policies have
not adapted the kinds of intermestic strategies which might change the constraints on that
market; and that this failure has allowed the violence to flourish. This conclusion is caveated
by the fact  that the market  has evolved significantly from a multipolar to a bipolar form,
centred around two major groups (the Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation), which could pave
the way for further evolution toward a different form of conflict entirely.
V. Concluding Notes
Finally, a few terminological issues need to be clarified. First, the narcotic-linked violence in
Mexico (amongst other places) is commonly attributed to “cartels.” This terminology, though
common,  is  essentially  inaccurate:  a  cartel,  by  definition,  is  a  monopolistic  price-fixing
organisation,36 and  there  is  no  evidence  that  any  group  in  Mexico  is  capable  of  either
developing a monopoly or fixing prices. Indeed, as Michael Kenney has demonstrated, it is not
clear if even the archetypical drug cartels (the Colombian Cali and Medellín cartels of the late
1980s and early  1990s)  deserve the term.37 A  better,  if  somewhat  generic,  term is  “Drug
trafficking organisation,” or DTO. Some authors prefer to use the term TCO, for Transnational
Criminal Organisation, which is also more accurate than “cartel” and correctly signifies that
large  criminal  organisations  almost  invariably  diversify  their  operations  across  different
aspects  of  criminality,  from  simple  drug  trafficking  into  extortion,  protection,  human
trafficking, software piracy, and so forth. I have elected to use DTO in this thesis, for two
major reasons: first, that the Mexican groups that are the focus of the bulk of the thesis make
most  of  their  profits  from  activities  directly  related  to  narcotics;  and  second,  that  drug
36
 Astorga, Luis and Shirk, David A., "Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug 
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context," Center for US-Mexican Studies Working Paper, USMEX 
10-01.
37
 Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government 
Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation, (University Park, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007).
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trafficking and the violence that enables and supports it is the topic at hand. That said, some
groups involved in drug trafficking either self-identify as “cartels” or are widely known by a
name which includes the word, as with the Medellín, Cali and Gulf Cartels. In those cases, this
piece uses the word descriptively rather than categorically.
Additionally, as the next chapter will explore in more detail, the terminology of violence is
central to our understanding of it. The situation in Mexico has been referred to by politicians,
newspaper headline writers and various academic and think-tank writers as a “war,” usually
with reference to the scale of the violence. This thesis does not use that terminology, largely
because the term “war” carries a political connotation that such situations do not merit. That
distinction will be explored in much greater detail in Chapter 1, but for clarity's sake, I have
chosen to refer to it as a “conflict,” which is a relatively neutral term.
Finally,  on the topic  of  drugs:  this  thesis  is  written within  the discipline of  international
relations, not the study of public health or medicine. Accordingly, some of the fundamental
questions of  drug use – why human beings  choose to use narcotics,  whether  it  would be
possible to enact a policy that would prevent drug use, and so on – are beyond its scope.
However, in terms of understanding illegal drugs as a resource that can fuel conflicts, it makes
sense to categorise  them with other  harmful  but addictive  substances  used – and largely
legalised – by contemporary societies, such as alcohol and tobacco. This classification of illicit
drugs as simply a commodity akin to alcohol and tobacco (which, in terms of social harms, are
at the very least comparable) but for their legal status, underpins the market metaphor for
drug trafficking, and helps provide historical and contemporary counterexamples for how the
legal  status  of  a  particular  substance  can  affect  the  types  of  harms  associated  with  its
production, trafficking and use.
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Chapter 2:
On Violence, Crime, War and Warfare
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I. Introduction
At a theoretical level, this work seeks to explore the relationship between two basic topics:
drugs and violence. Of those two, violence has been the subject of much more examination
within International Relations, but – perhaps for that reason – is also the subject of more
controversy and debate. As the violence in Mexico from 2006-2012 represents a confluence of
the two phenomena, before the case study can be examined in detail, we must construct a
theoretical  model  of  violence and of  the characteristics  of  narcotics.  Of course,  drugs and
violence are not necessarily correlative – the vast majority of organised violence worldwide is
unrelated to drugs, and substantial aspects of the trade in and use of drugs occur peacefully.
To  understand the  relationship  between  drugs  and  violence,  first  we  must  examine  each
separately.  This  chapter,  therefore,  examines  a  spectrum  of  theories  that  address  the
questions of organised violence, while the next will both examine the nature of drugs as a
topic and begin to reconcile the characteristics of  the drugs trade and the violence that it
engenders.  The subsequent chapters  will  then explore  the central  case study,  the ongoing
Mexican drug conflict, in more detail.
At its base level, violence is a fairly simple concept. Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the most
central  theorist  of  organised  violence  in  the  Western  canon,  wrote  that  the  ultimate
expression  of  violence  –  war  –  could  be  boiled  down  to  its  essence,  combat,  eg.,  two
combatants using (any) means of violence against each other with the intention of disabling,
disarming or  killing  the other.38 More simply,  violence  could  be  described  with  a  phrase
common in American military circles: “killing people and breaking things.” As crude as that
phrase is, it speaks to a quality of violence as an instrument, though an inherently brutal and
unforgiving  one,  whether  carried  out  in  a  war  between  states,  conducted  with  industrial
means, or in straightforward street crime. Between those two poles,  but connected by the
brutal and unforgiving qualities of violence, lies an extraordinarily complex world of violence
that does not fit neatly into either category. It is in that middle ground where the case study at
hand falls.  The differences  are  a  matter  of  scale,  to be  sure,  but  importantly,  also  of  the
motivations of the actors, their capabilities and the way in which they are organised – and
38
 Clausewitz, Carl, translated by Graham, J.J., On War, (Radford, Wilder, 2008).
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while the nature of brutality may be the same regardless of whether the aggressor is a street
criminal or a uniformed soldier, the character is vastly disparate in different circumstances.
This  world  of  violence  that  exists  between  completely  formal  and  completely  informal
archetypes has also been the subject of substantial academic exploration, but there has been
little agreement amongst international relations scholars as to its characteristics. Crucially,
there  is  a  debate  about  motivation  in  violent  conflict,  often  referred  to  as  “greed  versus
grievance.”  This  debate  proceeds  from  an  assumption  that  motivation  is  critical  to
understanding the character of  organised violence, and that such violence manifests  itself
differently based on motivation. This chapter serves to successively explore those archetypes
and, subsequently, to outline the one best suited to explain the character of violence in the
case study. To do so, it proceeds along broadly thematic lines, starting with an assessment of
the basic characteristics of organised violence as a tool and tactic of forces both formal and
informal. Next, it goes into greater detail on the use of violence by informal, profit-driven
forces by examining theories of violent crime. There is some dispute over the exact boundaries
of  crime,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  terminology  of  “organised  crime,”  and  where
criminality  becomes  violent  politics;  this  debate  segues  into  the  discussion  of  the critical
relationship  between  politics  and  war.  Therefore,  the  following  section  will  address  the
question of war and whether it is the appropriate frame of reference for irregular conflicts
such as the one in Mexico. 
Having demonstrated that the archetype of “crime” does not sufficiently explain the scale of
violence in Mexico, while that of “war” fails to account for the apparent motivations of its
participants, the chapter's final section examines the way in which metaphors of war affect
questions  of  public  policy  which  are  not  inherently  military  in  nature.  This  point  is
demonstrated by inquiry into the nature of two famous metaphorical wars: the War on Terror
and the War on Drugs.
As a final note, this study does not purport to provide an answer to the question of how all
types  of  “semi-formal”  violence  should  be classified  or  understood;  instead,  its  goal  is  to
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contribute a theory of how the relationship between drugs and violence can lead to persistent
violence, with the hope of informing policy that could limit its scope and damage. 
II. Violence
Violence, as a concept, has a wide variety of definitions. Some authors, such as Charles Tilly,
have included in their studies violence whose target is property rather than persons;39 others,
particularly those in policy fields,  have suggested that certain types of  social  effects – the
health risks from drug use, for example40 – also constitute a type of violence. There are also
broadened conceptions of  violence,  such as Johan Galtung's  concept of  'cultural  violence,'
which he defines as “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct
or structural form.”41 These definitions have important places in the study of violence as a
cultural or moral phenomenon. But although they may support useful debate in other fields,
they are less helpful for this thesis, which has a more limited mandate and specific relevance
to an ongoing conflict in which the major issue is the damage to, and loss of, human lives. As a
result,  for  these  purposes  the  simplest  and  most  analytically  useful  approach  is  to
definitionally limit violence to intentional acts that physically harm human beings. Therefore,
for the purposes of this study, I define 'violence' as  acts causing physical harm directed by
human beings at other human beings.
In many respects, the foundational piece of theory in the modern understanding of violence is
Hobbes'  Leviathan.  Hobbes  identifies  three  primary  causes  of  strife  amongst  humans:
competition,  diffidence and glory.  From this,  he  concludes  that  violence is  fundamentally
39
 Tilly, Charles, The Politics of Collective Violence, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 2-4. Tilly recounts the story of Malaysian tenant farmers who engaged in nighttime 
sabotage of their landlords as an example of violence against property; he counterposes this 
example against two examples of violence against people: cowboys shooting each other in the 
American “Wild West” and the Rwandan genocide.
40
 See for example Bertram et al, Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, (Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1996), p. 32, where the social harms inflicted by drugs and – particularly – the 
war on drugs are analogised to collateral damage in a military campaign.
41
 Galtung, Johan, “Cultural Violence,” in The Journal of Peace Research,vol. 27, no. 3, 1990, p. 
291. Galtung's definition was based on his previous work on 'structural' violence, which also does 
not fit into the conception of direct violence useful for this thesis.
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driven by desire for three qualities: gain, safety and reputation. Hobbes famously wrote that
in the absence of a common power to hold those individual motivations in check, life would be
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short,” and elaborated that the constant necessity of self-
defence in an environment where security was only guaranteed through individual strength
would deprive  society  of  its  scientific  and cultural  progress.42 To  Hobbes,  those advances
could only  be imposed by participation in a hierarchical  society,  where individual  desires
would  be  suborned  to  the  will  of  the  state  in  exchange  for  peace,  security  and  social
advancement – a basic structure which we will return to in time.
But  where  Hobbes  laid  out  the  principal  human  motivations  for  violence,  others  have
elaborated on the character of the violence itself. Here, I will rely primarily upon the work of
the Dutch anthropologist Anton Blok, who writes that violence has both an instrumental and
expressive character. To Blok, the concept of 'senseless violence' is not analytically useful; in
his conception it usually has both a purpose and a meaning. In critiquing the tendency of
anthropologists to simply treat violence as a characteristic of certain environments, he writes,
“We want to understand violence primarily in utilitarian, 'rational' terms, in terms of means
and ends. The question of what violence signifies, 'says' or expresses is at best of secondary
importance.  In  this  way,  historically  developed  sensibilities  serve  as  a  standard  in
comparative research and are responsible for distorted view of both violence and society.”43 In
contrast, to Blok even informal violence (football hooliganism, for example) is freighted with
symbolic importance, and is tied in with a particular conception of honour – even if that is
simply a variation upon “honour amongst thieves.”44 For the purposes of this study, viewing
violence in both expressive and instrumental terms is extremely helpful, since it allows us to
examine individual acts of violence in the central case study in light of the perpetrators, what
they  accomplish  and  the  unique  effects  of  the  way  in  which  they  are  carried  out.  This
42 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, London, 1651, Ch. 13, Project Gutenberg Version (2013), accessed 
from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0113 on 2 March 2014.
43
 Blok, Anton, “The Meaning of 'Senseless' Violence,” in Blok, ed., Honour and Violence, 
(Cambridge, Polity, 2001), p. 104.
44
 Ibid., p. 109-110.
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combination is particularly valuable in Mexico, where, as we will see in Chapter 5, acts of
highly symbolic violence such as “corpse messaging” are common.45
Allan Bäck draws a useful further distinction between 'violence' and 'aggression,' arguing that
the  forcefulness  of  an  act  should  be  measured  by  its  effects  rather  than  its  other
characteristics,  concluding  that  “[i]n  short,  aggression  is  forcefulness  plus  intention  and
injury.”46 Violence, to Bäck, implies a further moral dimension: “Violence, then, contains a
moral component associated with choosing to engage in actions that harm another person and
attempting to force that person to act as you want.”47 This study is concerned primarily with
the practical implications of violence, but the moral abhorrence of violence should never be
left entirely out of any discussion of conflict.
It must also be recognized that nothing in these conceptions of violence implies any particular
scale. They do not draw distinctions between levels of violence; instead, they represent an
attempt  to  draw out  a  set  of  characteristics  generalisable  to  the  entire  concept.  Violence
encompasses an extraordinarily broad range of possibilities: constituted according to the rules
above, an “act of violence” might be a single thrown punch, causing transient injury to a single
individual, or it can be the detonation of an atomic weapon in a city that might kill tens or
hundreds  of  thousands.   But  when  we  increase  the  scale  of  violence  from  an  individual
confrontation to a group or state effort, the instrumental and expressive implications of such
an action change significantly. 
Understanding  the  workings  of  groups  is  the  domain  of  sociology,  so  it  is  perhaps
unsurprising  that  the  most  useful  understanding  of  collective  violence  comes  from  a
45
 Blok's definition of violence as both instrumental and expressive stands in contrast to that of 
Hannah Arendt, who viewed violence in purely instrumental terms. As useful as the instrumental 
aspect of violence is for understanding the organisations and systems which use it, including the 
expressive aspect, as Blok does, is critical for a fuller understanding of the phenomenon. See 
Arendt, Hannah, On Violence, (London, Harcourt, 1970).
46
 Bäck, Allan, 'Thinking Clearly About Violence,' in Vittorio Bufacchi, ed., Violence, A 
Philosophical Anthology, (Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 223.
47
 Ibid., p. 224. The phrase “attempting to force that person to act as you want” of course raises 
the spectre of Clausewitz, who I will address in much more detail later in this chapter.
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sociologist,  Charles  Tilly.  Tilly  writes,  “With  collective  violence,  we  enter  the  terrain  of
contentious  politics,  where  people  make  discontinuous,  public,  collective  claims  on  each
other.  By no means all  contentious politics  generates violence...  But all  collective violence
involves contention of one kind or another.”48 To Tilly, groups engaging in contentious politics
– a category that can encompass a vast spectrum of politics,  including but not limited to
violent  resistance – have in common claims to political  identities,  which are  classified as
legitimate or illegitimate by the local  government.  This  sorting process  can (but  does not
necessarily) lead contentious politics to become violent politics.49 The ability of these groups
to  utilise  violence  to  effect  depends  on  a  successful  marriage  between  “political
entrepreneurs” and “specialists in violence,” the former to connect disparate elements into a
collective  with sufficient  mass  to  support  action and the latter  to develop  and utilise  the
expertise that allows the group to force its will upon outside individuals and groups (although
there  is  some  overlap  between  the  two).5051 This  specialisation,  along  with  the  greater
resources of groups, allows for a larger variety of violence on the collective level than on the
individual. 
We have therefore established a basic definition of violence, with some specifics relevant to
the case study at hand. This definition consists of intentional human acts causing harm to
other humans, with three aspects: instrumental meaning, expressive meaning and a moral
component. The next task is to explore some of the varieties of collective violence, starting
with the least formalised – crime.
48
 Tilly, 2003, p. 26.
49
 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
50
 Ibid., pp. 34-36. Importantly, Tilly notes that the existence of violence specialists does not 
necessarily entail the active use of violence; rather, given sufficient reputation or coercive power, 
the threat of violence or simple intimidation may suffice to attain the same goals.
51
 This idea finds perhaps its clearest expression in Just War Theory (JWT), which was initially 
promulgated as a set of divinely-inspired principles to reconcile religious imperatives with political 
exigency. Proportionality, in Just War terms, has two related meanings: that the initial decision by a 
state to go to war should be in proportion to the injustice it seeks to right; and that during war, 
actions taken by combatants should be proportional to the goals they seek to accomplish. Crucially, 
proportionality is the only concept which is represented in both categories, which demonstrates its 
centrality to the entire conceit. 
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III.  Crime
The metaphor of crime is frequently used to categorise violence that takes place outside an
established, formal political context. The term “crime” by itself, of course, does not necessarily
denote violence – many forms of crime as recognised by states are not inherently violent,
particularly  given  our  established  understanding  of  violence  as  a  form of  action  directed
against  persons.  Criminality,  at  its  base,  entails  failure  to  adhere  to  codified  societal
guidelines; but many of these guidelines have nothing to do with violence – in most of the
world, it  is possible to fall afoul of  those guidelines by engaging in specifically proscribed
forms of economic, sexual or cultural behaviours (amongst other categories). Of particular
concern to this thesis is the criminal status of narcotics, whose production, trafficking and
growth are not  necessarily violent,  but whose relationship with violence in one particular
country is at the heart of the inquiry at hand. Aside from drug use, which will be explored in
greater detail in Chapter 3, other forms of nonviolent criminality are not particularly at issue
here, so I will focus my inquiry on violent crime.
In terms of violent crime, individuals may choose to employ violence on their own behalf for a
variety of purposes: self-defence, passion, prejudice, desire for immediate profit – all of which
would have been familiar to Hobbes. But in an environment outside the state of nature –
some kind of legitimate authority wielding something approaching a monopoly of violence – a
more sophisticated understanding of what drives criminality is necessary. Edwin Sutherland's
differential association theory, first  articulated in 1939, is a touchstone here. The theory holds
that criminal behaviour is not inherited but rather learned from greater exposure to criminal
acquaintances and networks than to legitimate ones. More specifically, Sutherland holds that,
“A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favourable to violation of
law over definitions unfavourable to violation of law.”52 In short, criminality is not simply a
moral failing – rather,  it represents the product of  a complex socio-economic structure in
which the normative  value of  obeying the law may vary  widely  within societies  and even
smaller groups. 
52 Sutherland, Edwin H., et. al., Principles of Criminology, Eleventh Edition, Lanham, MD, General 
Hall, 1992, p. 89.
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Differential association does not account for a number of varieties of crime, such as crimes
carried  out  by  individuals  with  no  previous  criminal  history  (say,  a  mass  shootings
perpetrated by a high school student) or white-collar crime – but those are not at issue here.
Rather, differential association describes the process by which criminal forms of behaviour,
including  the  use  of  violence  for  non-state  sanctioned  ends,  become  ingrained  within
communities and normalised. 
As Tilly notes, those Hobbesian individual motivations for crime may have analogues at the
collective  level,  and may  contribute  directly to collective  violence.53 Yet  individual  acts  of
violence  disconnected  from  organisational  interest,  despite  their  possibly  analogous
relationship  with  collective  violence,  are  not  at  issue  here.  The  phenomenon  under  the
theoretical  microscope  is  too  large  to  be  accounted  for  by  individual  interests.  The
Westphalian state is predicated on the idea that the government maintains a monopoly of
violence within its  borders;  all  states see individual acts of  violence to a greater or  lesser
extent  and  virtually  all  have  at  least  some  degree  of  organised,  collective  violence,  but
relatively few see the rise of organisations able to challenge that monopoly on a broad scale. 
But as Hans Kelsen pointed out in his seminal  Pure Theory of Law, the distinction between
states and other forms of social organisation is more a normative difference than a functional
one. He writes, “Collective security or peace – as we have said – is a function that the coercive
orders designated as 'law' have in various degrees when they have reached a certain level of
development. This function is an objectively determinable fact. The scientific statement that a
legal  order  is  pacifying  the  legal  community,  is  not  a  value  judgment.  Specifically,  this
statement does not mean that the realization of justice is  essential  to the law;  this  value,
therefore, cannot be made an element of the concept of law and can therefore not serve as a
criterion for the distinction between a legal community and a robber gang.”54
In making this distinction, Kelsen cites Augustine, who wrote, “Set justice aside then, and
what  are  kingdoms but thievish purchases? Because what  are thieves'  purchases  but little
53
 Tilly 2003, pp. 23-24.
54 Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, translated by 
Knight, Max (2008), p. 48.
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kingdoms?”55 He also refers to the pirate states of North Africa from the 16 th through 19th
centuries, arguing that while their foreign policies (specifically attacks on foreign shipping)
were  considered  criminal,  their  means  of  maintaining  domestic  order  were  not  notably
different from those of other states. Kelsen's example demonstrates that outwardly-directed
criminality and violence do not necessarily coincide with inwardly directed chaos;  indeed,
given the complexity and cost of pirate operations, an ordered internal structure may even be
necessary.  Kelsen's  conception  of  coercive  orders  underlies  the  entire  understanding  of
complex criminal structures, not as agents of chaos but as alternative means by which order
can be imposed and objectives achieved.
In a more contemporary context, the intersection of a particular type of criminality (namely,
the large-scale production and distribution of controlled narcotic substances) and violence is
not  an  automatic  relationship:  some  drug  markets  indeed  operate  without  large-scale
violence,  despite  the fact  that  they by definition operate  outside the law;  in  contrast,  the
production of legal goods in conflict zones is often linked to violence.56 For example, despite
its role as a leading supplier of marijuana to the United States,57 Canada's drug traffickers
seem-  to  operate  with  an  extremely  low  level  of  violence,  generally  relying  on  trust
relationships and implied threats rather than the actual use of force.58 But Canadian drug
traffickers in the Pacific Northwest are operating in an environment with low levels of overall
crime, meaning that any violence is likely to be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted.59
Perhaps more interesting, then, are certain groups of Mexican black-tar heroin traffickers,
who participate in drug sales without engaging in large amounts of violence, despite the high
55 Ibid., p. 48.
56
 Snyder, Richard, and Duran-Martinez, Angelica, “Does illegality breed violence? Drug 
trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets,” in Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 52, 
2009, pp. 253-273.
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 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “World Drug Report, 2012,” 2012, p. 51.
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 Desroches, Frederick John, The Crime That Pays, (Toronto, Canadian Scholars Press, 2005), 
pp. 119-121.
59
 Canadian Ministry of Justice, Police Services Division, “Crime Statistics in British Columbia, 
2011,” October 2012, accessed from http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/policeservices/shareddocs/crime-
statistics.pdf on May 17, 2013. 
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levels of overall violence in their area of operations.60 This is worth pointing out because drug
markets are completely outside the scope of legality and therefore need an alternative system
of  regulation to ensure  that  obligations  are  met.  H.  Richard  Friman argues  that  violence
serves  as  a  “selective”  tool  for  market  regulation,  with  limitations  based  on  its  cost  and
disruptive effects, pointing to the “ebbs and flows” of violence in the cocaine market in the
United States of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Cuban and Colombian gangs vied for
control of the main trafficking routes.61 In this conception, it is the lack of authority from one
overwhelmingly powerful criminal group that creates the incentive amongst competitors to
make violent claims on market share. Charles Tilly uses the term 'segregated trust networks'
to refer to organisations operating inside areas of state control but for their own purposes.62
Per Tilly, five strategies are used by such organisations: “1) Predation on external individuals
and organizations; 2) concealment, 3) clientage, 4) dissimulation, and 5) combinations of 1 to
4.”63 However, the majority of segregated trust networks do not used predation to support
themselves – in other words, most groups in this category are not criminal organisations but
rather interest groups based on some form of identity (culture, ethnicity, religion) that face
oppression or disapproval from the state.64 Even criminal groups are unlikely to rely entirely
upon predation, as this leaves them with little in the way of recourse for survival once the
attention of the state, which inevitably has greater coercive capacity, turns toward them. 
60
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The  role  of  violence  in  relation  to  other  forms  of  criminality  is  therefore  complex,  and
dependant  upon  the  positioning  of  a  criminal  organisation  in  relation  to  other  criminal
groups, as well as the state and non-criminal groups in society. Vadim Volkov draws a useful
distinction here between “bandits” who provide services outside the bounds of the law and
“thieves”  whose  relationship  to  society  is  strictly  parasitical.65 Volkov's  argument,  which
relates to Russian organised criminals during and immediately after the fall  of  the USSR,
serves here to describe the way in which violent, non-state groups operating where the state
does not have a monopoly on violence can serve as “violence-managing agencies,”66 whose
activities construct an alternate form of social organisation where the state does not wield
sufficient power – a process similar in some respects to Weberian state formation.67 Misha
Glenny  seconds  this  description  and  provides  a  memorable  description  of  the  criminals:
portraying the Russian Mafiya as the “midwives of  capitalism.”68  In this  way, we see that
criminals – even though they may be acting out of pure self-interest – are not chaotic actors;
instead, their actions are part of a larger network of relationships. This brings us back to Blok,
and reinforces his argument that violence for violence's sake – pure sociopathy – is sorely
lacking as an explanation for persistent conflict and instability. 
Still, beyond the characteristics already applied to the concept of violent crime, there are two
further relevant considerations that we need to examine – the concept of “organised crime”
and the concept of “transnational crime,” both of which are germane to the case study. The
simplest definition of “organised crime” is, essentially, any crime carried out by a conspiracy
of  two  or  more people.  This  is  not  a  particularly  useful  definition,  however,  as  it  covers
everything from the smallest of criminal cooperatives with the lowliest of goals to the most
complex, sophisticated criminal conspiracies. At this base level, defining crime as 'organised'
serves mainly to distinguish crimes committed by individuals acting on their own behalf from
65
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crimes  committed  on  behalf  of  a  larger  organisation  or  purpose.  This  distinction  was
extrapolated by Mancur Olson, who uses the analogy of “stationary” and “mobile” bandits to
explore the origins of coercive power. Olson writes:
“The typical individual thief in a society of, say, a million people, bears about one-millionth of
the loss to society that occurs because his crime makes society's output less than it would
otherwise be. Yet he alone normally bears the whole loss of whatever opportunities for theft
he passes up. Therefore, the gain to criminals from a wealthier society and the reduction in
that society's wealth due to crime do not keep crime from paying... Now let us contrast the
individual  criminal  in  a  populous  community  with  the  head  of  a  Mafia  family  or  other
criminal gang that can monopolize crime in a neighbourhood. Suppose that in some well-
defined turf,  a  criminal  gang cannot  only steal  more or less as it  pleases but can prevent
anyone else from committing crime there. Obviously the Mafia family has an incentive to keep
other thieves out of its own domain. But will it gain from taking all that it can on its own
ground? Definitely not. If business in this domain is made unprofitable by theft, or migration
away  from  the  neighbourhood  is  prompted  by  crime,  then  the  neighbourhood  will  not
generate as much income and there will not be as much to steal. Indeed, the Mafia family with
a true and continuing monopoly on crime in a neighbourhood will not commit any robberies
at all.”69
Olson's point here is that the behaviour of groups of criminals changes dramatically as the
level  of  organisation  increases  –  and,  more  specifically,  as  criminal  groups  have  more
investment  in  the  territories  in  which  they  operate.  He  refers  to  this  dynamic  using  the
“stationary bandit analogy,” in which a mobile bandit stands to gain the most from taking
100% of what it is possible to take before moving on to new targets, whereas a criminal or
group of criminals who conduct their activities within the same community can increase the
amount of profit they accumulate over time by relying on less aggressively coercive methods
and taking less  than 100% of  possible  loot  – in  other words,  by  establishing a system of
taxation.70 A mobile bandit – whether an individual or a small group – can make a living, for a
time, based on violently appropriating 100% of lootable goods, but this necessitates a high
degree of mobility in order to avoid reprisals from the state or more powerful interests; the
same limitation also applies to the amount of time a mobile bandit can expect to utilise the
same strategy successfully. In the long term, given the various hard limitations on mobility
and the inherent  dangers  of  such  an approach,  this  is  neither  sustainable  nor  maximally
profitable.
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Once a  group has  established itself  as  a  “stationary bandit”  with interests  in  a  particular
community (broadly speaking), it can undergo a further evolution. Max Manwaring describes
this development from simple to complex criminal organisations as a process of evolution
through  three  generations.  First-generation  gangs  are  small,  generally  preoccupied  with
territory  (or  “turf”),  limited  in  their  activities  to  variations  upon  “protectionism  and
gangsterism” and limited in the extent to which they can apply violence against rivals or the
state. Most gangs never move past this stage. If, however, a gang manages to develop into the
second generation, it spreads itself across a larger geographic area, solidifies an organisational
structure and diversifies its activities. Second-generation gangs tend to be more capable of
violence, but this capability is usually more directed at rivals than at the state. Finally, third-
generation  gangs  are  spread  across  borders  and  have  a  widely  diversified  “portfolio”  of
economic activities, many of which may be legitimate, or at least serve a legitimising function.
Most  importantly,  their  capability  to  do  violence  is  exponentially  improved  over  their
predecessors, to the point where they are institutionally capable of employing violence against
the state in defence of their economic interests.71
Clearly, the capacity of an organisation (particularly a highly evolved organisation) to commit
violence  is  far  greater  than  the  capacity  of  an  individual,  thanks  not  only  to  its  greater
numerical  strength  but  to  the  possibilities  inherent  in  specialisation.  Large  criminal
organisations can afford to have some members who are specialists  in committing acts of
violence,  which  frees  other  members  of  the  organisation  to  focus  on  other  aspects  of
management and profit-making.72 Yet what constitutes “organised crime” rather than groups
of cooperative bandits remains disputed. As Adam Edwards and Michael Levi write, “Despite
the constant use of the term 'organised crime' in media, political and policing spheres around
the  globe,  the  overwhelming  consensus  within  the  criminological  literature  and  among
contemporary police... is that networks are very important and are more appropriately refined
71
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than 'organised crime' as a dynamic depiction of how criminals operate.”73 They go on to list
three common uses of the term: 
“1) As a way of describing the structure and/or everyday workings of the market as a whole, in
the sense that the market can be regarded as a complex social network (singular noun), within
which different participants have to network (verb) (to carefully seek out and interact with
traffickers who may be like or unlike themselves, etc.: see for example Coles, 2001, Pearson
and  Hobbs,  2001).  In  other  words,  through networking,  traffickers  [and other  offenders]
construct the market. 2) As a way of describing drug markets as made up of independent
small  groups  or  individuals,  sometimes  called  ‘disorganized  crime’,  sometimes  simply
‘networks’  (plural).  Doubt  is  cast  upon  the  existence  of  larger  and/or  ‘harder’  criminal
organizations  operating  in  the  UK  or  other  European  contexts  [outside  of  Italy],  partly
because it is posited that law enforcement agencies break up larger groups.... In other words,
in European drug trafficking [and many other offences], ‘small is beautiful.’ 3) As a way of
referring to the durability or otherwise of criminals’ organisational and other arrangements,
when these are seen as ever-changing....In other words, impermanence is the name of the
game. (This approach often co-exists with number (2) earlier, although they are analytically
separable.)”74
The idea of organised crime as a 'network' (number 1, above) is particularly useful for the
purposes of this study. Traditional depictions of organised crime groups as straightforwardly
hierarchical  organisations,  both  in  academic  and  public  policy  literature75 and  in  more
informal cultural settings (eg. the relatively traditional hierarchy embedded in the Corleone
family  in  The Godfather),  limit  our  understanding  of  what  this  phenomenon is  and how
complicated and parasitical its relationship with the rest of society is. Michael Kenney argues
at length in From Pablo to Osama that criminal organisations (in his example, contemporary
Colombian drug cartels) are much less hierarchical than generally thought and form instead a
“flattened”  network,  which is  better  suited  to  its  environment  than a  hierarchy.  Criminal
networks, in Kenney's conception, exhibit naturalistic organisational learning and are more
resilient in that they are far less vulnerable to the “decapitation” strategy of the type that
destroyed their predecessors,  the Cali and Medellín cartels.76 Such networks, on the other
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hand, often find it more difficult to coordinate complex offensives or engage in other very
specific forms of strategic behaviour. But when the objective of such a group is general, rather
than specific – for example,  to carry out a series of economic exchanges outside the legitimate
economy – an organised crime network is capable of success on its own terms.
Transnationality is  the  final  dimension  of  criminality  that  needs  to  be  addressed  here.
Traditionally,  crime has been viewed as a failure  to adhere to the domestic  norms of  the
country in which the activity in question takes place, but this has been changing in the last few
decades as economic activity becomes increasingly globalised. Relatively popular works such
as  Misha  Glenny's  McMafia and Moises  Naím's  Illicit have  popularised  the  idea  that  the
'growth sector'  in criminality is flows of persons and goods (both grey- and black-market)
across international boundaries.77 Moreover,  the idea of transnational crime as a national
security threat has gained substantial traction in policy circles over the last two decades.78
Indeed, the existence of offices such as the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
indicates  the  seriousness  with  which  transnational  criminal  organisations  are  taken  by
contemporary policymakers  (and,  importantly,  the centrality  of  drug trafficking to official
perceptions of dangerous trans-border crime). 
This dimension is particularly important given the varying levels of control that states have
over their own territories.  It is  more difficult to cultivate large quantities of  marijuana or
opium, for  example,  in a small  country with a strong government and security services  –
Britain, for example – than it is to do so in a large country with a weak government and less
capacity to disrupt those operations, such as Afghanistan or Colombia. Yet the comparatively
wealthy residents of Britain are able to spend substantially more money on narcotics than
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Afghans or Colombians, which creates a powerful  incentive  for  a criminal organisation to
maintain  operations  on  both  sides  –  and  more  importantly,  to  have  separate  types  of
organisation on both sides, since the utility of violence is much higher on the production and
trafficking side than on the distribution side.79 Nikos Passas refers to this discontinuity as
“criminogenic asymmetry,”80 which operates within a global system he refers to as “anomie
and dysnomie.” In these linked conceptions, contemporary globalised crime has been shaped
by the end of the Cold War and the spread of neoliberalism as the sole major socio-economic
model for global governance. Moreover, transnational crime is itself a product of that model:
“... it would be erroneous to argue that stereotypical organized criminals are giving capitalism
a bad name and undermining neoliberal  policies.  The implication is  that,  were we to rid
ourselves of some very bad apples, everything would be fine. Rather, it appears that serious
organizational misconduct is a consequence of such policies.”81 Contemporary transnational
crime can therefore be understood as a variation on contemporary transnational capitalism,
except one in which organisations cannot rely on an external body to enforce their contracts
and must therefore engage in either explicit or implicit violence in order to safeguard their
mechanisms of profit. By the same token, criminal groups do not generally operate within
completely ungoverned spaces, but in regions where more legitimate authorities have at least
some  sway.  As  with  the  case  of  the  mobile  and  stationary  bandits,  criminal  groups  are
presented with a strategic choice based on this factor: they can make some profit by directly
confronting states (generally by violently carving out ungoverned spaces in order to make
room for activities frowned upon by the authorities), or they can pursue the potentially more
profitable option of finding some accommodation with the state, either by bribing and co-
opting  officials  or  by  maintaining  a  low  enough  profile  to  avoid  repercussions.  Both
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alternatives  generally  involve  minimal  violence,  or  at  least  minimal  violence  that  directly
challenges the authority of the state.
Globalisation  adds  some  complication  to  this  picture.  Given  the  unequal  distribution  of
government authority, and the transnational demand for criminal products, from narcotics to
pirated software to human beings,  criminal  organisations are  incentivised to spread their
operations beyond established borders.  
Crime, therefore, is a useful model for understanding the dynamics of profit-making activity
outside the legitimate economy. The profit motive inherent in criminality is also helpful for
understanding  the  limitations  that  criminal  groups  operate  under  –  as  opposed  to
ideologically  or  politically  motivated  violent  actors,  criminals  operating  in  a  state  that
maintains at least some authority are incentivised to manage their use of violence rather than
using it randomly and haphazardly. However, as a result, it does not do a particularly good job
of explaining violence driven by transborder networks, or violence of a persistent and intense
nature,  as  seen  in  Mexico.  We  must  therefore  extend  our  enquiry  into  another  form  of
organised violence better suited to those conditions: war.
IV. War
The precise meaning of the word war has always been a contentious debate in international
relations and conflict studies, but the debate has been particularly vigorous in the post-Cold
War era, with its proliferation of irregular conflicts and dearth of conventional state-on-state
wars. In the Western world, at least, much of this long-standing debate can be traced back to
the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, in whose widely-cited words war was “not merely
a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a
carrying out of the same by other means."82 Of equal importance to this discussion, Clausewitz
believed that war entailed a certain symmetry:83 “[W]ar is always the shock of two hostile
82
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bodies in collision,  not  the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass,  because an
absolute state of endurance would not be making War; therefore, what we have just said as to
the aim of action in War applies to both parties.”84 Here, we see the roots of the difference
between violent crime and war. Given the presence of organised, violent crime in even the
most powerful industrialised nations, the “action of power against inanimate mass” seems a
more apt description for attempts to control persistent forms of violence than a clash between
two relatively equal opponents,  each with some kind of central organising principle,  as in
conventional warfare. 
Of course, as previously mentioned, contemporary wars are frequently neither conventional
nor  symmetrical.  While  there  is  some dispute  as  to  the  precise  nature  and  cause  of  this
change, most argue it is the combination of the level of devastation incurred by WWII and the
potential for even greater destruction if nuclear weapons were used on a large scale.85 Indeed,
conventional war is now at a historic low ebb.86 Unconventional wars, on the other hand, have
remained  common.  Yet  these  conflicts  frequently  challenge  Clausewitz's  conception  of
warfare. As Herfried Münkler points out, the 'new wars' that have arisen since the end of the
Cold  War  are  inherently  asymmetrical:  “Whereas  symmetrical  wars  tend  to  result  in  a
symmetrical  distribution  of  costs  between  the  belligerents  –  so  that  the  incentive  to
economise by avoiding war  is  the same for  both sides  – this  is  precisely not  the case  in
asymmetrical  wars.”87 As  we  have  already  seen,  the  costs  and  economic  motivations  are
thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to 
the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret 
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.” (Hobbes, 
1651, ch. XIII). Hobbes elaborates that this equality of potential violence leads to diffidence, or a 
sense of insecurity, from which arises the desire to make war out of self-protection. 
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fundamentally different between banditry and more sophisticated forms of crime – let alone
between criminals and the state. This dynamic is particularly strong in unconventional wars. 88
Furthermore, although Clausewitz broadly addressed the question of "small  wars,"  he was
primarily concerned with the kind of conflict  that turned on a decisive battle;  to him, all
aspects of war turned on the outcome of such battles.89 Needless to say, this sort of decisive
action is  somewhere between  extremely  difficult  and impossible  to  replicate  in  efforts  to
control criminality. In recent history, a few criminal organisations have grown to a size where
a  decisive  battle  or  some  close  analogue  is  possible;  one  good  example  would  be  the
US/Colombian “decapitation” strategy against the Cali and Medellín cartels in Colombia in
the early 1990s. But even this victory was dependent upon very specific circumstances and a
particular type of cartel organisation. In addition, it had little impact on the actual flow of
cocaine  from  Colombia  to  the  US;  instead,  it  drove  Colombian  traffickers  to  adopt  less
centralised  network  forms  of  organisation  that  were  less  vulnerable  to  decapitation
operations.90 While  these  decentralised  networks  are  less  capable  of  achieving  complex
strategic  or  political  goals,91 they  demonstrated  in  this  instance  that  they  are  ideal  for
maintaining a challenge to the state by means of providing illegal services, both drugs and
violence.  In this  sense,  true organised criminal  networks are not  definitionally  capable  of
taking part in Clausewitzian warfare, as they lack both the ability to engage in decisive battle
and the interest or organisational structure to take part in politics as part of the trinitarian
relationship between state, military and populace.
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But there is another strain of thought, which holds the traditional conception of politics as
something practiced by states alone needs to be updated to take into account the growing
power of non-state actors, particularly in regions where the power of the state is less than
absolute  (as  it  is  in  regions  where  large-scale  drug  production  takes  place).  Isabelle
Duyvesteyn  has  argued  that  the  Clausewitzian  conception  of  politics  continued  through
violence can be scaled down to include irregular wars inside states, using the hypothesis that
“...actors involved in armed conflict in which the state structures have collapsed are political
actors.”92 This  argument,  much like  the argument about  violence explained earlier  in this
chapter,  holds that politics  is  an inherently  scalable concept  – that  the politics  that exist
between ephemeral, less-organised groups that take part in such violence are real and exist in
the  service  of  political  objectives,  even  if  those  are  not  objectives  common to  a  state,  or
common to an organisation that has state-like interests.  
David Keen gives us a more useful framework for describing the kind of low-level fighting
predominant since the end of the Cold War. He refers to conflicts of this type not as wars, but
as "complex emergencies," which he describes as "alternative means of profit, power and even
protection."93  The lack of a discrete political objective – such as an overt military victory or
takeover of the apparatus of government – is, in this view, not just an incidental feature of
these  conflicts  but  a  central  characteristic:  they  last  many  years  precisely  because  their
participants benefit from prolonging them indefinitely.94 As Münkler points out, not only is
the historical trend of conventional warfare one of indefinitely increasing expense, but the
combination  of  low-cost  unconventional  war  with  a  globally-linked  “open  war  economy”
allows for the sustenance of war over decades, without any clear victor or resolution.95 
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To this end, Robert Mandel defines victory in two parts: war winning and peace winning, the
former occurring “when a state attempts to bring a war to a successful military conclusion,
affecting the mode of battle in terms of how one fights and whether one continues or ceases to
fight,” and the latter occurring “when a state attempts to reap the payoffs of war, affecting the
mode of postcombat activities in terms of how one manages the transition afterwards and
whether  one  stays  in  or  leaves  the area in  which the fighting occurred.”96 Such a  split  is
important in contemporary warfare, since frequently at least one of the opposing sides does
not have a centralised command structure that can concede defeat and agree to the victor's
terms. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the contrast between the speed and success of the
U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent descent into insurgency and civil war, even a war
won  rapidly  and  overwhelmingly  can  be  a  strategic  defeat  if  it  is  not  followed  by  a
comprehensive victory over the peace.97 States, generally speaking, do not benefit from the
continuation of conflict as in a complex emergency – at least not when it occurs on their own
territory, or that of their allies, but the benefits of continuing violence are much clearer for
non-state actors – a phenomenon explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
None of this is to say that the concept of “war,” writ large, is no longer a useful framework for
understanding violent conflict. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, there have been a (relatively
small) number of wars that both started and ended conventionally in recent history; Russia's
war  with  Georgia  in  2008 and the first  Gulf  War  being perhaps  the  strongest  examples.
Moreover,  in  the  same time period  there  have  been  a  number  of  wars  that  have  largely
adhered to the classic  insurgency/guerrilla  warfare  paradigm, such as  the insurgencies  in
Colombia and Sri Lanka, both of which ebbed and flowed throughout the 1990s and 2000s
before declining significantly – if not permanently – around the beginning of the 2010s. But
the groups that participated in these wars – state militaries  and ideological  or  religiously
oriented insurgent movements – tend to have an overarching strategy leading to victory, or at
96
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least  a  desired  end  state,  no  matter  how  improbable.98 In  contrast,  the  idea  of  complex
emergencies – a system whose sustenance provides benefit for actors within, even if those
actors are not intentionally sustaining it, points to a more useful model for understanding
organised violence as somewhere in between crime and war. 
That said, a critically important distinction must be drawn here between two conceptions of
“war.”  Proponents  of  the  anarchic  violence  thesis  seem  to  be  using  the  term  to  refer  to
violence that has met a certain threshold – to  mark a certain condition or set of conditions as
particularly  serious.  In  this  conception,  war  does  not  necessarily  have  an  overt  political
component, but it does not need one: the trappings of “war” are sufficient, whether those are a
certain quantitative level of violence, an ineffable quality to the brutality, or even the simple
fact of militarisation (eg. the presence of armed soldiers, or heavily-armed police officers, on
civilian streets) can make a “state of war.” While this conception has a certain emotional truth
to it, it is of limited analytical value. To be meaningful analytically, we must draw a distinction
between conflicts that simply have what might be termed the optics of war, and those which
meet a more specific definition of war.
This brings us back to the question of the nomenclature of unconventional violent conflicts.
The most straightforward categorisation in that regard is probably Mary Kaldor, who simply
calls these conflicts “new wars.”99 Kaldor argues that the dominant form of warfare in the
post-Cold War era has been internal violence in poor and failed states, which often entails a
combination  of  large-scale  human  rights  violations  and  the  creation  of  a  criminalised
economy. Martin van Creveld, under the heading of “non-trinitarian warfare,” takes the same
basic concept and elaborates it using explicitly Clausewitzian terms. According to van Creveld,
the “new wars” are different from the old because they do not require a unity of  purpose
98
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between  the  “remarkable  trinity”  of  state,  people  and  military.  Coupled  with  the  “force
multiplier” effect of modern technology (particularly modern small arms and communications
gear) and the corresponding ability of  small  armed groups to do vastly more damage per
capita than in any previous era, the proliferation of this type of warfare, in van Creveld's view,
indicates that the (post-Westphalian) era in which states are indisputably the most powerful
international  actors  is  coming  to  an  end,  to  be  replaced  with  new  forms  of  social
organisation.100101
Other  thinkers  have  focused  on  the  organisational  aspect  of  the  non-state  actors  around
whom this entire conceit is based. The traditional view of war, outlined above, is that it is a
process, a means by which actors achieve their desired goals using violence. The alternative,
to borrow a description from Robert Bunker, is the school of “Future Warfare Studies,”102
which holds that warfare is an evolutionary process, and that its modern iteration leverages
technological developments to allow for entirely new forms of organisation, decision-making
and tactical adaptation. In other words, the concept of 'future warfare,'  broadly construed,
considers armed non-state actors not primarily as political actors with political objectives, but
as agents in a violent market seeking to maximise profit through technological and tactical
innovation,  including  frequently  shifting  patterns  of  alliances  and  connections  and  a
willingness to experiment at all operational levels. This is a fundamentally different model of
violent group behaviour because it emphasises the linkages between such groups and sees
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their actions as taking place in a network of similar groups, rather than simply arraying the
interests of such a group against the interests of a state. Traditional conceptions of war tend to
focus on two opposed groups with contradictory interests; as useful as this model can be in a
conflict with exactly two sides, it becomes less and less useful as the number of individual
participatory  groups  increases  beyond  two.  In  a  complex  conflict  with  some  dozens  of
individual combatant groups, alliances and tactical cooperation of varying depths and lengths
become necessary for all participants. In order to map out such a conflict, we must turn to the
study of complex networks.
These theories of  future warfare owe a large debt  to Manuel  Castells,  whose work helped
create a model of society based on a complex set of interrelationships between individuals and
groups.103 Instead of unitary bodies with specific interests, this model understands society as a
series of connected “nodes,” and bases the study of behaviours on the relationship between
the individuals and groups which comprise those nodes.  In  The Network Society,  Castells
writes, “Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of
networking  logic  substantially  modifies  the  operation  and  outcomes  in  processes  of
production, experience, power and culture. While the networking form of social organization
has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the
material basis its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure. Furthermore, I
would argue that this networking logic induces a social determination of a higher level than
that of the specific social interests expressed through the networks: the power of flows takes
precedence over the flows of power.”104 [Italics added.] In other words, the prevalence of
modern networking technology – the Internet,  mass media  communications,  rapid travel,
global trade – have fundamentally altered the form of society, and made it dependent upon
the ability of groups to form alliances of convenience based on mutual utility rather than old
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forms of social, geographic, cultural or religious affinity. In the contemporary world, Castells
tells  us,  the  power  lies  with  the  ability  to  form  ties  between  groups  and  create  such
alliances.105 
Castells,  however,  largely  based  his  theory  on  legitimate  economic,  political  and  cultural
flows. The armed form of the network society is based the work of John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt,  who use network  theory  to  draw similar  conclusions  to Castells  with  regard  to
warfare, rather than to economic and cultural issues. They argue that violent actors need not
form hierarchical  structures modelled vaguely  after  state military or political  organs,  with
strategic direction coming from a small top echelon, tactical directives coming from a larger
middle echelon and operational actions carried out by the bottom rungs. Instead, a violent
group taking part in netwar might organise itself according to one of three basic models: 1) the
chain network, in which each node communicates with one directly before and directly after
it, and has no other communications elsewhere in the network; 2) the hub/star network, in
which  different  nodes  (which  might  represent  different  specialised  groups  –  money
laundering, for instance, or security) are connected through a small number of central nodes;
or 3) the all-channel network, in which every individual actor is able to communicate with
every  other  within  the  network.106 These  archetypes  are  not  entirely  formal,  and  can  be
modified on an ad-hoc basis, but they demonstrate the ways in which a violent non-state actor
can  organise  itself  without  becoming  reliant  upon  the  strategic  direction  and  knowledge
embodied in one vulnerable leader. Of course, all of these basic models have their individual
weaknesses – the chain network, typical of smuggling networks, is vulnerable to disruption
along  any  point  of  the  pathway;  the  hub  network  is  vulnerable  at  the  central  point  of
communication, and the all-channel network can be destroyed from the inside, since every
member is able to provide information about every other member. But allowing for greater
individual  autonomy,  particularly  by  using  an  all-channel  form  of  organisation,  allows
members  of  a  group  to  adapt  to  local  conditions  and  provide  testing  under  operational
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conditions of new tactics and technologies much faster than a centralised bureaucracy can
learn and innovate – in other words, the process allows for a much faster Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act (OODA) loop than a traditional hierarchical model.107
The metaphor of a network is useful for explaining the process and organisational logic of
violent non-state actors, but it lacks explicatory power with regard to the broader dynamics of
conflict. One of the commonalities between general network theorists like Castells and more
conflict-inclined  researchers  like  Arquilla  and  Ronfeldt  is  their  relative  agnosticism  with
regards to the purpose of networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue, toward the end of Networks
and Netwars,108 that organisational models used successfully by criminal, militia and terrorist
groups can also be used with success by legitimate groups operating in the civil society sphere.
The concept of a network is a useful counter to the misconception of a violent non-state group
as, essentially, a mirror-image of a state's hierarchical military or police force; but it does not
in and of itself represent a change in the nature of warfare. The idea that there is something
fundamentally different  about the  organisational structure,  and therefore the  capabilities
and  weaknesses  of the non-state actors in 'new wars' has led to a strain of thought which
argues  that  contemporary  modes  of  communication  and  organisation  have  led  to  a
fundamental shift in what war means, generally known as fourth generation warfare, or 4GW,
theory. (Interestingly, these commandments coincide to some degree with Sun Tzu's notions
of the ideal strategy, in which “to fight and conquer all your battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.”109) In sum,
4GW  theory  holds  that  the  irregular  organised  violence  –  everything  from  relatively
straightforward  political  insurgency  to  violence  for  nonpolitical  causes  –  can  be  grouped
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together based on tactics. In other words, it holds that the questions of “who is fighting” and
“why are they fighting” are independent from the question of “how are they fighting.”110 
The difference between war and crime is therefore in part a qualitative one, as the objectives
of those engaged in profit-minded criminal violence cannot be met with maximal violence,
whereas  no  such  limitation  applies  in  war.  But  there  is  no  absolutely  reliable  metric  to
differentiate war from other incidences of  organised violence – the conflicts  in which the
greatest number of people have died have not always been subjected to the most academic or
media  scrutiny.111 Because  of  this  lack  of  metrics  to  adequately  describe  and understand
conflicts that fall in between clear, definable models of war and crime, we must examine the
role of metaphor and language in security policy.
V.  Terror, crime and the metaphor of war
The optics of war could be said to be accompanied by the soundbites of war. Describing a
conflict, struggle or campaign as a “war” has a number of virtues as a rhetorical strategy: it
implies a sense of moral clarity, of national unity or simply of purpose. American presidents
in  particular  have  historically  deployed this  metaphor  to a  variety  of  ends not  related to
violence; Lyndon Johnson called for a “war against poverty,” for example, which did not entail
the deployment of the U.S. Army into inner cities to distribute aid to the homeless. Similar
declarations of war on inanimate or inhuman subjects – cancer, AIDS, climate change – may
indeed be problematic  from a critical  perspective  in  that  they can militarise  non-military
problems. But the purpose of the critique here is more limited: to examine the use of “war” as
a metaphor for combating irregular violence. In that context, there are two significant and
ongoing examples: the war on drugs, as declared by Richard Nixon in 1971; and the war on
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terror,  as declared by George W. Bush in 2001.  There are  significant similarities between
these two constructions, particularly in their vagueness, their openness to interpretation and
their  lack  of  a  clearly  construed  enemy.  But  there  are  also  significant  differences,  which
demonstrate the difficulties inherent in using the metaphor of war to encapsulate complex
conflicts with a combination of domestic and foreign elements. This admixture of foreign and
domestic  elements,  which  Bayliss  Manning  described  with  the  term  “intermestic,”112 has
increasingly  dominated  contemporary  policymaking,  as  security  problems  increasingly
involve a mix of domestic and foreign policy issues. But even as security threats have become
globalised,  and governments  have  moved toward a  risk-management  approach to contain
them, the rhetorical usage of war has not kept pace. The wars on terror and drugs have many
differences, but the mismatch between the rhetorical ambition inherent in the terminology
and  their  policy  outcomes  demonstrates  the  need  for  a  more  sophisticated  means  of
communicating a typology of organised violence.
First,  it  is  important  to note that  American policymakers have explicitly  linked these two
“wars” in the past. Public service announcements designed to leverage the relative popularity
anti-terrorism to boost the fortunes of the war on drugs have made the most explicit public
linkage between the two. One such campaign warned potential drug users that money spent
on the illicit goods would find its way into the pockets of terrorist groups.113 While there is
some evidence114 that terrorists have used drug profits to support their activities, and while
some  organisations  such  as  the  Taliban  have  been  linked  to  both  terrorism  and  drug
trafficking,  the linkage is  not  particularly strong. As  discussed previously,  drug traffickers
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operating in ordinary criminal contexts prefer to limit the scope and scale of their violence
where possible in order to mitigate their risks from the authorities. Fighting against the more
numerous,  better-armed,  better-trained  forces  of  the  state,  after  all,  is  not  generally  a
profitable  enterprise.  Terrorists,  on the other hand,  have to compensate  for  their  relative
weakness by attracting as much attention as possible to their strikes. Fundamentally, there is
a difference between terrorism and drug trafficking violence, with the former being offensive
and expressive  and the latter  using more  defensive  and instrumental.  The relationship is
therefore one-sided:  terrorist  groups may profit  from drug trafficking,  but it  is  not in the
interest of established drug trafficking groups to cooperate with terrorists.
But it is at the metaphorical level where the comparison between the war on terror and the
war  on  drugs  is  both  more  important  and  more  insidious.  American  drug  war  strategy
documents are littered with references to “narco-terrorists” and “narco-terrorism.”115 While
some of this language refers to the use by drug gangs of specific tactics normally associated
with terrorists, it largely indicates a convenient conflation of two very different phenomena.
As Phil Williams notes, the fact that the meaning of “narco-terrorism” has largely shifted from
the use of terrorist tactics by DTOs to the use of drug trafficking as a source of revenue for
ideological  terrorists  demonstrates its unhelpfulness as a categorisation.116 In any case,  as
enemies, drugs and terrorism are not really comparable. One is a banned, inanimate resource,
while the other is a tactic used by groups that lack the ability to confront the state in more
orthodox fashion. As Philip Bobbitt points out, these two also differ in the sense that drugs do
not have a constituency117 – or at least, their constituency is unwilling to make itself publicly
known, or to take action to defend the trade. Terrorists, on the other hand, do generally have
constituencies – they have specific political  objectives, and even if they do not necessarily
represent  a religious,  ethnic  or  cultural  group,  there  are usually groups of  those varieties
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whose interests align with theirs.  This of course assumes that terrorists are rational actors
with political, religious or cultural goals but methods beyond the scope of normal politics – an
assertion which is fairly broadly accepted.118119 Finally, terrorism as a tactic relies on fear to
induce either direct compliance or oblique compliance via compelling an official overreaction.
By contrast, drug trafficking depends on the user's desire for narcotics to make a profit. Fear
and violence can be used instrumentally to support the goal of profit-making, but neither are
essential to its character. 
Despite  the  fundamental  differences  between  the  drug-linked violence  and  terrorism,  the
universalisation of prohibition and the coterminous militarisation of language and policy has
created a system in which states frequently respond to both using the same tactics. Both have
also suffered from “mission creep.”120 The Bush Administration's “Global War on Terror” may
have started as a rhetorically punchy shorthand for a war against a particular band of Islamic
extremists who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, but the justification has subsequent expanded to
cover counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the creation of a vast
new  security  bureaucracy.  While  the  Obama  Administration  has  been  somewhat  less
rhetorically  aggressive  than its  predecessor,  replacing  the Global  War  on Terror  with the
much more  anodyne  “Overseas  Contingency  Operations,”  the execution has  been broadly
similar, justifying a range of covert military actions against targets across Central Asia, the
Middle East and Africa. Similarly,  the war on drugs, which started as a demand-reduction
programme  for  drugs  and  has  come  to  encompass  both  vastly  more  aggressive  domestic
enforcement and involvement in foreign conflicts driven, or at least sustained by, the drugs
trade.  To  refer  to  the  wars  on  drugs  and  terror  as  “metaphors”  is  not  to  diminish  the
significance of the conflicts; it is instead to explain how language affects policy and drives it
out of sync with the problem that policy at hand, and can lead to unnecessary escalation. In
reference to the war on terror, Michael Howard writes:
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“The threat of terrorist protest thus accompanies the development of our global society
like an inescapable shadow, and is likely to remain a major social problem as far forward
as we can foresee... It is a combination that presents a formidable challenge to the stability
of the entire world order. But there is no point in ‘declaring war’ on it, let alone adopting
the apocalyptic  language of religious  extremists  who stigmatise  their  opponents  as  the
embodiment of evil... This is not a mere matter of semantics. There is no harm in speaking
of wars against poverty, or crime, or disease. These are mere metaphors: they do not give a
license to kill.  But in the world of international politics ‘war’ has a specific meaning. It
means quite specifically the abandonment of civil restraints and the legitimisation of the
use of whatever force is necessary to achieve one’s objectives. Restraints inherent in the
culture of  the belligerent societies may be observed in the conduct  of  war – restraints
recently described by one American attorney general as ‘quaint’ – but they will be very
quickly abandoned under duress. The leaders of nations at war have always considered
themselves entitled, if all else fails, to use any means to defeat their adversary and avoid
defeat  themselves, whether  it  be the torture  of  individuals or  the destruction of  entire
cities, and they will usually enjoy massive popular support when they do so. Let us be clear
about it. To ‘declare war’ is formally to espouse a set of values and to legitimise activities
normally outlawed in civil society.”121
In one sense, this is a helpful understanding of the war on drugs, as well: the “'threat that
accompanies the development of our global society like an inescapable shadow” could also
describe the prevalence of illegal narcotics, and the inability of governments in a globalised
world to shut themselves off from them without also shutting off other essential trade. No
matter how much money is spent to counter them or how aggressive state counter-narcotics
policies are, drugs have proven to be incredibly resilient and survivable – the basic facts of
drug availability and use have not substantially shifted over 40 years of 'war.'122 
However, there is a critical distinction between the wars on terror and drugs, which Howard's
point obscures. Unlike disease or poverty, the individuals in terrorist and drug trafficking
groups have agency, so war can be made against them, at least in a tactical sense. But their
objectives  are  vastly  different.  Individuals  and groups choose to use terrorism as  a  tactic
against  enemies  from  whom  they  seek  some  concession;  as  Louise  Richardson  has
demonstrated,  they  are  rational  (if  not  necessarily  rationally  self-interested)  rather  than
agents of chaos or forces of nature. The goals of terrorist organisations may be unattainable
(for  instance,  al  Qaeda's  stated  goal  of  killing  4  million  Americans  and  resurrecting  the
Islamic Caliphate), but as they use directed violence with the intent of compelling others to do
121
  Howard, 2008, p. 254
122
  Bertram, 1996, pp. 266-7.
54
their will, their actions could be construed as acts of unconventional war.123  Drug traffickers
have  an  entirely  different  relationship  with  violence,  and  it  is  here  where  we  find  a
fundamental difference between them and terrorists. Since the drug trafficker's profitability
depends on the maintenance of a complex, underground system of production, transportation
and distribution, the maintenance of some form of order is necessary; violence directed at the
state is often counterproductive to this goal. 
Individual  terrorists  and drug traffickers  can gain notoriety and even transient  victory  by
challenging states aggressively and assertively, but the otherwise divergent examples of Pablo
Escobar and Osama bin Laden demonstrate the risks of such a strategy. Even a weak and/or
distracted state will respond more aggressively to a direct challenge to its authority, and the
individuals most responsible make themselves targets for the state's  violence by doing so.
Importantly,  though,  neither  war  was  ended  with  the  death  of  its  principal  antagonist:
whatever the immediate effects, the killing of Escobar did not change the fundamentals of the
Colombian cocaine trade any more than the killing of bin Laden erased the threat of mass-
casualty terrorism. In this, we see the weakness of using the metaphor of war to describe
unconventional forms of violence: the removal of participants does not necessarily alter the
structure of the conflict. 
Therefore, in order to have any descriptive power, the war metaphor as used in these cases
must be understood as a combination of violence directed at specific discrete targets (persons
and groups) and a more general effort to change an underlying condition: namely, society's
susceptibility  to  terrorism  and  drugs,  respectively.  This  condition  was  made  explicit  by
Richard Nixon, who in his original drug war statement, claimed that “[t]he final issue is not
whether we will conquer drug abuse, but how soon.”124 More modern drug war proponents
often espouse similar views: the world's leading anti-drug NGO, the World Federation Against
Drugs,  which  is  endorsed  by  both  the  UNODC  and  the  American  counter-narcotics
authorities, adheres to a constitution that calls for an uncompromising end to the use of all
123
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varieties  of  drugs  worldwide.125 Yet  such  efforts  often  pave  the  way  toward  an
oversimplification  and  over-reliance  on  military  methods:  President  Ronald  Reagan
announced in 1982 that his administration was “hauling down the surrender flag and running
up the battle standard,”126 indicating that all aspects of the government's response would be
hardened – more jail time for offenders, more aggressive domestic law enforcement and more
military aid to overseas governments fighting drug-backed insurgencies. This set the tone for
the subsequent three decades of American counter-narcotics policies, as we will see in the
coming chapters. Here, the war on terror is distinguished only by the fact that it was explicitly
launched  as  an  intermestic  campaign  of  domestic  counterterrorism  and  foreign  military
operations, rather than evolving into a militarised campaign over time.
Despite the differences between the construction of the war on terror and the war on drugs, in
both cases, it is clear that war is a problematic metaphor for complex intermestic forms of
violence. Nevertheless, its continued use points to both a failure of political imagination and a
lack of a better vocabulary to describe organised violence outside traditional conceptions. 
VI. Conclusion
There  are  significant  gaps  in  the  policy/theoretical  nexus  in  terms  of  categorising  and
describing organised violence. There are clear archetypes of crime and war that respectively
cover small-scale violence carried out for economic purposes and large-scale violence carried
out toward political or social ends. But in a world defined by global economic and cultural
linkages  and  the  attendant  risk-management  approach  of  governments  and  international
organisations,  many  conflicts  and security  issues fall  into  a  contentious category between
those archetypes. Social scientists have not agreed on a common set of terms or definitions for
these  “intermediate”  conflicts,  and  lacking  any  other  framework,  policymakers  have
proceeded to use inappropriate  metaphors to describe their  responses to social  problems,
leading them to mobilise the wrong types of national resources to address the problems.
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Mexican authorities clearly demonstrated this confusion: In 2008, President Felipe Calderón
referred to the country's drug violence as “a war,”127 yet when asked for a definition of the
violence,  his  government's  own  national  security  spokesman  demurred  from  that
characterisation and used the term “a fight against organised crime” instead.128 And when
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used the term “insurgency” to describe the situation,
the Mexican government protested, forcing President Obama to contradict her.129 That there
is  so  little  agreement  at  the  highest  levels  of  the  countries  most  affected  on  the  basic,
definitional question of the violence bodes poorly for a unified strategic response.
This thesis does not purport to create a new typology of violence or to propose policy solutions
for  all  complex  conflicts  in  a  networked world.  Instead,  its  purpose  is  to contextualise  a
specific relationship between violence and illegal narcotics, as demonstrated by the ongoing
conflict  in  Mexico.  Having  explored  and  clarified  the  issues  around  contemporary
understandings of organised violence, the next chapter will link these with the characteristics
of illegal narcotics, and construct a model that sheds some light on the Mexican conflict, and
by extension, irregular conflicts elsewhere.
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Chapter 3:
The Characteristics of the War on
Drugs and the Market of Narcotic
Violence
58
I. Introduction
Having examined the different species of organised violence, we must now move on to the
second element  of  the  theoretical  formulation:  drugs,  which  serve  as  the  catalyst  for  the
violence seen in the case study. This chapter serves largely to specify the theoretical argument
of Chapter 2, examining a specific type of violence that falls between the theoretical categories
established there. From a broad theoretical perspective, it will examine the linkages between
drugs  and  violence  in  an  attempt  to  further  situate  the case  study  within  the theoretical
literature on the different types of organised violence. More specifically, it serves to situate the
case  study  of  the  ongoing  violence  in  Mexico  in  the  context  of  the  history  and  broad
characteristics of state anti-narcotics campaigns, as well as the violence associated with drug
trafficking. Finally, this chapter serves to outline the overall hypothesis of this work: that the
trade in illicit narcotics can lead to the creation of a resilient, persistent “Market of Narcotic
Violence” in transit states. The subsequent case study chapters will test whether the drug-
linked violence in Mexico from 2006 – 2012 forms such a Market of Narcotic Violence, or
whether it falls into a more conventional category of organised violence.
Before discussing any specifics, however, it is necessary to address a simple question at the
very  heart  of  this  research:  Why drugs? Why does  a  single  category  of  brain  chemistry-
altering substances command so much attention from policymakers and academics,  while
seeming to correlate with so many violent conflicts worldwide? Drug use undoubtedly has
negative effects on individual and public health, but neither the legal classification nor policy
focus on narcotics are proportionate to those threats, especially considering the comparable
harms of tobacco and alcohol abuse.130 So why is there so much violence linked to the traffic in
drugs, but so little around products that have comparably deleterious public health effects?
The  answer  to  this  question  lies  with  the  policies  pursued  by  both  national  leaders  and
international policymakers over the last century. The portrayal of narcotics as not simply a
public health hazard, but as an existential threat to domestic peace and stability led to a rapid
130
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progression from a balanced, public health-led approach to one shaped by law enforcement
and  military  strategies.  The  change  in  emphasis  from  demand-based  to  supply-based
solutions is the clearest policy outcome of this shift. By itself, the United States imprisons
hundreds of thousands of people convicted of drug use and trafficking offences, both violent
and nonviolent – a tactic which has had little measurable impact on demand or drug abuse. 131
Anti-drugs enforcement has become a multi-billion dollar federal budget issue, spread across
a number of agencies, with similarly little effect on demand.132 Meanwhile, the militarisation
of both counter-narcotics policy and the drugs trade itself has spread far beyond the U.S.
border,  from drug-funded insurgencies  in  South  America  and Central  Asia  to widespread
drug-related gang violence in Latin America and West Africa. What started as a rhetorical call
to arms against a public health threat morphed into a very real, deadly set of global military
efforts,  and  significant  challenges  to  the  existing  international  norms  have  begun  to
materialise only recently.
To make this case, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the history of narcotics use and
efforts  to  control  it,  with  a  concentration  on  recent  history,  particularly  the
internationalisation of narcotics prohibition by the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs  and  its  associated  instruments,  and  the  militarisation  of  counter-narcotics  which
followed President Richard Nixon's declaration of war on drugs in 1971. Given the case study,
it focuses especially on the Western Hemisphere drug trafficking networks that extend from
the production regions in the Andes through the transit zones of Central America and Mexico
to the world's largest individual market for recreational drugs, the United States. The chapter
then  examines  the  specific  characteristics  of  drugs  to  determine  why  they  correlate  so
frequently with conflict, and how they enable and empower violent non-state actors. Finally,
the chapter lays out the theoretical model of the Market of Narcotic Violence, explaining both
the  characteristics  that  define  it  and  the  constraints  that  limit  it,  thereby  setting  up  the
research question for the empirical chapters that form the bulk of this work.
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A final note: it is not the purpose of this work to describe in great detail or critique American
domestic  drug  policies,  although  some  discussion  of  those  policies  is  necessary  to
contextualise the subsequent empirical chapters. Instead, this chapter simply establishes that
the status of drugs as a factor in, and driver of, a particular kind of conflict is not only because
of  their  inherent  characteristics,  but because of  a  legal  system that  made them a banned
resource.  This  chapter  details  the  origins  and  nature  of  that  system  as  a  basis  for
understanding whether the conflict in Mexico is in fact a Market of Narcotic Violence.
II. The history of narcotics and the international order 
To begin to understand the linkages between drugs and violence, one must understand the
exact  characteristics  of  drugs.  The  first  step  toward  doing  so  is  examining  the  historical
context  of  drug  use,  drug  abuse  and  government  policies  that  seek  to  control  them.
Governments have long treated drugs as a security threat,  or, even a social evil of foreign
origins.133 However, the institutionalisation of open warfare against them is a fairly recent
development.  The  use  of  naturally-occurring  narcotics134 –  especially  coca,  opium  and
cannabis – dates back essentially as far as civilisation itself.135 Opium in particular spread
widely  and  relatively  rapidly  across  the  world,  starting  from  somewhere  in  the  eastern
Mediterranean region, originally as a medical aid and then as a recreational narcotic.136 By the
nineteenth century, opium byproducts were used to make increasingly effective painkillers.
But  as  Western  nations  began  subsidising  opium  cultivation  for  medical  needs,  they
133
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discovered that  opium addiction was on the rise  as  well.137  In the latter  half  of  the 19th
century, chemists first synthesised opium into heroin, believing it to be a less-addictive, more-
powerful alternative. As it gained popularity, it began to be sold commercially by a variety of
major pharmaceutical companies.138 The middle of the 19th century also saw the two Opium
Wars between Great Britain and China. The Chinese government had long been isolationist,
and resistant to the opium trade; Britain sought to open up China as a potentially  lucrative
market  for  opium,  amongst  other  products.  The  British  won both  of  these  conflicts,  and
compelled China to open its borders to foreign trade, including opium.139 As interesting as this
conflict is as a historical example of drugs as at least part of a casus belli, it is fundamentally
different from contemporary drug conflicts. The Opium Wars took place in a world where
narcotics were a legitimate form of international trade and trade itself was an accepted cause
for war. Today, neither of those conditions is true. 
Around the same time as heroin emerged, chemists had isolated cocaine, the active ingredient
of  the  coca  leaf.  This  was  not  the  first  human  use  of  coca  –  recreational  use  amongst
Mesoamericans had been discovered by the conquistadors as long ago as the 16th century, and
had almost certainly been occurring for centuries beforehand.140 But here too, commercial
interests took hold, bringing a variety of medical remedies based on cocaine to market by the
1870s, not to mention a new soft drink called Coca-Cola, whose original incarnation as an
alcoholic drink sold as French Wine Coca was stymied by prohibitionists.141 
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Between their  pharmaceutical  and recreational  uses,  narcotics  (primarily  opium) were  an
important, lucrative resource for Western colonial powers by the turn of the 20 th century.142
However,  the  permissiveness  that  had  until  then  marked  the  international  community's
approach to drugs was about to change drastically, and quickly. At the beginning of the 20 th
century, global opium production was at an historic high, with global totals exceeding 41,000
metric tons.143 The major colonial  powers  of  the 19th century dominated the opium trade,
including the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, and the Persian and Ottoman empires. Some of
these states were also major international traders of coca leaf and its extracts.144 Meanwhile,
the  major  rising  power  of  the  era,  the  United  States,  differed  from  the  others  in  two
substantial aspects: it had no large commercial interest in the opium or coca trades, and it had
a powerful, rising religious/social-justice inspired prohibitionist movement.145 Following the
American takeover of the Philippines from Spain in 1898 (along with its hundreds of formerly
Spanish-operated  opium retail  outlets  and  its  tradition  of  recreational  opium  use),146 the
United States in 1909 convened the first international drug control convention in Shanghai.147
While this convention did not lead directly to the adoption of binding legislation, it set the
stage  for  the  first  meaningful  international  convention  on  the  opium  trade:  the  1912
International  Opium  Convention,  signed  in  The  Hague.148 The  convention  compelled
signatory  nations  to restrict  opium imports  to  an  amount  deemed “medically  necessary,”
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though it  left  the exact  amounts  undefined.  The splintering  pre-WWI international  order
made widespread acceptance difficult; only five nations ratified the treaty.149 
The wake of the world wars left  an international order dramatically more in favour of an
aggressive prohibitionist regime. Nations that were previously major opium producers had
either ceased entirely to exist (Austria-Hungary, the Persian and Ottoman empires), or seen
their empires and influence winnowed down to a shadow of their 19th century selves (the UK,
Germany, Holland, Spain). Meanwhile, the United States, which maintained a prohibitionist
attitude  toward  drugs  despite  the  failure  of  alcohol  prohibition,  emerged  from  the  wars
relatively  unscathed physically  and  in  a  position  to  dictate  terms  to  weakened allies  and
defeated enemies across the globe. Additionally, the League of Nations, though hobbled by
lack  of  participation  from  major  nations  (notably  the  US),  had  created  a  number  of
conventions dedicated to suppressing the opium trade in particular, and the narcotics trade in
general, thus laying the groundwork for a prohibition-focused international community.150 Its
replacement in 1945 by a more widely-representative and empowered successor, the United
Nations, meant that there was now a more effective means in place to institute and enforce a
global norm regarding the trade in narcotics.
The UN moved quickly to take up the prohibitionist  mantle.  In 1961,  it  enacted the most
thorough international drug prohibition measure to date: the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs.  This  sought  to unite  all  the  prohibitionist  measures  instituted  under  the previous
treaties into a single document, with the ultimate aim of rendering illegal the non-medical
cultivation,  trade  and  use  of  narcotic  drugs  globally.151 While  subsequent  drug  control
conventions have modified its particulars, the 1961 convention remains the underlying basis
for international prohibition,  a regime without equal in scope or size. Virtually every country
in  the world  is  party  to  the  Single  Convention,  and the  UN has  subsequently  built  up  a
bureaucracy for enforcing drug prohibition, most notably the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
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(UNODC),  whose remit  is  to aid national  law enforcement and counter-narcotics units  in
prohibition enforcement. 
Few countries dare to challenge the consensus. A few (most famously the Netherlands) have
limited their  enforcement  of  laws relating  to “soft”  drugs  such as  marijuana,  ecstasy  and
psychotropic mushrooms. A few others have either directly participated in drug trafficking or
intentionally turned a blind eye to it,  including Panama under Manuel  Noriega,152 Bolivia
from 1980-1982,153 Burma from 1991-1996,154 Afghanistan155 from 1996-2000 (and, arguably,
at present) and North Korea156 – but these are by and large outlaw states, separated from the
international community primarily by their domestic and foreign policies rather than their
approach to narcotics. In short, the ban on the drugs trade has evolved to a point where it is as
solid an international consensus as exists in the world today.
This  international  consensus  has  three  important  consequences,  which  are  explained  in
greater detail below. First,  it  moves the international narcotics trade out of  the legitimate
sphere into an unregulated, transnational criminal market. Second, it allows states to utilise
as  much  violence  in  their  counter-narcotics  policies  as  they  see  fit,  which  legitimises  an
unlimited use of force in the name of narcotics control. Third, it creates an economic dynamic
that favours the use of violence by traffickers, whether they have political motives or simply a
desire to make large quantities of money. 
The fact that the entire international drugs trade, from production to consumption, is now
completely outside the sphere of legitimate economic activity creates a unique dynamic. Other
conflict-linked resources are only illegitimate thanks to their provenance; timber or diamonds
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from a conflict  zone are  not  inherently illegal  and significant  international  cooperation is
necessary to separate legitimately and illegitimately sourced goods (as with the Kimberley
Process for diamonds). In other words, as a conflict driver, those resources are both lootable
and launderable, which makes it feasible for states and non-state groups to profit from their
trade at a relatively low risk to themselves. Drugs, on the other hand, are not launderable –
under the current international system, there is no way to legitimise involvement in drug
trafficking. A completely illegal market,  with no recourse to courts or legitimate means of
dispute resolution and contract enforcement, will accordingly operate along a different set of
standards as it seeks its own order.157 Mark Duffield draws a useful distinction here between
“transborder trade,” which is any kind of international economic activity, and “parallel” or
“informal” economic activity, which is inherently illegal to some degree.158 While some types
of illicit trade can be disguised as legitimate transborder trade in the complexity of modern
commerce, drug markets by nature constitute parallel activity.
Second, in terms of government policy, the fact that narcotics are universally illegal creates
space for states to define their counter-narcotics efforts using any amount of force they see fit.
In other words, the international consensus implicitly permits a war mentality in the name of
counter-narcotics.  States  party  to  the  global  economy  cannot  afford  to  openly  flout
prohibition, which limits their options to a spectrum from semi-tolerance to a full embrace of
total eradication. Under those circumstances, nations such as the United States, which have
long defined drugs as a security threat, are free to securitise and/or militarise their responses,
confident in the knowledge that doing so will not generally strain their relations with other
states,  who  are  bound by  the same standard  and cannot  visibly  profit  from the trade  in
narcotics. Delegitimising the entirety of the drugs trade also frees states to associate drugs
with other forms of completely unacceptable activity, such as terrorism – as discussed in the
last chapter. 
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Third, given the fact that states are free to use broad violence while “defending” their citizens
from the “threat” of drugs, traffickers have become incentivised to deploy a certain level of
violence in response. Additionally, there is at least some evidence of a correlation between
drug markets and violence. There are some exceptions to this rule; marijuana-only markets,
are not generally violent,159 though marijuana is less attractive as a smuggled resource, both
because it can be grown virtually anywhere, and because it  is less profitable per kilo than
opium or  coca  products.160 Svante  Cornell's  survey  of  conflicts  in  which  drug production
supports an anti-government force demonstrates that while there is no correlation between
the existence of  drug markets and the inception of  conflict,  there is  a notable correlation
between drug cultivation and the temporal extension of existing conflicts.161 In other words,
while drugs alone may not cause violence, the volatile combination of their presence and an
international black market can extend a conflict that would have otherwise ground to a halt.  
III. The modern history of the War on Drugs
From  1971,  the  narrative  of  this  survey  centres  much  more  on  the  United  States.  While
American counter-narcotics  policy  before  1971 tracks fairly  closely  with the history of  the
international narcotics consensus, the specific dynamics of drug trafficking in the Western
Hemisphere,  especially  given  the  United  States'  overwhelming  political  influence  in  that
theatre, require a specific focus on American policies in that timeframe. 
One  important  point  of  reference for  American counter-narcotics  policies  is  the country's
failed experiment with prohibiting alcohol in the early 20th century. A single-minded lobby,
willing  to  make  common  cause  with  groups  of  every  political,  religious  and  geographic
description made the constitutional prohibition of the sale of alcohol possible. However, once
the ban came into force, the rate of alcohol consumption dropped only temporarily before
returning to its previous levels – with the added problem that instead of funding legitimate
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businesses and the government, alcohol sales funded an unprecedented growth of organised
crime. The experiment was such a failure that it was repealed just thirteen years later – the
only  Constitutional  amendment  in  U.S.  history  to  be  repealed.162 The  failure  of  alcohol
Prohibition,  however,  did  not  undermine  the  efforts  of  American policymakers  to  extend
controls over other forms of intoxicating substances, and the subsequent decades saw – as
David Courtwright points out – a “decoupling” between alcohol and tobacco, which became
socially  acceptable  to  the  point  of  invisibility,  and  other  drugs,  which  were  subjected  to
increasingly harsh controls.163 
Following the passage of the 1961 Single Convention, the United States became involved in the
war in Vietnam, a country near the 'Golden Triangle,'  which at the time accounted for the
majority of the world's opium supply.164 As the war dragged on and the number of American
troops  stationed  in  Southeast  Asia  grew,  the  rate  of  heroin  use  skyrocketed  as  returning
veterans  brought  the  drug  home  with  them.165 Faced  with  increased  drug  use  amongst
veterans,  along  with  a  generally  unstable  social  situation  in  the  wake  of  a  losing  and
unpopular  war,166 President  Richard  Nixon  borrowed  a  rhetorical  strategy  from  his
predecessor. As Lyndon Johnson called for a “war on poverty,” Nixon decided to declare a
“war on drugs.” This 1971 statement was a rhetorical strategy aimed at unifying public opinion
behind an increase in federal spending on drug prevention and domestic law enforcement.167
In a statement that would come to define decades of American and international counter-
narcotics  policies,  Nixon  held  a  press  conference  in  which  he  declared  that  drugs  had
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“assumed the dimensions of a national emergency” and required the full force of the federal
government  to  reach  a  solution.  Despite  being  cast  with  militarised  language  such  as
“conquer,”  “threat”  and  “struggle,”  the  original  plan  called  only  for  stepped-up  law
enforcement efforts against major traffickers, along with an increased budged for preventative
services  and  rehabilitation  for  domestic  drug  users.168  To  read  Nixon's  statement  in  the
context of today's drug policy is to be struck by its explicit construction of drugs themselves,
rather than users or traffickers, as the enemy:
“It is a problem which demands compassion, and not simply condemnation, for those who
become the victims of narcotics and dangerous drugs.  We must try to understand the
confusion and disillusion and despair that bring people, particularly young people, to the
use of narcotics and dangerous drugs.”169
But  those  spending priorities,  and the strategy they  implied,  did not  last.  At  the time of
Nixon's  announcements,  the  most  popular  drugs  in  the  United  States  were  heroin  and
marijuana.170 Heroin at the time mostly reached the United States via war-linked Southeast
Asian routes  (returning veterans and refugees),  or via the so-called French Connection.171
With the end of the American military presence in Vietnam, heroin trafficking from Southeast
Asia to the United States became much more difficult, and shortly thereafter, American law
enforcement broke up the French Connection. As important as they were in the short term,
these victories over drug trafficking would prove to be short-lived.
Around the same time, a number of changes were unfolding that would come to define the
state of drug trafficking into the United States for decades to come. Misha Glenny describes
three important, and more or less contemporaneous, developments in South America during
the late 1960s and 1970s: 1) An increase in the number of American- and European- trained
chemists, who returned to their homes in Colombia and Peru to find few legitimate jobs; 2) an
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increase in American domestic marijuana production,  which slashed the profit  margins of
marijuana importers  based overseas,  and 3)  a  growing awareness  in  the United States  of
cocaine as a 'fashionable'  alternative to heroin or marijuana.172 These developments would
combine  to  fill  the  void  left  by  the  decline  in  heroin use,  and  in  doing  so  would  create
enormous violence at all stages of the drug distribution process.
Another  factor  that  contributed  to  the  increase  in  violence  was  the  growth  of  left-wing
insurgencies in South America, which had access to some ideologically-based Soviet aid, but
sought additional sources of support to increase both their capabilities and independence.173
The primary groups that in category were two Colombian rebel groups, the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia  (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) and the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), and a Peruvian group, the
Sendero Luminosa, or the Shining Path.
The Colombian groups began their struggle against the government in the wake of the 20-year
civil conflict known as La Violencia. From the end of La Violencia, in 1966, until the end of
the Cold War, Colombia's civil war followed the general pattern of a proxy war: The USSR
supported FARC and ELN financially  and materially,  while  the U.S.  aided the Colombian
government.174 Peru's conflict began slightly later – 1980 – and was more local, but followed
the  same  basic  pattern:  a  leftwing,  socialist-inspired  insurgency  arrayed  against  a  more
conservative government backed by the United States.175 
Drugs soon came to play a major role for all three groups. The coca plant requires a very
specific set of climactic conditions to grow successfully,176 which puts a premium on areas
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with both limited governmental control and favourable coca-growing climates. The Peruvian
and Colombian countrysides both fit this bill. The result was an alliance between traffickers
and insurgents: the latter would protect the former from government interference in exchange
for a cut of the profits. The exact relationship between the two groups during the 1980s was
somewhat informal – generally, the cartels did not have political aspirations in the same way
as the insurgents, but they were willing to employ spectacular violence against the state in
order to secure their operations and profits. Pablo Escobar, the ruthless head of the Medellín
cartel,  was  the  most  aggressive  and  infamous;  his  organisation  was  implicated  in  the
assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984, along with the subsequent
killing  of  presidential  candidate Luis  Carlos Galán.177 Escobar  was an unusual  figure who
presided over  an  unusually  hierarchical  criminal  organisation.  In  his  efforts  to  legitimise
himself and his trade, he sought election to the Colombian Congress (successfully, although
he was shortly thereafter barred from taking his seat) and later convened a group of drug
traffickers  nicknamed  “Los  Extraditables”  for  their  shared  opposition  to  the  Colombian
government's  extradition  treaty  with  the  United  States.178 In  centralising  power,  Escobar
found that it was possible to more or less directly challenge the state - although he was aided
in this by the FARC and ELN, which served the dual purposes of splintering the attention of
Colombia's  security  forces  and  sheltering  the  all-important  coca  growing  fields.179 Had
Escobar managed to continue, he might well have pioneered a mirror image of the war on
drugs – a “war for drugs.” But his situation proved to be untenable.  Having agreed to be
imprisoned (under highly luxurious circumstances of his own creation180) and then escaping
when the government clumsily attempted to move him to a more secure facility, Escobar was
killed in 1993 by a joint U.S.-Colombian task force.181 In the wake of his death, the Medellín
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cartel fell into disarray, and its capacity to directly challenge the state came to an end. The
same fate befell the somewhat less violent and aggressive Cali cartel a few years later, as the
government shifted resources that had been devoted to defeating the Medellín cartel to its
erstwhile rivals as part of a “divide and conquer” strategy.182 In subsequent years, Colombia's
insurgent groups, both left- and right-wing, began to take a much more protective, involved
approach to the cocaine trade,183 while the international component of the trade has been
taken over by a range of smaller, less hierarchical organisations.
A similar dynamic played out on a slightly different timeline in neighbouring Peru, where,
following a government crackdown on independent drug organisations in 1984, the Shining
Path  became  increasingly  involved  in  the  cocaine  trade  on  its  own  behalf,  acting  as  a
“middleman” between local growers and international traffickers. However, the arrest of the
group's  leaders  in  the  early  1990s  dealt  a  fatal  blow  to  the  organization,  and  it  shortly
thereafter lost its ability to impact the cocaine trade, as Peru's  share of the world cocaine
market also subsequently declined significantly.184
Another major global development affected the cocaine-growing nations of South America at
around  the  same  time:  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  USSR's  downfall  left
communist and socialist insurgent groups bereft of their major supporter. The income from
drugs may have been substantial, but it was not enough to replace the ideological, political
and material support of a superpower patron. Between the early 1990s and the end of the first
decade  of  the 21st century,  left-wing insurgents  in  South  and Central  America  went  from
seriously threatening the integrity of their host states to clinging on to small tracts of land,
protected mostly by their distance from population centres. But neither the end of an era of
state-sponsored left-wing insurgency nor the toppling of the most powerful Colombian drug
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groups led to the end of drug trafficking in the region. Rather, it led to a new form of DTO,
ably described by Michael Kenney:
"Rather than destroying the Colombian drug industry, however, the kingpin strategy
decentralized it, as dozens of chain networks emerged in the wake of the few wheels
targeted by the state. These enterprises were smaller, flatter and less hierarchical than
the  wheels  they  replaced.  Individual  nodes  transacted  through  ad  hoc  support
networks, sans the mediation and oversight provided by the core. Some chains arose
from the institutional residues of the former wheels,  while others  had been quietly
coordinating  drug  shipments  for  years  without  attracting  the  attention  of  US  and
Colombian law enforcers."185 
In other  words,  as  the international  circumstances evolved  and law enforcement agencies
changed tack, drug traffickers also adapted. While drug production did not prove to be a like
for like replacement of  Soviet support,  leaving insurgent movements unable to completely
uproot  the  state,  it  provided  sufficient  means  for  them  to  integrate  themselves  into  the
countryside and transition into resilient, survivable networks. 
For its part, Mexico never had a substantial left-wing insurgency,186 nor would such a group
have  had  the  option  of  integrating  themselves  into  agricultural  drug  production  in  any
significant way, given the relatively small amount of drugs that the country produces. Instead,
Mexican drug trafficking groups had to navigate a similar terrain shift in how they co-existed
with their own government.
As the next chapter explores, Mexico has long suffered from political corruption linked to the
trade in illegal drugs, particularly during its 70-year period of one-party rule by the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutionalized Revolution Party) from 1930 to 2000.187
Under PRI rule, the drug market in Mexico functioned as what Snyder and Duran-Martinez
refer to as a “state-sponsored protection racket,” in which the government served as unofficial
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guarantor for the business conducted by illicit groups in exchange for concessions and limits
on  the  amount  of  violence  employed.188 More  specifically,  until  the  1990s,  Mexican
government  agencies and drug cartels  coexisted  in  a  “one protector,  many organisations”
arrangement,  in  which  the  state's  law  enforcement  agencies  were  corrupted  by  drug
traffickers  and served as  a central  organisational hub for the various cartels  operating on
Mexican territory.189 The stability  of  this  type of  system is  a  result  of  a  central  authority
regulating in some sense all the participant organised crime groups, which rarely happens in
other types of illegal markets. However, during the 1980s, this long-lasting structure began to
change  substantially:  increased  political  competition  threatened the  PRI's  grip  on  power,
while the growing strength of Colombian traffickers using their own distribution networks
(which  had  previously  extended  from  Colombia  all  the  way  to  the  U.S.)  created  intense
competition for Mexican gangs and led them to become more violent. At around the same
time, Mexican governmental reforms split up power within law enforcement and the attorneys
general,  which meant that  corrupt  officials  could no longer guarantee protection for drug
cartels, and the previously existing one-protector model began to fall apart.190 The fall of the
state-sponsored protection racket was occurring even before the PRI lost the 2000 election
and a non-PRI president, Vicente Fox, took office for the first time in 70 years. Fox's election,
and the subsequent  replacement of  PRI officials  at  all  level  of  government,  tore  up what
remained of the old arrangement.
This development laid the groundwork for the most recent stage of Mexico's  drug war, in
which numerous cartels have warred with one another and with the forces of the state using
weaponry and tactics normally only associated with political insurgencies or by state forces.
Mexican drug traffickers, on the whole, do not support a political insurgency or a social or
religious resistance movement. They do not seek to secede from the state, or to overthrow the
government.  They have not  articulated a  specific  grievance with the Mexican government
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beyond its desire to enforce the monopoly of violence within its borders. In other words, on
the much-discussed political science spectrum of greed vs. grievance, the drug-linked violence
in Mexico is inarguably on the side of greed.191 It is therefore tempting to classify the violence
there as simply criminal, but the scope of the bloodshed since 2006 belies that, and places the
conflict  outside  the  scope  of  normal  state  responses  to  either  organised  crime  or  a
conventional  military  threat.  The  conflict  in  Mexico  is  the  ultimate  response  of  drug
traffickers to the war against drugs: a multi-polar, hybrid conflict driven by the underlying
economic realities of the drugs trade. In order to understand this dynamic further, we must
look  at  the  general  characteristics  of  drugs  and  how  they  function  as  a  driver  for  such
conflicts.
IV. Drugs in the context of warfare
As  the  previous  chapter  addressed  the  definitional  issues  surrounding  different  types  of
organised violence, the task is now to explain the purpose of treating the war on drugs as
anything other than a rhetorical exercise, particularly since it was conceived as a means of
addressing domestic drug use rather than as a foreign policy strategy.192 In order to do that,
one must understand the relationship between violence and illegal  economic activity,  and
what kinds of violence are linked to the drugs trade specifically.
As  demonstrated in the preceding chapter,  “war” in the theoretical  sense basically  entails
organized  violence  in  the  service  of  a  political  objective.193 The  elimination  of  drugs  for
reasons of  domestic  policy  can certainly  be described  as  a  moral  objective,  but  it  is  also
without  a  doubt  a  political  objective.  But  even  at  this  basic  level  of  analysis  there  is  a
definitional problem with the metaphor of war: when fighting against “drugs,” who or what is
the  enemy?  Is  it  drug  users,  the  citizens  whose  demand  for  narcotics  drives  the  entire
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economic  system behind  trafficking?  Is  it  the  traffickers  and  producers  who  embody  the
trade? Or is it the drugs themselves, the inanimate driver of so much bloodshed? 
There are arguments in favour of each of these possibilities. In strictly military terms, the idea
of a war against users is probably the weakest, at least with reference to domestic counter-
narcotics  policies.  Direct  action against  the users  of  illicit  drugs  is  generally  limited194 to
imprisonment  and,  depending  on  the  jurisdiction,  rehabilitation  or  re-education.195 The
stricter amongst these arguably constitute a form of war, as imprisonment itself can be seen
as a form of violence (not to mention the possibilities for violence in the process of arresting
lawbreakers). But while drug users are in some sense the 'target,' the goal is not to eliminate
them from existence; rather, it is to convert them to non-drug users or to punish them for
engaging in criminal behaviour. Within the terms of the war metaphor, drug users are more
closely akin to the populace in an insurgency; the “terrain” over which the battle is fought.196
To that end, Nixon's drug war declaration – and subsequent official rhetoric regarding the
threat  of  narcotics197 –  sought  to portray drugs as  an alien threat,  coming from far-away
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shores to threaten decent, sober citizens. Insofar as the war on drugs has an overall strategy, it
does not emphasise violence against drug users. While usage is illegal, and a certain amount
of violence accompanies domestic enforcement, most violence is targeted against producers
and distributors.198 Moreover, while drug traffickers directly serving end users engage in a
certain amount of violence to secure their territories,199 the violence is primarily competitive
and also not directed at users. Furthermore, in the rich countries where the most valuable
drug users (eg. those with the largest amounts of  disposable income) live,  this  violence is
scattered and sharply limited in its potential scope by the enormous coercive power of the
state. Therefore, the dynamics of drug violence in end user markets, while an important topic
for the understanding of drug violence overall, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
That  said,  the  bifurcation  of  contemporary  transnational  drug  trafficking  is  vital  to
understanding the phenomenon.  The nature of the violence that accompanies the trade is
shaped by the fact  that  the production and the majority of  the transit  process take place
outside the borders of the wealthy nations whose populations will pay the largest amount for
drugs.200 This is one particularly stark representation of Passas's “criminogenic asymmetries”
– the uneven distribution of the benefits and harms of globalisation based on pre-existing
levels of wealth and global influence.201 
Returning to the war metaphor, production and transport are the stages of the process at
which  drugs  can  most  easily  be  intercepted.  Consequently,  in  drug-linked  conflicts,  the
violence  tends  to  concentrate  around  the  mechanisms  of  production  and  international
distribution – crops, laboratories, and air, sea and road links.202 Here we can see perhaps the
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most direct  linkages between conventional war and the drug war:  on one side,  instead of
munitions factories or oil fields, drug trafficking organizations must protect the systems from
which they draw their profits and that allow them to pursue their objectives.203 On the other
side, most governments, having by and large subscribed to the international drug prohibition
consensus, view drugs and drug traffickers as security threats and are willing to escalate the
level of violence in order to destroy both. In this (strictly limited) sense, the nature of a war
against drugs can be seen as roughly comparable to other wars – a battle between, to borrow
Clausewitz's metaphor, two wrestlers, each trying to compel the other to do his will.204
States  seeking  to  combat  drug  traffickers  have  employed  three  basic  tactics:  demand
reduction,  eradication and interdiction.  Demand reduction constitutes  the “soft  power” of
anti-drug efforts, ranging from drug resistance training for children to programmes like the
ones used in certain European cities that offer addicts stepped-down quantities or substitutes
in  a  safe,  legal  environment  in  an  effort  to  wean  them  off  drugs.  The  idea  behind  such
programmes is to reduce trafficking operations to unprofitability by reducing both the total
number of users and the willingness of average users to violate the law in order to obtain
drugs. Arguably, imposing prison sentences against users is also a demand reduction strategy,
but as Reinarman, Cohen and Kaal point out in a comparative study of cannabis use in cities
with varying levels of drug enforcement, drug prohibition does not appear to correlate with
less (or less intensive) drug usage.205
States  also  find  eradication  attractive  because  it  is  the  most  direct  approach  to  the  war;
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attacking, as it were, the enemy's means of production. It is appealing because it holds out the
prospect that the mechanism of drug trafficking can be stopped at its source. Eradication has
long been a major part of American drug control strategy, and remains so: in reference to
Colombia, the 2009 National Drug Control Strategy reads: 
"[D]isrupting the drug market at its source is at the core of the layered defense 
described in this strategy. By working with the governments of producing countries, we 
can eliminate illegal drug crops before they move to final production and interdict 
shipments before they are broken down into smaller loads, thereby removing the 
greatest amount of narcotics from the market."206 
While  this  argument  may  make  sense  against  a  hierarchical  opponent,  the  evolution  of
trafficking groups from hierarchical to networked forms severely limits its effectiveness. For
example,  the Colombian networks  that  produce and ship cocaine northward in enormous
quantities have evolved from relatively traditional organisations with hierarchical leadership
structures, which are vulnerable to decapitation strikes, into either semi-hierarchical “wheels”
or  leaderless  “chains.”207 Since  everyone  involved  in  drug  production  or  trafficking  is  a
potential target for both the government and rival groups, the economic, political and social
structures that exist around drug production need to be resilient above all else. The result is
that  drug  production  in  Colombia  has  spread  out  across  a  greater  number  of  physically
smaller farms, which makes eradication operations more difficult and puts a large number of
farmers on the front lines.208 Since large-scale production is generally found in places where
there  is  little  in  the  way  of  alternative  economic  activity,  this  means  that  eradication
campaigns  tend  to  alienate  the  rural  populations  whose  livelihoods  depend  upon  drug
production, which drives them toward drug traffickers, rather than the state, as providers of
physical  and economic protection. A network set up to take advantage of this  dynamic is
incredibly resilient:  Colombia's  FARC, for  example,  alienated their  rural,  agricultural  base
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with a series of mass killings in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but have been able to maintain
a grasp on the market partly because drug producers cannot expect government protection209
and partly because the guerrillas control the link to the market abroad, which is  the only
means by which the farmers can make a profit from their crop.210
Furthermore, eradication suffers from the difficulty that the economics of  the drugs trade
upend the truism that structures (whether physical or organisational) are more difficult to
build than to destroy. In Colombia, where enormous sums of American money has supported
eradication  programmes  undertaken  both  by  means  of  manual  elimination  and  by  more
efficient but less discriminate aerial spraying, the main effect seems to have been to decrease
the size and increase the number of cocaine fields.211 There are also substantial environmental
and health effects associated with aerial spraying, which only exacerbate the problem of lost
public support.212 These side effects can be avoided by means of ground-based eradication
campaigns that either manually eliminate drug-producing plants or use tractors to precisely
spray herbicides, but these campaigns are much slower and more logistically difficult, and as a
result they are much more expensive and dangerous.
Finally,  eradication is only relevant in some drug conflicts.  Afghanistan and Colombia are
world-leading producers of opium and cocaine, respectively, but Mexico has historically been
only  a  relatively  small  producer  of  opium213 and  a  mid-sized  producer  of  marijuana.214
Mexico's real value to drug traffickers is as a transit state – the ease with which products cross
its thousands of miles of border with the United States.  In places where eradication is an
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option,  there  has  been  some  indication  that  it  can  –  if  undertaken  thoroughly  and
consistently,  and  in  the  company  of  a  policy  of  sustained  violence  against  trafficking
organisations  –  at  least  limit  the  ability  of  drug  traffickers  to  coalesce  into  forms  which
directly threaten the state.215 However, short of declaring total war on drug producers and
their livelihoods, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001,216 it appears that even a
well-financed,  consistent  eradication  campaign,  such  as  the  one  in  Colombia,  is  at  most
capable  of  limiting the  means  of  production:  after  considerable  expenditure  in  lives  and
money,  Colombian  cocaine  production  in  2008  was  approximately  where  it  had  been  in
1998.217 A similar dynamic has played out in Afghanistan since the U.S.-led intervention in
2001, where extensive eradication efforts failed to cut into the nation's majority share of the
world opium market.218 And even a "limited" production capacity still  appears  more than
capable of meeting American domestic demand, given that retail cocaine prices in the United
States over the same period are at about the same level they were in 1998.219 Historically,
then, it appears that eradication is not in and of itself a complete, functional strategy.
The  third  tactical  choice  is  interdiction,  which  entails  action  against  those  transporting
processed drugs from their point of origin to the point of sale. Interdiction generally relies on
the  employment  of  surveillance,  intelligence,  law  enforcement  and  military  assets,  either
individually or in concert. It bypasses one of the central problems with eradication in that it
focuses on people directly involved in drug trafficking, rather than subsistence farmers who
have generally chosen the best crop with which they believe they can make a living. However,
effective  interdiction  is  risky,  expensive  and  labor-intensive.  As  with  eradication,  the
215
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economic forces at work are not favourable to the government, as the profit margins are high
enough to permit a substantial law enforcement-related loss factor – the UNODC cites a 42%
worldwide seizure rate for cocaine and a 26% rate for heroin,220 but the market for both drugs
remains  strong.  Additionally,  drug  smugglers  as  networked  agents  display  a  degree  of
flexibility  and innovation  difficult  for  bureaucratic  government  agencies  to match,  having
adopted  a  series  of  increasingly  creative  methods  for  bypassing  interdiction  efforts.  For
example,  in  the  1980s,  faced  with  a  growing  American  naval  interdiction  programme
supported  by  aerial  surveillance,  drug  smugglers  shifted  from  attempting  to  import
Colombian marijuana into the U.S.  to relying upon Mexican and domestic  sources, which
undercut marine interdiction efforts.221 The coca plant, which for climatic reasons cannot be
grown  closer  to  the  U.S.  than  Colombia,  required  a  different  approach.  This  approach
included the creation of an entire shipbuilding industry devoted to building powerful, stealthy
“go-fast” boats in the jungle, along with a network of logistical support that allowed them to
navigate hundreds of miles of open ocean to deliver their cargo while avoiding Coast Guard
patrols.222 More recently, as go-fasts have proven increasingly vulnerable to interdiction by
American  air  and  naval  units  in  the  Caribbean,  they  have  been  supplemented  by  semi-
submersibles, which are much more difficult to detect, and even by true submarines. 223 After
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened the border between the U.S. and
Mexico, smuggling across land borders became much easier; with the advent of free trade,
drugs could find their way north more easily while a parallel flow of guns purchased in the
220
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U.S.  flowed  south  to  arm  the cartels.224 Interdiction,  like  eradication,  is  not  a  complete
strategy in its  own right,  and its  weaknesses  are  inseparable  from a central  part  of  what
enriches  and  strengthens  modern  states:  namely,  international  trade  enabled  by  open
borders. 
Because of the superficial similarities to conventional military strategies, the militarisation of
counter-narcotics can be sold and understood as a form of conventional war. But such wars,
as we have seen, require symmetries between combatants – and the nature of the drugs trade
lends  itself,  on the supply  side,  to  massively  asymmetrical  approaches  to production  and
distribution. Critical here is the concept of renewability: the combination of diffuse, resilient
production structures, an apparently limitless user base and states whose borders are (in an
era of globalised trade and commerce) necessarily open all contribute to the resilience of drug
trafficking even in the face of determined and powerful foes. But since drugs are in essence a
commodity  with  economic  value,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  their  significance  in  this
respect as well. 
As  Svante  Cornell  points  out,  while  the  debate  over  resources  as  drivers  of  conflict  has
considered  the  causes  of  civil  war  extensively  (often  reduced  to  the  useful  if  somewhat
simplistic dichotomy of “greed versus grievance”), comparatively little work has been done on
the specific effect that the drugs trade has on warfare. As Cornell notes, “drugs have been
included in subcategories such as “lootable resources” together with [conflict] diamonds. The
results of this research have tended to show that lootable resources, including drugs, have no
link to conflict initiation, but that they are positively correlated with conflict duration.”225 In
general,  the availability  of  many  transportable  natural  resources  – timber,  diamonds,  oil,
narcotics – can serve to extend conflict, but drugs have a number of characteristics that make
them particularly valuable to violent non-state actors:
224
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•  They  are  extremely  portable  (or  “lootable”),  and therefore  relatively  easy  to  smuggle  in
economically worthwhile quantities, unlike timber, oil, natural gas or semi-precious metals.
•  They  do  not  require  a  particularly  sophisticated  infrastructure  to  produce  or  transport,
although  technical  sophistication  in  production  and  transportation  certainly  pays  profit-
margin dividends.
• Their very illegality renders them an inelastic product. In other words, since the market for
almost all recreational narcotics is outside the scope of legality, there is no official regulation,
unlike diamonds, whose profitability depends on a largely legitimate business model. Drug
traffickers  are  therefore  free  to  charge  whatever  “risk  premium”  they  like,  and  demand
appears  to  be  unaffected.226 As  a  result,  while  the  exact  return  on  investment  for  drug
trafficking organizations is extremely difficult to estimate, it is without a doubt very high.227 
•  Finally,  the demand for drugs is also inelastic,  thanks to their  addictive qualities.  While
there is some dispute228 over the extent to which  addiction is inherent to drugs (and further
dispute over the addictive qualities of  particular drugs),  the most common and profitable
narcotics are known to have at least some addictive qualities,229 which means that dealers
have to do relatively little to ensure that their customers continue to require their services.
Drugs, therefore, can be seen as an ideal correspondent of irregular wars – a resource that can
enhance or prolong existing conflicts, especially in producer countries such as Colombia, Peru
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or Afghanistan. They also correspond with violence in consumer states, albeit at a much more
disorganised and granular level thanks to the greater stability and security resources of those
states. But few producer states directly border the wealthy states where the richest body of
drug consumers lives, which leaves a third category of states. Devoid of either the violence-
suppressing resources of  the consumer states or  the territorial  considerations of producer
states, transit states have the potential to host a markedly different type of conflict. The final
section of this chapter will examine exactly what that type of conflict might look like.
V. The Market of Narcotic Violence
The preceding chapter established a model of crime in which violence occurs to the economic
benefit  of  participants,  but  whose  character  precludes  sustained,  high  levels  of  organised
(rather than ordinary) violence. More violent and sustained conflicts are usually described
with reference to the metaphor of war, either explicitly or implicitly through the language and
strategies of militarisation. The proponents of 4GW theory, as discussed earlier, are correct
that globalisation and technological advancement have strengthened the power of individuals
to commit acts of violence and allowed for the creation of networks and organisations with
new  and  innovative  structural  arrangements,  but  their  analysis  tends  to  group  conflicts
together based on tactics while ignoring larger structural differences. Networks are a useful
way  to  conceptualise  the  structures  of  organisations,  but  offer  little  insight  into  their
motivations. In order to describe conflicts that do not fall into the established categories of
war or crime, a more specific metaphor is needed. 
Mancur  Olson's  conception of  markets  as  ubiquitous,  self-enforcing and irrepressible  is  a
useful starting point here as a metaphor for the entire environment in which drug traffickers
operate.230 It has been established with reference to Kelsen that violence in the service of an
economic order is not simply a project of legitimate states, with reference to Keen, Reno and
others that violence can enable, rather than impede, certain forms of economic activity, and
that  network  theory  is  useful  for  creating  a  typology  of  organisational  forms,  but  is  not
especially illuminating with regards to motivations of violent actors. Participation in a market
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economy allows us to view violent groups through the prism of economic self-interest – and
differential association theory allows us to understand that individual participation in those
groups is not irrational but rather a result of exposure to specific influences. 
Moreover, the concept of a market provides a multilayered view of the interaction of violent
economic actors: violence, in such a conception, can be a service offered for sale or exchange
by specialists; it can be a medium by which participant actors communicate; and it can serve
an additional role as the regulator of a market in which no other regulatory mechanism exists.
Therefore, the hypothesised type of violence examined in this work will be called the Market
of Narcotic Violence, or MNV. This concept is defined by six primary characteristics.  These
are  its  scope,  scale,  resilience, decentralisation,  external  constraints  and  internal
constraints.
Scope  is  a  qualitative  measurement  of  organised  violence,  relating  to the  optics  principle
discussed in Chapter 2. Violence associated with most organised crime has a mostly limited
scope: assault, intimidation and sporadic murders do not rise to this level. Conflicts meeting
the standard of a Market of Narcotic Violence must be indiscriminate, must involve targeting
of uninvolved civilians and authority figures along with participants. The use of equipment
and tactics normally associated with terrorist and guerrilla forces also helps a conflict meet
this measurement – mass casualty attacks on civilian or state targets, the use of high-powered
weapons and military-style small  unit  tactics are all  signifiers of  the scope that marks an
MNV.
Scale,  by contrast, is a measurement of the breadth of violence associated with a conflict. A
single large-scope incident against a background of ordinary levels of violence does not by
itself qualify a conflict as a Market of Narcotic Violence. Instead, an MNV must see levels of
significant,  relevant  violence  (assaults  and  murders  relatable  to  the  trade  in  narcotics)
increase by a statistically significant amount in the area in question, and remain elevated for a
period of years.231
231 For the reasons outlined in the previous chapters, these are not exact measurements. Rather, they are 
intentionally unspecific to account for the variety of possible dynamics in such a market.
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Resilience is, effectively, the quality of survivability. A market of violence cannot have a single
point of failure, nor can it be significantly impaired by small changes to the cultural, security
or political environment in which it operates. Inherent to the concept of resilience is its ability
to  adapt  and  evolve  to  continue  to  survive  changing  conditions  without  mutating  into  a
completely different form (an explicitly political insurgency, for example). 
Finally,  decentralisation  is perhaps the most important characteristic,  and forms a central
part  of  the rationale for  the use of  the term “market.”  John Robb built  upon this idea of
decentralised violent networks with the concept of a “bazaar of violence;” an open market in
which individuals  compete to offer  their  services  as  purveyors  of  violence  to a  variety  of
actors, thereby increasing their effectiveness through market dynamics. The concept of the
bazaar was based on the violence  in  Iraq from 2003 to 2008 and serves  to explain  how
organisations can survive, evolve and exhibit complex behaviour in an environment where
both competition between non-state groups is fierce and a powerful authority is actively trying
to suppress violence and destroy the organisations opposing it.232 
But decentralisation is not simply an organisational concept, which is one of the reasons why
the MNV is distinct from Robb's bazaar of violence. To Robb, the bazaar is the appropriate
metaphor because those looking for violent services – insurgents in Iraq with a particular
objective relative to the government or the American occupation forces, for example – have a
broad variety of violent specialists available for hire, ranging from expensive, highly-skilled
bomb-makers or sharpshooters down to the “unskilled labour” in the form of un- or under-
employed young men willing to emplace an Improvised Explosive Device or fire an AK-47 at
American troops  for  a  small  payment  (and whose  moral  resistance  to doing so has  been
eroded by differential association – specifically, that the influence of those who advise against
such action is weaker than those who encourage it).  In a Market of Narcotic Violence, these
interactions certainly take place, but the absence of an overriding political agenda means that
the market forces at work go a level deeper, meaning that violence serves not only as a service
available to all who can pay, but also a means by which competing groups can communicate
232
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and the very force which regulates the market and ensures that the most evolved and efficient
groups are the most successful.
A market possessing such characteristics is also defined by its constraints. These are both
external and internal. The external constraints are the characteristics that the state affected
cannot control – geography, climate, international economic trends and flows, etc. Internal
constraints  are  those  over  which  the  state  has  at  least  some  measure  of  control  –  the
transparency and accountability of its political processes, the reliability of its security forces,
its to provide adequate living conditions for its people, and so on. These sets of constraints
provide the overall structure in a Market of Narcotic Violence could conceivably take hold.
Such  a  market  can  exist  only  within  the  “flow”  of  narcotics  from  producer  to  consumer
regions, as the essential characteristic of resilience only functions if the profit margins of drug
trafficking are sufficiently high at the transit stage to compensate for the inevitable attrition
due to competition and state interference. Such a market's size is not necessarily linked to
state boundaries – indeed, the transnational nature of contemporary economic transactions
and particularly the bifurcated nature of the drugs trade means that such a market is unlikely
to operate solely within the borders of one individual state. The transnationality is a critical
element – distinguishing an MNV from single-state cases of illegal markets such as the U.S.'s
alcohol prohibition experiment, where the coercive power of the restricting state was limited
to  its  borders,  rather  than  the  multinational  nature  of  enforcement  in  the  global  drugs
prohibition system.
This, then, is the hypothesised type of conflict that will be tested against the case study of
Mexico  from  2006-2012.  The  international  drugs  trade,  which  has  developed  under
conditions of near-total global prohibition during an era when markets were becoming vastly
more internationalised, carries with it the potential for emergent behaviour – that even in the
absence of larger organising forces, the profit motives are high enough (relative to the other
economic alternatives) to create emergent forms of violent behaviour even in the absence of
an overarching political structure or motive. 
VI. Conclusion
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The nature of the transnational drugs trade in an environment of general prohibition can
result  in  conflicts  with  massive  asymmetries  between  combatants.  Herfried  Münkler,
extending an analysis of Clausewitz, writes, “In the new wars, by contrast, force becomes the
dominant  element in exchange  relations themselves  – either by  being bought in order to
produce  certain  results,  or  because the  exchange  of  equivalents  is  overlaid  or  completely
replaced with extortion and open threats of violence. Whereas classical inter-state wars are no
longer worthwhile, because they cost more than they yield for each of the participants, the
new wars are highly lucrative for many of the participants, because in the short term the force
used in them yields more than it costs – and the long-term costs are borne by others.”233
Although Münkler was not writing about the war on drugs, he could well have been: the costs
versus benefits accrued by the “combatants” in the war on drugs is vastly different between
drug  traffickers  and  governments.  For  governments,  limiting  the  spread  of  drugs  has
historically  been seen as  worthwhile  on the grounds of  health,  public order  and security,
whereas drug traffickers can turn a substantial profit without having to follow the classical
constraints of war. Historically, drugs have been too powerful an economic force, and their
prohibition too weak a social cause, to enable states to use the level of force that would be
conducive to permanently defeating drug traffickers.  While  it  is  eminently  possible,  given
sufficient determination and violence, for a state to kill or capture particularly powerful drug-
traffickers, the history of drug warfare demonstrates that the underlying constraints of the
international drug economy will usually lead to their replacement by more flexible individuals
and organisations.
This  thesis  argues  that  the ongoing violence  in  Mexico  occupies  part  of  a  broad category
between traditional archetypes of violent crime and war. Specifically, it argues that DTOs do
not  fall  into  the  category  of  Olson's  “roving  bandits,”  since  they  require  an  established
infrastructure  to  produce,  process,  move  and  sell  their  product;  to  collect,  launder  and
distribute the proceeds; and to maintain the necessary personnel and equipment to perpetrate
the  violence  necessary  to protect  themselves  in  a  competitive  and  violent  marketplace  (a
model that owes a great deal to Volkov's “violent entrepreneurs” thesis). Certainly the idea of
233
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violent entrepreneurs operating in direct conflict with authorities with the aid of a cash flow
from the production of narcotics is not terribly out of sync with other drug conflicts, as seen in
Afghanistan,  where  the  Taliban  and  local  warlords  have  had  mutually  convenient
arrangements with opium producers that enable them to make money from the onwards sale
of narcotics while gaining the popular support critical to a political insurgency.234 The growers
are by and large subsistence farmers for whom producing drugs is the only reliable way to
make a profit; preventing them from doing so has driven many into other forms of crime. 235
As a  result,  efforts  to reduce violence by targeting  drug crops  only  propagate  violence  in
apparently  open-ended  fashion.  This  self-perpetuating  model  has  also  been  found  in  the
border regions of Colombia and Peru in the late 1960s and early 1970s,236 where techniques
for the large-scale growing and processing of cocaine coincided with political upheaval – and,
importantly, the growth of demand for cocaine in the United States.237 
The examples of Colombia and Peru demonstrate that it is possible at great cost for a state to
reduce and marginalise an insurgency which uses drug trafficking as a source of funding. But
even in those cases, the production and distribution networks remain intact, along with some
degree of associated violence.  In an environment without that agrarian/political insurgent
dynamic, those counter-insurgency tactics are largely irrelevant; without a political cause to
win  over  the  population  or  terrain  to  win  and  hold,  violent  groups  will  inevitably  adopt
organisational forms best-suited for resilience and survivability. In such cases, the danger is
not that the state will be overrun or outfought, but rather that a network outside its control
will command sufficient violence to deteriorate its authority and hollow it out, and in doing so
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to create space for illegal trade to flourish.238 Within this hollow space, a Market of Narcotic
Violence  could  take  root  and  self-perpetuate,  creating  an  environment  in  which  levels  of
violence and insecurity remain high regardless of the fate of any particular group. The next
chapters explore whether the conflict in Mexico from 2006-2012 fulfilled the characteristics of
the hypothesis, and what relationship that has with Mexican and American counter-narcotics
policies.
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Chapter 4:
History and Geography: Specific
Constraints of the Mexican Drug
Conflict
92
I. Introduction
We now move from the theoretical to the empirical, advancing from a broad examination of
issues surrounding organised violence toward a detailed look at the thesis case study, the drug
conflict in Mexico from 2006 to 2012. Here it is critical to specify the ways in which Mexico's
geography and history serve create the conditions for a Market of Narcotic Violence. 
A detailed outline of the history and geography of Mexico is necessary to situate the drug
conflict at the heart of this research. This begins with an overview of the relevant aspects of
Mexican history, especially in relation to the critical U.S./Mexico border region, in order to
establish the contested physical and human terrain in this conflict.  Then,  the more recent
history of the Mexican conflict comes to the fore, with the roots of large-scale drug trafficking
during the rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), followed by the period of
co-existence and cooperation between the transactional drug traffickers of the mid/late 20 th
century. This period is critical for understanding what came next: the transition from the PRI
to  the  Partido  Acción  Nacional  (PAN),  which  proved  unable  to  maintain  an  effective
monopoly of force nationwide despite an aggressive campaign against traffickers. 
Finally,  the chapter examines two separate subsystems within the broader theatre of  drug
trafficking violence. First, it examines a case in the north of Mexico, specifically the “border
metropolis”  comprised  of  Ciudad Juarez  in  the Mexican state  of  Chihuahua and El  Paso,
Texas, which illustrates the apparent contradictions of the market of violence: the two cities,
linked by culture, populace and history and divided only by a national border, wherein one
became the epicentre of  the conflict  with thousands of  murders  per year,  while the other
remained astonishingly safe by any standard. It then examines the case of Guatemala, whose
location south of Mexico renders it vulnerable to many of the same drug trafficking and drug
violence trends, but whose contrasting political and geographic circumstances have yielded
violence of a dissimilar character. These discussions support the conclusion that that many of
the factors that can create a Market of Narcotic Violence are unique to Mexico, it is possible to
identify a general set of characteristics for actual and potential MNVs in other regions.
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In the context of this largely empirical chapter, it is nonetheless important to note some of the
essential  qualities of  drug violence in  Mexico,  including those that are  missing  from that
conflict.  Principally,  it  is  important  to note that despite the occasionally  apocalyptic news
coverage, Mexico's national murder rate is still relatively low by comparison to other Latin
American states.239 Certain areas of the country, particularly along the country's northern and
southern borders and along its Pacific coastline, have become vastly more dangerous since
2006; a few specific northern Mexican cities are now amongst the world's most dangerous
urban areas.240 But much of Mexico still enjoys stability and low rates of violence by regional
standards, and the national average murder rate is below that of El Salvador, Colombia or
Brazil,  and  is  roughly  equivalent  to  that  of  Russia.241242 By  itself,  this  dynamic  of  vastly
differing levels of danger by region is not unique to Mexico; globally,  most countries have
strong regional variations in violence. But several factors make the dynamic in Mexico worth
examining in detail. First, the speed with which relatively peaceable regions became havens of
violence is  uniquely  extreme:  the murder rate  in Juarez,  for  example,  escalated from 301
murders in 2007 to 1,607 in 2008 – an increase of over 500% in the space of 12 months. 243
Second, there was not a particularly compelling rationale for the sudden upswing in violence:
while Mexico has undergone significant political and economic changes in the last decade,
there have been no other indicators of social resistance in the form of a significant insurgency
or  protest  movement.  Third,  Mexico  was  not,  by  conventional  indicators,  a  particularly
239
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vulnerable  state  to  this  kind  of  upsurge  of  violence:  certainly,  its  democratic  and  law-
enforcement institutions were imperfect,  but by no means were they in worse shape than
those  of  other  comparable  nations.244245 Finally,  as  Chapter  3  detailed,  the  transnational
nature  of  contemporary  drug  trafficking  is  central  to  understanding  its  dynamics  and its
interplay  with violence,  and that  rarely  finds a clearer expression than in Mexico,  a  state
valuable to drug traffickers largely due to its proximity to a consumer market, rather than as a
production zone or market in its own right. Mexico, in other words, may have largely escaped
the political turmoil which swept its southern neighbours during and after the Cold War, but
its characteristics made it singularly well-suited to host a Market of Narcotic Violence. 
II. External Constraints: Three illustrative periods in Mexican/American
history
No conflict occurs in a vacuum, and the drug conflict in Mexico is no exception. The dynamics
of the turmoil have been deeply affected by that nation's relationship with its neighbours,
most  importantly by  its  relationship with its  immediate  northern counterpart,  the United
States. The relationship between the two countries is complex and multifaceted one; policy
made by one country across a broad range of economic and security issue areas inevitably
affects and pertains to the other. In this sense, Mexico and the U.S. demonstrate an evolved
form  of  intermestic  theory.  Countries  sharing  borders  do  not  always  share  destinies;  for
example,  the  relationship  between  Mexico  and  the  U.S.  has  significantly  more  complex
ramifications than the relationship between Canada and the U.S., despite the similarities of
their shared borders. 
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The joint  history of  Mexico and the U.S.  is  not the central  topic of  this  thesis.  But  some
background is necessary in order to illustrate the specific constraints of the hypothesis. Here
the relationship will be contextualised by examining three periods centred around the years
1846, 1911 and 1985, which demonstrate the critical aspects of this relationship in terms of
U.S./Mexican security and counter-narcotics policies.
1846. Mexican-American relations began with the two countries in similar circumstances –
recently independent post-colonial states competing to expand across what would eventually
become  the  American  southwest.  Mexico's  independence  from  Spain  came  within  a  few
decades of America's independence from Great Britain, and was also the product of a national
uprising.  Despite  this,  the  following  decades  saw  the  the  competition  between  the  two
countries spiral into outright war. Unlike the United States, Mexico found itself marginalised
by  Europe  –  it  was  not  even  formally  recognised  by  European  powers  until  1830.246
Meanwhile, the United States was rapidly consolidating its control over much of its present-
day territory by sending settlers westwards and reinforcing them with military forces where
they  met  opposition.  Many American settlers  ended up in  modern-day Texas,  which  was
legally part of Mexico; so many, in fact, that they soon outnumbered Mexicans roughly four to
one.247 Given the harshness of the land and the difficulty the nascent Mexican government
was having developing its economy, it initially saw the foreign settlers as a means to quickly
and cheaply develop an underpopulated section of their territory, but the relationship soon
soured. 
The Mexican government could exercise  little to no authority over Texans, who (amongst
other  violations)  kept  slaves,  in  contravention  of  Mexican  federal  law.  The  Mexican
government  attempted  to  maintain  order  by  prohibiting  further  colonisation,  but  Texans
instead elected to secede from Mexico entirely, forming an independent Republic of Texas.248
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When negotiations broke down and Mexico attempted to forcibly reintegrate its lost territory,
the United States annexed the Republic of Texas and declared war on Mexico in 1846. With a
larger population, a deeper treasury and a more developed industrial base, the subsequent
war was lopsided: the U.S. Army broke through the piecemeal Mexican defences quickly by
opening a number of fronts simultaneously and had taken control of Mexico City by October
1847.249 In the era of non-mechanised militaries, this was an enormous amount of territory to
cover  in  a  relatively  short  period;  moreover,  although  the  Mexican  military  aggressively
contested the advance, it  was soundly defeated in every major engagement. The Treaty of
Guadalupe,  signed at the beginning of 1848,  ended the conflict;  as part of  the terms,  the
United States paid Mexico $15 million for most of what is now the American Southwest –
roughly half of Mexico's total area at the time.250 The images of American troops storming the
ramparts of  Mexico City and raising the U.S. flag over the capital  echoed Hernán Cortés'
defeat of the Aztecs at Tenochtitlan.251 
1911.  The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries marked a period of significant
domestic unrest  in  Mexico. The fluctuation of  political  and economic systems during this
period undercut Mexico's  growth and development and left  it  with a  legacy of  weakened,
corrupted political institutions. Mexico's losses to the United States in the 1840s threw the
country into turmoil, which was exacerbated by European interventions during the 1850s and
1860s. In the aftermath of the American Civil  War, when the United States reasserted its
authority over North America, and European intervention ceased, the government of Mexico
briefly  reverted  to  a  republican  norm.  However,  in  1876,  Porfirio  Diaz  ascended  to  the
presidency,  which  he  held  almost  continuously  until  1911.  Diaz  ran  the  country  in  semi-
dictatorial fashion: he attempted to modernise the nation's agricultural and industrial bases,
249
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but also accumulated enormous power within his own office which he used to reward a small
inner circle to the exclusion of the vast majority of Mexicans.252 
After several decades of Diaz's rule, several disparate groups of Mexicans, mostly representing
the lower classes who felt left out of his reforms, revolted in the early 20th century and drove
him into exile. Unfortunately, none of them were willing to cede or share power – perhaps
unsurprisingly, given that the revolt represented a coming-together of disparate geographical
and social groups against a shared enemy. Factions led by Pancho Villa, Francisco Madero
and Emiliano Zapata turned on each other, transforming a revolution into a civil war. During
this  struggle,  forces  loyal  to  Villa  crossed  the  American  border  and  killed  a  number  of
American citizens,  leading to a  reprisal  operation  on Mexican territory  led  by U.S.  Army
General  John Pershing.  Madero ascended to the presidency in a  compromise intended to
bring a halt  to the fighting,  but was assassinated within two years,  and Zapata was killed
shortly thereafter. Villa, who had managed to evade General Pershing's forces (despite their
use of aircraft,  which at the time was considered revolutionary),  never managed to attain
formal political power. By 1930, with the dust settled from the civil war, the country fell int
the  hands  of  the  Partido  de  Revolucionario  Institucional (PRI),  a  political  party  whose
domination over Mexican politics would last for the next seven decades. For all its apparent
success, though, the PRI's 70 years in power would be marked by successive administrations
pledging fealty to the same party structure, but in reality serving very different constituencies.
The  informal  and  unaccountable  power  structures  created  by  this  arrangement  would
ultimately have significant implications for  the Mexican government's  ability to cope with
internal security threats.253
1985. The trends toward institutional corruption, weakness and an arm's-length relationship
with the United States continued apace throughout the long stretch of PRI rule. These factors
manifested themselves  in increasingly bold and profitable strategies amongst trans-border
252
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smugglers, especially drug traffickers. But what had been a limited amount of both trafficking
and  violence  along  the  border  began  to  change  with  the  arrival  of  transnational  drug-
smuggling syndicates in the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, Colombian groups ran the drug traffic
in the Western Hemisphere, with Mexican organisations primarily responsible for bringing
narcotics  across  the  American  border.  Production,  the  bulk  of  the  transit  and  end-user
distribution were all handled by Colombians. Mexico was also not a factor in the distribution
of the most lucrative (by weight) product, cocaine, which was brought to the American market
via  the  Caribbean  and  Miami.  In  the  1980s,  however,  increased  American-led  nautical
interdiction efforts cut into the profits from this route while law enforcement on land dealt
harsh blows to the leadership of the Colombian groups.254 
However,  these  efforts  did  nothing  to  tamp  down  the  demand  for  narcotics  in  the  U.S.
Instead,  it  created  a  power  vacuum  in  the  drug-smuggling  industry  and  left  Mexican
organisations uniquely positioned to capitalise on it. Equally importantly, the PRI, with its
centralised  but  complacent  power  structures,  presented  little  resistance  to  enterprising
traffickers with abundant financial and human resources, eventually accepting a symbiotic
coexistence with them. Smugglers such as Amado Carrillo Fuentes, called “The Lord of the
Skies” for  his  use of  a fleet  of  aircraft  (reputedly  including massive Boeing 747s)  in drug
smuggling, neutralised the Mexican state by bribing security officials at the highest levels.255256
They also made an informal agreement with the government: they would limit the extent of
violence used to regulate their trade, and in return the government would turn a blind eye to
drug smuggling and stall the counter-narcotics efforts of the U.S. The degree to which the
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central authority of the PRI was knowingly complicit with drug traffickers is disputed,257 but
Peter Lupsha provides a helpful outline of the dynamics at the lower levels by breaking the
principal trends in narco-corruption into chronological phases:
“Phase I (before 1960 to approximately 1965), the dance of narco-corruption appeared to
be dominated by the rhythm of the “La Plaza”.258 In phase II (from approximately 1962-
1982),  the  “Direction  Federal  de  Seguridad”  (DFS),  the  political  police  arm  of  the
Secretariat  of  Government  (Gobernacion),  began to dominate  the dance.  Although the
rhythm of “La Plaza” and that of Mexican Federal Judicial Police (PJF), and the military
were  still  present.  From 1982-1985,  these  latter  rhythms came to  dominate  phase III.
Phase IV, (1985-1990), witnessed a decentralization of narco-corruption with the military,
State, and individual officials adding their regional and state rhythms to the dance.” 259
Lupsha's research suggests that the internal power dynamics within the PRI served to create
multiple resilient  lines  of  communication between drug traffickers  and state officials.  The
result  was  that  whether  or  not  the highest  authorities  were  directly  in  contact  with drug
traffickers,  the system of  state  security  they relied upon to carry out  their  orders was so
thoroughly corrupted that any attempts to impose reform from on high would be frustrated
from the bottom up by the security apparatus.260
These  trends  came  to  a  head  in  1985,  when  undercover  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camerana was kidnapped, tortured and murdered while
on  assignment  in  Mexico.  This  event  triggered  the  largest  homicide  investigation  in  the
history  of  the  DEA,  and  resulted  over  the  next  few  years  in  the  arrest,  extradition  and
257
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conviction of a number of high-level drug traffickers who had been involved in his murder.261
More importantly, it represented the high-water mark for the strategy of virtually unrestricted
state capture by DTOs. After 1985, the Mexican government began a process by which, slowly
and  unsteadily,  its  central  power  structures  became  increasingly  less  vulnerable  to  overt
corruption, cutting traffickers off from a major source of power and an enabler of profit.
These historical benchmarks are important because they demonstrate what are, effectively,
the external  constraints  for  the Market  of  Narcotic  Violence  in  Mexico:  a  combination of
historical antagonisms with the United States, institutions undermined by decades of political
instability followed by decades of single-party rule and the country's geographic situation as
the  vital  last  link  in  a  narcotics  supply  chain  that  runs  from  South  America  to  the  rich
customers in the United States. With this backdrop established, it is important to examine
how the recent history of Mexico has shaped the dynamics of the drugs trade and created the
conditions for conflict.
III. Internal constraints: the contemporary history of Mexican drug violence
By the mid-to-late 20th century the Mexican state had become increasingly entangled with the
business of drug trafficking. The end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st saw it slowly
and haltingly start to extricate itself from this arrangement. Given that this study concerns the
period from 2006-2012, an examination of the historical context of the last two decades is
necessary in order to determine the internal constraints of the market.
Contemporaneously with the era of PRI state capture by DTOs, the legitimate border trade
between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  was  also  experiencing  a  period  of  rapid  growth.
American companies were beginning to move operations south of  the border in search of
cheaper labour and less regulation, while Mexican manufacturing began to surpass the oil
industry as the country's most lucrative export.262 Given their common cause, companies on
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both sides of the border began to pressure their respective governments to lower the barriers
to doing business transnationally. The culmination of this effort was the North American Free
Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA),  which  largely  eliminated  tariffs  and  export/import  duties
between the U.S., Mexico and Canada. NAFTA's entry into force had both direct and indirect
effects for the drug-trafficking industry: it vastly increased the volume of trans-border trade,
which made detection of illicit cargo “piggybacking” with legal goods much more difficult and
expensive, and it led to massive intra-Mexican migration.263 American companies seeking to
cheaply produce goods destined for American consumers established large factories along the
border, where shipping and labour costs could be minimised. These  maquiladoras offered
what were, at the time, reasonably good wages and the promise of a better life for unemployed
Mexicans, who flocked north to cities such as Ciudad Juarez to find jobs. When these factories
closed  –  a  frequent  occurrence,  especially  in  the  wake  of  the  2007-8  recession264 –  the
displaced workers found themselves with few legitimate alternatives that could compete with
the pay offered by drug traffickers.
In 2000, the PRI – weakened by years of scandal and infighting – lost a presidential election
for the first time in 70 years. The winner was the PAN's candidate, Vicente Fox. The PAN's
rise continued a trend that had begun to define the structure of the Mexican state and society
since the 1980s: the replacement of a top-down, hierarchical system with a more distributed
system of authority. This system, while more democratic, also upset the fragile peace between
DTOs  and  the  state.  Under  the  PRI,  the  Mexican  government  had  come  to  an  informal
agreement with a small number of large cartels, principally those centred around Sinaloa and
the Gulf  coast.  Broadly speaking,  the government would not seek to interrupt the flow of
drugs into the country from the south or out of the country to the north, while in exchange the
cartels would limit the level of violence they used. On the whole, the hierarchical, centralised
DTOs and their mutually beneficial relationship with the authorities kept violence local and
minimal; there was, after all, no incentive for it to be otherwise. 
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The period from 2000 to 2006 represents a transitional period for drug trafficking in Mexico.
With the defeat of the PRI at the national level – and, just as importantly, the widespread
replacement of local PRI governments with those controlled by opposition parties (a process
that had started in the 1990s265), the power structures which had enabled the traffickers to
efficiently capture the state quickly ceased to be. The new PAN government not only brought
in its own justice and law enforcement officials, it  fundamentally reorganised the Mexican
justice system. Crucially, it distributed power outwards from the national attorney general's
office to the offices of the state attorneys general, which hampered the ability of a few large
criminal groups to maintain control over the political-criminal nexus and establish themselves
as the dominant, unassailable player in the drug-smuggling game.266 At the turn of the 21st
century, the most powerful trafficking organisation was the Sinaloa Cartel, headed by Joaquín
“El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, a flamboyant but canny trafficker whose billions in assets had
landed him on the Forbes list of the world's wealthiest individuals, and whose escapades had
become legendary.267268 The  Sinaloa  Cartel's  major  opposition  came from the  Gulf  Cartel
(Cartel del Golfo, or CdG), based on Mexico's eastern seaboard, while a smattering of smaller
groups maintained territories spread out over other parts of the country. Under pressure from
the Sinaloa Cartel, the CdG took a shortcut to developing a specialty in violence: they enticed a
number of soldiers from an elite, American-trained Mexican Army unit, the Special Forces
Airmobile Group (Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, or GAFES), to desert and become
their “armed wing.” Styling themselves “Los Zetas,”269 this group was destined to become one
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of the most violent and nihilistic of the criminal groups, but initially they served to defend the
interests of the CdG, largely at the expense of the Sinaloas.270
In short, the fragmentation of the criminal power structure was already well underway during
the Fox administration. Nationally, the level of violence, which had been trending downward
for roughly a decade, began to creep upward again toward the end of Fox's time in office. 271
The Fox administration was on much friendlier terms with the United States than its PRI
predecessors, so security cooperation with the United States was also slowly increasing during
this period, although at least some of the increased security cooperation (particularly the ties
between the militaries of the two nations) began in the last years of PRI rule.272 
The  2006 election  proved a  pivotal  point  for  violence  in  Mexico.  Mexican presidents  are
prohibited  by  law from seeking  consecutive  terms  in  office,  so  Fox  was  not  a  candidate.
Instead,  the PAN nominated  Felipe  Calderón,  a  former  party  chairman and Fox's  former
Secretary  of  Energy.  In  a  three-way contest  with the candidates  of  the PRI and the PRD
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática, a left-wing coalition party), Calderón prevailed by an
officially certified margin of roughly one-half of a percentage point, with just under 36% of the
total  votes  cast.  The PRD alleged irregularities  in  the election,  but  were  overruled in  the
courts, and despite major protests in Mexican cities on their behalf (not to mention a brawl in
the Chamber of Deputies between PAN and PRD representatives273), Calderón was sworn in
as the president of Mexico on December 1, 2006.274 
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One of Calderón's first acts was to order the Army and the Federal Police into his home state
of Michoacán in a show of force against drug traffickers. This operation met with initial public
success:  drug  seizures  escalated  considerably  without  a  noticeable  uptick  in  violence.275
Moreover, the operation produced useful visuals for the Mexican government in a way that
has  subsequently  become  familiar:  captured  drug  figures  brought  before  the  cameras,
shackled, and paraded in front of tables groaning under the weight of confiscated drugs and
weapons – often customised with gold or silver plating, inscriptions or ivory handles – all
while under the vigilant eye of masked, heavily-armed federales.276 
The target of the deployment in Michóacan was predominantly the local cartel,  La Familia
Michóacana  (LFM).  La Familia  were in  many  ways  an  unusual  player  amongst  Mexican
DTOs. At the time, they were also one of the newest, having only announced their presence to
the  world  (by means  of  rolling  five  severed  human  heads  with a  statement  of  principles
attached to them onto the floor of a nightclub) earlier that year.277 They were also, unusually,
a  DTO  with  a  socio-religious  code;  a  criminal  gang  with  insurgent  tendencies  that  also
developed an  alternative  social  safety  net  and  government-replacement  structures.278 The
Army and Federal Police made some arrests, but were unable to separate LFM from its power
base.  Nonetheless,  the  Calderón  administration  viewed  the  operation  as  a  success,  and
widened  the  deployment  of  the  federal  police  and  military  to  other  parts  of  the  country
affected by the drugs trade.
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Militarisation  was  in  many  ways  an  undesirable  strategy,  but  one  which  the  Mexican
government viewed as a necessity. The Calderón administration's policy priority was to 'break'
the drug organisations at all levels, from their linkages to legitimate power structures to their
ties  to  local  communities  and  their  ability  to  launder  money  and  undertake  armed
operations.279 In  order  to  execute  this  strategy,  the  administration  took  stock  of  its  law
enforcement  agencies  and  determined  that  they  were  not  up  to  the  task.  Mexican  law
enforcement is, broadly speaking, organised in similar fashion to its equivalents in the United
States. Municipalities and states have their own forces, which are primarily concerned with
local crime and are the lowest-paid, worst-equipped and most vulnerable to corruption in the
country.280281 The  federal  police,  which  have  been  restructured,  repurposed  and  renamed
several  times  in  the  period  since  2006,  are  responsible  for  security  throughout  Mexican
territory, and are generally better equipped for more serious confrontation than the state and
local police.282 All these forces have had corruption at some level, although as local and state
forces  are  lower-paid  and  are  organic  to  the communities  they  are  assigned  to,  they  are
inherently more susceptible to coercion and corruption.
The Mexican military, on the other hand, is organised somewhat differently from its American
counterpart. The Mexican Army and Air Force form one branch, which answers directly to the
Office of the President, while the Navy and Marines form another. There is no equivalent to
the Pentagon; no central civilian official below the President is responsible for overseeing all
the branches of the military, which has contributed to a higher level of institutional rivalry
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between the different branches of the armed forces. The military is well-equipped and well-
trained for a force whose main objective is the physical security of the nation, rather than
power projection at a regional or global level.283 Furthermore,  they are held in fairly high
regard  by  most  Mexican  citizens,  particularly  compared  to  other  parts  of  the  Mexican
government and security apparatus.284285 Nevertheless, they were not trained for the kind of
specialised  counter-insurgency/counter-narcotics  work  the  Calderón  administration  was
demanding.
As a result, the Mexican government turned to its northern neighbour for assistance. Even
given  the  post-2000  warming  in  relations  between  the  U.S.  and  Mexican  governments,
institutional and national rivalries and suspicions have imposed some limits on the scope of
the links.286 But the requirements of the new counter-narcotics mission left  Calderón with
little choice. In 2008, the United States and Mexico formalised the new relationship through
the vehicle of the Mérida Initiative, which pledged $1.4 billion in training and equipment for
the Mexican military  and law enforcement.  Unfortunately,  this  aid was relatively  slow in
coming.  Internal  politics,  bureaucratic  infighting  and  the  unwillingness  of  the  American
government to simply hand over cash without substantial oversight slowed its distribution to
the responsible Mexican agencies. By autumn 2010, two years into the programme, only 9% of
Mérida funds had actually been spent.287 Meanwhile, the Calderón administration, eager not
to appear as though it was simply settling scores in the president's home territory, was rapidly
broadening  the  scope  of  its  counter-narcotics  campaign.  It  followed  the  deployment  in
Michoacán with military operations in Sinaloa, Matamoros, Chihuahua, Baja California and
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other regions, largely along the northern border. But as these deployments were occurring,
the  rate  of  violence  in  those  areas  began  to  increase,  in  some  cases  dramatically.  If  the
objective  was  an  immediate  pacification  of  the  areas  in  question  –  a  “shock  and  awe”
campaign directed at drug trafficking groups – it cannot be described as successful.
Pre-2006, the Mexican DTOs were large and well-established, given that they did not have to
deal  with a government that  viewed them as an existential  threat.  As a result,  they could
expand across new territories and into new markets while using significantly lower levels of
violence. When this dynamic shifted, the motivation for violence shifted as well. While there is
not a clear, single turning point, the increased level of  government pressure on traffickers
under Calderón's government lead to a rapid fracturing of the drug trafficking culture. One of
the  most  important  splits  occurred  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Mexican  government's
crackdown, when the Zetas, the Gulf Cartel's semi-independent enforcement arm, split  off
from their erstwhile benefactors and went into business for themselves.288 In order to bolster
their  numbers,  the  Zetas  recruited  openly,  even  hanging  banners  from bridges  in  Nuevo
Laredo offering good salaries, healthcare, life insurance, a “company car” and other benefits
to recruits.289 
These  changes  in  the  Mexican  political  and  law  enforcement  situation  fractured  the
established drug trafficking networks and created a diffuse, violently competitive market in its
place. Whereas before 2000, the bulk of drug trafficking from Mexico was undertaken by
three major cartels operating in entirely separate regions, by 2011 there were at least 10 major
groups, along with countless dozens of smaller regional or local operations.290  Moreover, the
trafficking organisations that existed under the PRI had essentially divided up the country's
territory between them, which limited the potential for open conflict. The subsequent split of
these geographically  disparate  groups,  combined with increased  law enforcement on both
288
 Garzón, 2010, p. 96.
289
 Ibid.
290
 STRATFOR, “Polarization and Sustained Violence in Mexico's Cartel War,” 24 January 2012, 
accessed from www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-violence-mexicos-cartel-war 
on 21 May 2013.
108
sides of the border, placed a much larger number of trafficking groups in direct competition,
thus increasing the potential for competitive violence. That dynamic is exacerbated by the
rapidly shifting allegiances between groups and sub-groups of traffickers, as seen with the
Gulf/Zetas  split.  Moreover,  the  Mexican  government  pursued  a  broad-based  decapitation
strategy: instead of aiming to systematically break down a particular group, as Colombia did
(with substantial U.S. assistance) in the early 1990s, it has sought to capture or kill whatever
high-level  traffickers  it  can  find.291 Instead  of  weakening  the  existing  organisations  and
depriving them of leadership, direction and capacity to perpetrate violence, that strategy had
the effect of further fracturing existing cartels, creating increased competition for terrain and
resources and increasing the value of the currency of violence.292 The Mexican government
has  repeatedly  argued  that  the  vast  majority  of  victims  in  the  drug  war  are  themselves
participants and that the surge in violence is a sign of its success,293 but the ongoing drumbeat
of  casualties,  especially  amongst  vulnerable  populations  such  as  migrant  workers,  has
undercut this message.  
Together, these issues – the continuing institutional weaknesses of the Mexican government's
security services, the economic trends that prompted massive migration of Mexican citizens
from the south to the north of the country and then left many of them without a legitimate
way to make a living and a security strategy that exacerbated the fragmentation of major,
geographically  divided  DTOs  into  smaller,  more  competitive  and  more  violent  groups  –
represent  the  internal  constraints  of  the  Market  of  Narcotic  Violence  in  Mexico.  To
understand how both sets of constraints work in practice, it is necessary to examine both a
microcosm of the Mexican case, and the separate (but related) conflict in Guatemala.
IV.  The Border Nexus of Crime and Commerce:  Ciudad Juarez and El
Paso
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A Market of Narcotic Violence does not have what Clausewitz might recognise as a centre of
gravity, but if it did, it would likely be Ciudad Juarez, which is located in northern Chihuahua
state, directly across from El Paso, Texas. Juarez is useful in this context because it represents
a critical terrain for DTOs in a tactical sense. It is also a microcosm of the dynamics of the
border, which is the most critical piece of terrain to the participants in the conflict. In order to
better understand the El Paso/Juarez dynamic and its place in the conflict, an October 2011
fieldwork  visit  to  El  Paso  is  part  of  this  analysis.  Unfortunately,  the  ongoing  security
concerns,294 made travel into Juarez itself impractical.
Juarez and El Paso form the “world's largest border metropolis,” joined by culture and history
and divided by a border fence and the shallow, narrow and sluggish Rio Grande. In many
respects, the two are functionally indistinguishable. Driving through El Paso, there are dozens
of cars with Chihuahua state license plates, and although El Paso's downtown resembles that
of many other medium-sized American cities, its nearby 'golden horseshoe' neighbourhood,
which abuts the border, might as well be in Mexico: nearly every sign is in Spanish, every
radio seems to be set to Spanish-language stations, and the vast majority of residents are of
Mexican ancestry.  The lives  of  the two cities are  run through with  deep interlinkages:  in
addition to the many families with members living on both sides of the line, conversations
with El Paso residents indicated that up until 2008 it was extremely common for them to
simply walk across the international border into Juarez for a meal, shopping or a night out.
The grim realities of the violence in Juarez seem to have put a stop to that practice. Now, El
Paso and Juarez are deeply divided by a simple risk calculus: where Juarez had over 3,000
murders  in  2010,295 El  Paso  had  5.296 The  combination  of  post-9/11  security  measures,
political pressures around border control and the surge in drug violence have made crossing
the border a time-consuming, frustrating experience. Heeding the fairly unambiguous travel
294
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advice  of  the  State  Department,297 Americans  have  largely  stopped  traveling  into  Juarez,
which has devastated the city's once-thriving tourism industry – and, in doing so, reinforced
the economic rationale for involvement in drug trafficking. 
The recent level of violence in Juarez is unparalleled in the city's history, at least going back to
the early 20th century, when the city was a critical battleground in the Mexican Civil War.
Under  the  PRI's  rule,  tensions  were  generally  high  between  the  Mexican  and  American
governments, but the mid-20th century period saw the development of increasingly strong
informal cross-border relationships. Twinned border cities, including San Diego and Tijuana
and a plethora of smaller cities, towns and settlements developed increasing trade across the
frontier, paired with the development of families spreading both north and south of the line.
These organic, apolitical linkages predated any kind of formal border control by the national
governments,  giving  smugglers  a  number  of  advantages  over  their  law-enforcement
counterparts.298 Up until roughly the 1970s, the illicit trans-border trade largely consisted of
small consumer items, cigarettes,  alcohol,  marijuana, heroin destined for customers in the
immediate border region. 
As an example, Howard Campbell relates the story of  La Nacha  (“The dope queen,” whose
real  name  was  Ignacia  Jasso  González), one  of  the  most  famous  and  influential  drug
traffickers in Juarez from this period. While reliable information on the drugs trade from this
period is difficult to come by, it appears that  La Nacha came to control the heroin trade in
Juarez from the 1930s until the 1960s, accumulating a fortune of at least $4.4 million in the
process. The interesting contrast between La Nacha and her successors is that her business
was locally-oriented; she bought heroin on the Mexican side of the border and sold it there as
well, either to American tourists (including a large number of American soldiers on leave from
nearby Fort Bliss) or in bulk to individual smugglers, who were specialists  in crossing the
border with illicit cargo and had their own contacts on the northern side of the border. There
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was violence associated with the trade in La Nacha's day, of course, but it was localised and
limited in scale – evidenced by the fact that she died of old age, peacefully and free, in 1977. 299
The next important development for Juarez was the passage of NAFTA. With the significant
easing  of  tariffs  and  trade  bureaucracy  between  Mexico  and  the  U.S.  came  a  significant
incentive for  companies to locate operations in Mexico, where labour was cheaper, but as
close to the U.S. border as possible in order to minimise the costs and complexity of shipping.
The foreign-owned factories that sprang up along the border in the wake of NAFTA's passage
were known as  maquiladoras,  and their promise of better wages led to a massive wave of
migrants  moving  from  southern  Mexico  to  Juarez  and  its  surrounding  area.  The
maquiladoras  were far from a blessing for the city. Between the overabundance of migrant
workers and the general laxity of Mexican labour laws, wages are generally very low, forcing
workers to live in overcrowded slums. In addition to the poor conditions, another danger
emerged prior to the onset of widespread drug violence: hundreds young women, mostly poor
maquiladora  labourers,  were  murdered  in  the  early  2000s.  Most  of  these  cases  remain
unsolved.300 But if the coming of the maquiladoras brought social problems, the slow death
spiral of the region's economy (thanks in part to competition from even cheaper production
elsewhere in the developing world and in part to the recession of 2007) have not undone those
effects;  rather,  they have left  the city with even more underemployed residents,  putting a
strain on social services and offering a fertile recruiting ground for drug gangs.
As the other economic options dwindled, drug trafficking became an increasingly attractive
alternative  means  of  financial  support,  regardless  of  the  risks.  But  not  only  does  Juarez
represent a desirable route into the United States, it has also increasingly become a contested
drug market in its own right. As a result, two parallel “tracks” of violence are unfolding –
more organised violence for control of the border approaches, and more free-form violence
for control of the local plazas and tienditas. In some respects, the two are deeply connected:
the availability of ad hoc violent specialists who have cut their teeth in local battles for plazas
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and tienditas has made it much easier for the larger trafficking organisations to contract out
their operations in Juarez to locals – and their numbers (along with the ready availability of
arms  in  nearby  American  gun  shops)  have  driven  down  the  price  of  violent  services
dramatically.  This lack of accountability and professionalism, along with the fear amongst
contract assassins that they will become victims themselves if they fail their missions, 301 which
accounts for some of the worst, most indiscriminate crimes in Juarez, as when 15 teenagers
were machine-gunned as they attended a party in 2008. Although a number of people were
subsequently arrested and convicted for the attack, the trial was marred by accusations that
the accused had been tortured by police.302 
In response to such wanton attacks, and the overall lack of security in Juarez, the Calderón
Administration undertook a multifaceted strategy to try to rein in the level of violence in the
city. In addition to permanently stationing federal police and Army units, and installing as
police chief  Julian Leyzaola,303 a former Army colonel who had previously taken over and
reformed the police department in Tijuana (although not without substantial complaints that
his forces serially violated human rights and due process)304, the Mexican government began a
series of public restoration programmes, such as Todos Somos Juarez (“We are all Juarez,”)
to  rebuild  the  city  and  its  civic  institutions  as  a  bulwark  against  drug  trafficking.  The
government presented these measures as part of a two-track strategy, along with increased
armed campaigns against local traffickers. While these efforts had (at best) a mixed record,305
the level of violence in Juarez did decline a small but significant amount in 2011 and 2012 –
though the lower rates were still significantly higher than both the overall rate of violent crime
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in  Mexico  and Juarez  itself  before  2006.  Given the importance  of  Juarez  as  a  smuggling
waypoint strategically located in the centre of the Mexican-U.S. borderlands, it remains to be
seen whether such gains can be made permanent in the absence of a broader resolution to the
conflict. 
V. The significance of geography and history: The case of Guatemala
As established, one of the principal aspects of the contemporary trade in narcotics, and the
violence that accompanies it, is  transnationality.  The Mexican drug conflict can accurately
said to be a largely Mexican issue, but at a fundamental level, it is not solely a Mexican one.
As demonstrated, the mechanism of the modern drug trafficking system works best when it
can take advantage of  the same efficiencies as  legitimate business:  locating production in
countries with the lowest labour costs and selling goods where prices are the highest. In the
case of the specific mechanism that includes Mexico, the area in question could be said to
include everything from the southernmost coca production operations in Peru and Colombia
to  the  end  users  across  the  United  States,  and  even  further  afield  if  money  laundering
operations are included.306 The Market of Narcotic Violence requires a globalised economic
environment  to  exist;  it  follows  that  its  connections  can  be  traced  out  very  far  and  very
broadly. But the specific type of violence discussed here is clearly subject to some limitations.
Violence in producer countries – which, discussed, frequently correlates with an ideological
insurgency of some kind – is beyond its scope; as is the local market violence associated with
the retail drugs trade. Money laundering linkages can also be excluded, largely on the basis
that  the  process  of  money  laundering  by  its  nature  is  not  associated  with  high  levels  of
violence, which are contrary to its purposes.
Mexico stands apart from Guatemala and its Central American neighbours in a number of
respects. It is vastly larger (in both physical and population terms) than any Central American
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nation, and its proximity to the United States gives it closer cultural and political ties with the
Northern Hemisphere's superpower than any of them. But its contemporary history is also
significantly different: during the Cold War, Mexico's government steadfastly refused to align
with either global superpower, choosing instead a path of vaguely left-wing non-alignment.307
But where Mexico had the advantage of considerable size, population density and resource
wealth to protect its non-aligned stance, the smaller, poorer nations to its south did not. As a
result,  they were less  able to resist  economic,  political  and military  interference  from the
superpowers,  with  the  Soviets  interested  in  bolstering  their  position  in  the  Western
Hemisphere  in  order  to  counter  the  American  containment  strategy,  and  the  Americans
seeking to limit Soviet influence in what they had, since the Monroe Doctrine of the early 19 th
century, considered their “back yard.”
Guatemala has a significant history of  instability  and political  violence dating back to the
1960s. But the country's  civil  war between leftist  insurgents and a right-wing government
reached a brutal peak during the 1980s. That history is directly relevant to the current drug
violence, as the conflict left the country bereft of functional institutions but with a surfeit of
weapons  and  men  with  no  skills  or  job  prospects  aside  from  the  ability  to  use  force.
Guatemala also suffers from its geography: its position occupying most of Mexico's southern
border makes it both an important waypoint for northbound drug shipments and a relatively
safe base of operations for Mexican drug traffickers.  
Guatemala's recent history tracks with that of much of the rest of Central America: with the
emergence of the Cold War, it  hosted a proxy conflict  between established capitalist  elites
backed by the United States and left-wing guerrillas supported through various means by the
Soviet Union. As with similar conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsehwere in Central and
South America, this war was largely fought through irregular means. The Soviet Union was
not  willing  to  send  its  own  forces  or  create  local  armies  equipped  with  heavy  military
equipment,  so it  provided aid largely  in the form of  small  arms  and training in  guerrilla
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warfare. In Guatemala, the rebels never succeeded in building the necessary support for an
assault  on the  capital  á  la  Mao  or  Castro;  as  a  result,  the  war  mostly  played out  in  the
countryside, with sympathetic villagers supporting and hiding the rebel forces, enabling them
to  conduct  hit-and-run  raids  on  military  facilities  and  forces.  In  response,  and  with  the
support of the United States, the Guatemalan military created special forces units known as
kabiles trained in the arts of jungle warfare, whose remit was to track the guerrillas through
the jungle and destroy them. However, this strategy resulted in rapidly escalating violence, as
the  kabiles  would  frequently  attempt  to  “drain  the  swamp”  by  massacring  entire  villages
judged to be supporting the rebels. The ultimate human toll was enormous: some 200,000
people are estimated to have been killed,308 although the exact total is heavily disputed.309
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the major source of external funding and
support  for  the  rebels  disappeared.  In  contrast  to  Colombia  or  Peru,  where  rebels  could
replace  their  financial  support  whilst  simultaneously  binding  themselves  to  their  rural
constituents by becoming involved in drug production, Guatemala lacked both an established
drug  production  tradition  and  the  climactic  conditions  to  support  large-scale  coca  leaf
growth.310 With no realistic potential for victory and few remaining alternatives, the rebels
agreed to a negotiated settlement, which brought the political phase of the conflict to an end
in the mid-1990s. 
Nevertheless,  the  rate  of  normal  violence  remained  high  in  Guatemala.  The  conflict  left
thousands of men, skilled only at fighting, out of work in struggling post-conflict economy.
Additionally, thanks to the absence of any serious, coordinated attempts at demilitarisation,
the small arms that had flooded the country during the civil war remained in circulation. As a
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result, the murder rate in the immediate wake of the conflict remained high by international
standards, though somewhat lower than other Central American with similar histories. But
starting in 1999, the rate of violence began to climb again rapidly, exceeding the comparable
rates in Colombia and Mexico, and leading then-president Álvaro Colom to declare that the
violence  was worse  than during the  civil  war.311 With  under-equipped,  under-funded and
often corrupt police forces, the Guatemalan government subsequently struggled to control its
territory, even though it was no longer facing an insurgency – instead, what seems to have
driven the violence initially  was a surge  in gang membership and violent  competition for
control of local criminal markets.312
The fact that Guatemalan politics were not particularly well-settled in this period prevented a
consolidation of power or the development of more effective law enforcement, intelligence,
judiciary  or  penal  systems.  Power  shifted  rapidly  between  parties,  and  personal  animus
between powerful  party leadership figures has played a major role in the country's recent
political history.313 Furthermore, party elites are not immune from violence; the 2007 election
cycle saw the murder of some seven sitting Congressional deputies, and a host of other attacks
on political figures.314
The transit of illegal narcotics is not a completely new phenomenon in Guatemala, but it has
increased considerably in the last few years. Hal Brands explains: 
“The amount of  cocaine transiting  the country  has  grown exponentially  over the last  two
decades [since 2011], and U.S. officials estimate that between 180 and 400 metric tons—with
a street value of up to $10 billion—now transit Guatemala per year. In its annual narcotics
report, issued in early 2010, the State Department identified Guatemala as 'the epicenter of
the drug threat' in Central America.”
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With the rapid increase in the amount of narcotics entering Guatemala have come external
criminal  organisations,  most  notably  Mexican  cartels.  Guatemala's  border  with  Mexico
remains  fairly  unsecured,  despite  a  considerable  joint  effort  on  the  part  of  the  two
governments,  supported  by  the  U.S.  Operating  across  it  enables  such  groups  to  frustrate
official efforts to deprive them of sanctuary. The Zetas are commonly reckoned to be the first
Mexican DTO to establish a major presence in Guatemala, although the Sinaloa Federation
has followed suit.315 The result has been a sharp uptick in the country's already high murder
rate, along with military deployments and the use of “state of siege” legislation in the northern
border regions, which permits the government to suspend certain civil rights and temporarily
assume greater powers for security forces. Naturally, such laws also carry significant potential
for abuse.316 
Despite the rapid increase in the amount of narcotics transiting Guatemalan territory, drug
use remains relatively rare, due in no small part to the inability of average Guatemalans to
afford expensive imported drugs.317 Given that, Guatemala can be said to be facing what is
almost entirely a security, rather than a public health, problem with drugs. It is in that context
that current president Otto Perez Molina called for an international legal structure that would
permit  Guatemala  to  decriminalise  the  passage  of  narcotics  into,  through  and  out  of  its
territory  without  falling  afoul  of  the  international  narcotics  control  consensus.318 But  the
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violence  may  be  entirely  beyond  the  control  of  the  state  at  this  stage,  and  in  any  case,
changing the legal status of the drugs as they pass through Guatemalan territory might not
affect the violence there. 
As with Mexico, the violence in Guatemala represents a multifaceted conflict, rather than a
bilateral struggle between criminals and the state. Guatemala is home to a number of different
violent  groups,  including  local  street  gangs,  larger  gangs  with  international  reach,
paramilitary  organisations,  corrupt  police  and  military  formations  and,  to  an  increasing
degree, the two largest Mexican DTOs, the Sinaloa Federation and the Zetas.319 Facing these
groups  are  the  relatively  small  and  underpaid  Guatemalan  security  services,  whose
compensation and reputation are so dismal that private security guards for the wealthy have
become one of the country's biggest industries, with estimates of their numbers ranging up to
three  times  the  size  of  the  national  police  force.320 In  contrast  to  the  Mexican  example,
Guatemalan forces are not the only ones engaged:  American forces  belonging both to the
military and the DEA (in the form of paramilitary Foreign Advisory Support Teams) also take
part in direct action, carrying out armed raids against suspected drug traffickers with the
permission and cooperation of the Guatemalan government – although as accounts of such
raids by American State Department officials indicate, the need for secrecy is paramount, as
leaks  within  Guatemalan  security  agencies  are  rampant  and  corrupt  police  officers  are
frequently amongst those found at targeted locations.321
The smaller size of Guatemala, the legacies of other forms of civil conflict and the particular
dynamic  of  the  country's  national  politics  have  blurred  the  line  between  economic  and
political  violence.  Nevertheless,  there  is  an  identifiable  strand of  drug-related  violence  in
Guatemala,  especially  thanks  to  the  presence  of  Mexican  drug  trafficking  groups.  The
presence of these groups serves both to amplify existing micro-scale conflicts and to create
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new ones; to both increase the vulnerability of already-violent regions and to turn formerly
peaceful areas into conflict zones by virtue of their usefulness to the logistics of large-scale
smuggling. 
These groups,  with their particular modes of  violence, also have significant effects  on the
medium of conflict in Guatemala. While the nation is used to an extraordinarily high level of
violence, the particular expressive tactics used by Mexican DTOs – the writing of messages on
bodies which are then dumped in public places, for instance – are unfamiliar in a country
where the most common methods of murder during the civil war tended to either involve the
“disappearance” of targeted individuals, or take place as massacres carried out in rural areas
far from the public eye. The narrative of bloodshed in Guatemala, which is often rendered in
terms of “hidden forces” (poderes ocultos  or  grupos clandestinos),  reinforces this idea of
hidden violence.322  The uncertainties in the conflict are exacerbated by lingering issues from
the  civil  war: in  the  rush  to  rebuild  the  security  forces,  background  checks  were  often
overlooked,  resulting  in  security  agencies  with  a  large  representation  of  former  military
personnel with chequered pasts. And the use of state of siege legislation has drawn complaints
from some quarters that the government is capitalising on the “opportunity” presented by the
violence to settle land disputes with the largely indigenous, rural farming population.323 
Whereas in Mexico the violence attributable to drug trafficking is distinct in style and exists in
the  context  of  a  country  which  is  otherwise  relatively  peaceful,  in  Guatemala,  the  drug
trafficking  conflicts  coexist  with  violence  related  to  ordinary  criminality,  power  struggles
322
 Deibert, 2009.
323
 Both of these trends were on full display in the 2013 trial of former dictator Efraín Ríos 
Montt, who became the first head of state ever convicted of genocide by a court within their own 
country. Montt stood accused of ordering the extermination of the Ixil indigenous people during the 
civil war. His conviction marked a departure from a post-conflict arrangement which had previously 
tended toward the restorative rather than the retributive. See Malkin, Elizabeth, “Former Leader of 
Guatemala is Guilty of Genocide Against Mayan Group,” in The New York Times, 10 May 2013, 
accessed from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/world/americas/gen-efrain-rios-montt-of-
guatemala-guilty-of-genocide.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 on 19 May 2013.
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amongst the country's political elites324 and ongoing land and property disputes that originate
from the civil  war.  This  makes Guatemala not only a prime example of  hybrid warfare  –
combining different types of actors who carry out different varieties of violence – but also a
mixture  of  the  Market  of  Narcotic  Violence  in  Mexico  and  the  type  of  narcotics-fuelled
leadership struggles seen in failed states such as Guinea-Bissau.325
To the  extent  that  Guatemala  represents  a  Market  of  Narcotic  Violence  in  its  own right,
depends  on  the  continued  presence  of  Mexican  DTOs  in  the  country.  Since  Guatemalan
groups (even sophisticated third-generation gangs) do not have the same access to the United
States as their Mexican equivalents, for whom access is simply a matter of digging a tunnel
under the border or bribing an American customs agent, the value of Guatemala as a transit
market  hinges  on the continued value of  Mexico as  a  conduit  to U.S.  consumers.  Should
American  consumption  habits  shift  toward,  say,  synthetic  drugs  whose  ingredients  are
sourced domestically or from different foreign sources, it is unlikely that Mexican organised
crime groups would find intrinsic value in remaining in Guatemala. The northern edge of the
country might maintain some use as a safe area for Mexican traffickers, but Guatemala is less
an irreplaceable (and therefore resilient) part of the drug supply chain and more an area into
which  drug  traffickers  moved  for  temporary  convenience,  albeit  in  spectacularly  violent
fashion. Such a shift, of course, would not by itself end organised violence in Guatemala, or
even substantially lower the country's extremely high murder rate. But it would reduce the
complexity of the conflict and take away a major income stream for the country's organised
criminal groups and corrupted security officials.
VI. Conclusion
324
 In one famous and bizarre case, a prominent attorney named Rodrigo Rosenberg was shot to 
death while riding his bike in Guatemala City, leaving behind evidence that implicated then-
President Colom. The UN team investigating the murder, however, determined that Rosenberg had 
in fact commissioned his own murder as an act of vengeance against Colom for another murder he 
was convinced Colom had a hand in. See Grann, David, “A Murder Foretold: Unravelling the 
ultimate political conspiracy,” The New Yorker, 4 April 2011, accessed from 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/04/04/110404fa_fact_grann?currentPage=all on 22 May 
2013.
325
 Ellis, Stephen, “West Africa's International Drug Trade,” in African Affairs, vol. 108, no. 431, 
2009, p. 192.
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The  examples  of  Guatemala  demonstrate  that  transit  market  violence  is  by  no  means  a
uniquely Mexican phenomenon. While Guatemala's presence in the same narcotics chain and
the  overlapping  presence  of  certain  trafficking  groups  in  both  countries  means  that  it  is
difficult to examine the two cases separately, it is possible to use these examples to draw out
some broad characteristics that define markets of narcotic violence:
1)  Location between 
supplier and 
destination 
marketplace is critical
2) Government 
weakness is essential
3) The presence or 
absence of a local 
market for drugs is 
largely irrelevant
4) Given (2), 
transnational criminal 
groups are capable of 
creating opportunities 
for transit markets 
quickly and without 
substantial prior 
contact
1b) For resilience, the 
geographic 
advantages have to be 
non-replicable
2b) A recent history 
of internal conflict is 
helpful in that it leads 
to (2), but not 
necessary
4b) Human capital in 
the form of a pre-
existing smuggling 
culture and black 
market is important 
First,  geography.  This  is  an  obvious  point,  but  bears  some  examination,  as  the  specific
geography of a potential  transit  market is critical.  A transit  market ideally shares a direct
border with the end-use market, but the absence of a direct border can be compensated by the
pre-existence of smuggling links between the transit  and user states (which itself  places a
rough limit on the possible distance between the two). Specific geography is also important:
all of the transit markets studied here offer substantial protection to traffickers in the form of
large rural spaces, such as the Sierra Madres in Mexico or the jungles of Guatemala. Urban
areas offer another form of protection, thanks to the large population available for traffickers
to blend in with and limits the freedom of action of government forces, although by the same
token the concentration of people increases the potential for violent competition. Urban areas,
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with large populations of potential drug users, also create the possibility of a complex mixed
transit/end-use market, the clearest example of which is Ciudad Juarez. 
However,  this is  a fairly broad set of  conditions. Mexico stands out in that its  geographic
advantages relative to the United States are non-replicable in the region. Given the success of
the American military and law enforcement agencies in interdiction of maritime smuggling
through the Caribbean or the Pacific, Mexico is the only remaining option for drugs moving to
the U.S. from the south. Guatemala's location on Mexico's southern border is less unique: it
shares that border with Belize, and as a “landing pad” for narcotics moved by sea from South
America,  El  Salvador and Honduras  are  also competitors  (indeed,  both have seen similar
upticks in drug-related violence lately326).  
Second, the weakness of the government is absolutely critical. Both Guatemala and Mexico
underwent  significant  political  transition  recently,  but  only  Mexico's  was  peaceful.
Government weakness can manifest itself in a variety of ways, but the most important to the
question of  hosting  transit  market  violence  is  a  failure  to  maintain  a  monopoly  of  force.
Neither  Mexico  nor  Guatemala  succeeded  on  that  front:  again,  Mexico  has  been  more
successful, if only because of the ability of its professional and well-funded military's ability to
backstop or, where necessary, replace poorly-paid and easily-corruptible local and state police
forces. The shape of the violence, and the extent to which it is directed at the highest-ranking
elites in the government, appears to be heavily dependent upon the size of the country (both
in physical and population terms). In a large state, the central government can be effectively
ignored; in smaller ones, co-option or assassination of central government officials may be
necessary  to  create  the  degree  of  weakness  required  to  protect  large-scale  drug  transit
activities.
The weakness of a particular government can have many fundamental sources, but a recent
history of conflict is perhaps the most obvious. It is here that the divergence between Mexico
and Guatemala is at its greatest: Guatemala's government is a product of recent conflict, and
personal and ideological differences amongst the ruling class are much stronger than they are
326
  Guillermoprieto, Alma “In the New Gangland of El Salvador,” New York Review of Books, 
November 10, 2011.
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in Mexico. Mexico, on the other hand, has not seen civil war on that scale in more than a
century.327 Instead, its weakness and susceptibility to transit violence appear to be from a
form  of  “rot:”  decades  of  corruption  and  neglect  thanks  to  one-party  rule  and  a  poorly
managed decentralisation of economic resources that  created a  very wealthy elite without
substantially improving living conditions for the majority of citizens.328 Illegitimacy sets the
stage for transit market violence; a civil war is simply the most obvious and common source
for it. In a related vein, economic inequality and the absence of legitimate job opportunities –
particularly for demobilised combatants with no other marketable skills and continued access
to weaponry – both prevent the government from increasing its legitimacy and provide the
necessary workforce and conditions under which resilient criminal organisations can grow. 
Third,  the presence  or  absence  of  a  local  user  base for  narcotics  is  essentially  irrelevant.
Neither Mexico nor Guatemala has a large enough drug user base to be determinative of the
wider conflict. But while a local drug market may create micro-variations in violence (as in the
battles for control over the plazas in Ciudad Juarez or Guatemala City), such states are of less
value to drug traffickers than user market states, as the potential user base is smaller and
poorer.  The exponential differential in price between wholesale cocaine in Guatemala and
major American cities demonstrates the virtue of moving as much product as possible to the
more lucrative markets.
Fourth,  modern transnational  criminal  networks are able  to set  up shop in a  state which
meets  the  above  requirements  quickly  and  easily.  Again,  the  value  of  a  potential  transit
market state is more in the existence of what Michael Kenney calls smuggling metis329 – eg.
the established practises and knowledge of smuggling goods regardless of their type – than in
the pre-existence of links between drug producing groups and local criminal elements. 
327
 Excepting the relatively short-lived and small-scale student riots of the 1960s and the 
extremely localised Zapatista rebellion of the 1990s.
328
 Casteñada, Jorge, Mañana Forever? Mexico and the Mexicans, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
2011), Ch. 2. 
329
 Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government 
Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation, (University Park, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007), p. 4.
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These, however, are all commonalities of violence occurring in drug transit markets. As the
previous chapters have demonstrated, amongst the distinguishing characteristics of Markets
of Narcotic Violence it that they are apolitical and resilient – that is to say, the violence serves
as  a  service,  means  of  communication  and  market  regulatory  system  rather  than  a
complement to an ideological goal. Additionally, the constraints on the system allow for the
continuation of both violence and trafficking regardless of the fates of any individual or group
taking part. While these traits are difficult to quantify, they are less central to the conflict in
Guatemala, certainly high-level corruption amongst the security services and political elites
and the persistence of the  grupos clandestinos  mean that the struggle  for power is by no
means disconnected from the drug violence.
Resilience is difficult to judge in recent conflicts, where (for example) a decline in violence
could either be a temporary lull or the beginning of a sustained drop, but with several years'
worth of evidence, it is possible to draw some conclusions in this case. Guatemala has some,
but not  all,  of  the makings  of a resilient conflict  that could become a Market of Narcotic
Violence. Unlike Mexico, Guatemala is not a necessary link in the supply chain leading to the
United States, which means that the violence there cannot be entirely ascribed to the country's
position in the stream of international narcotics trafficking. Instead, the conflict there might
be  termed  “complex  transit  market  violence:”  it  is  a  transit  market,  and  has  some
characteristics of a full Market of Narcotic Violence, but it is impossible to entirely separate
out  either drug from non-drug related violence or to separate violence linked to Mexican
actors operating in Guatemala from organic Guatemalan actors. On the whole, Mexico is a
much stronger exemplar of the Market of Narcotic Violence hypothesis.
Meanwhile,  the strategies and hierarchies of individual DTOs are evolving rapidly to keep
pace with their competitors and with the state. This instability makes the specific dynamics of
violence – where attacks will spike, when there will be periods of calm – more difficult to
predict. Likewise, predicting the broader course of the conflict becomes more difficult as well.
In the course of interviews for this research, a variety of knowledgeable observers were asked
what they thought the endgame of the current spate of violence in Mexico would be: whether
it  would  persist  and  become  the  new  normal;  whether  the  efforts  of  the  Mexican  and
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American governments would bring it under control, or whether it would mutate into some
distinct, new form. As with many issues around contemporary drug violence, there was little
agreement. The most optimistic response source pointed out that the the rate by which 2011's
murder rate had increased over 2010 was less than the rate by which 2010's murder rate had
increased over 2009 – in other words, the situation was not getting better per se, but it was
getting worse less quickly than before. 
Of course, an analysis based simply upon body counts is likely to be faulty. There are any
number  of  reasons  why  the  rate  of  violence  will  fluctuate  over  time – shifts  in  alliances
amongst trafficking groups, changes in government tactics or deployments or simply logistical
concerns that  impact  operational  tempos.  In other  words,  violence may be the regulatory
mechanism of the the market,  but  it  is  not  an immediately  measurable  correlative to the
dynamics of the conflict. The quantitative metrics of violence overall and in particular regions
are key indicators, especially from a tactical or policymaking perspective, and can indicate the
strengths and weaknesses of individual trafficking organisations or a particular deployment or
strategy. And, certainly, the breaking of such a market could be accompanied by a reduction of
singularly  violent  events  –  assassinations,  mass-casualty  attacks,  the  murder  of  civilians,
journalists and peace activists, etc. But from a theoretical perspective, the end of a Market of
Narcotic  Violence  would  only  come with  a  fundamental  change  in  the  constraints  of  the
conflict  –  either  a  change  that  substantially  reduces  the  incentive  for  such  decentralised
brutality, or its mutation into a more recognisable form (an open political insurgency, say). 
This chapter outlined and explored a number of those internal and external constraints: the
history of mistrust and poor cooperation between Mexico and the United States; the human
and  physical  geography  of  the  border  regions  that  make  closure  to  illicit  trade  nearly
impossible; demand from wealthy American consumers that supports violent traffickers in
Mexico and provides for attrition replacements; a history of tacit cooperation between drug
traffickers and the 20th century Mexican state that set the stage for the extreme violence that
followed when the government changed radically; and the poor ability of the Mexican law
enforcement agencies to manage the violence and compel the drug traffickers to respect the
state's monopoly on violence. These constraints corroborate, but do not in and of themselves
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confirm, the existence of a Market of Narcotic Violence in Mexico from 2006 to 2012. It is
now necessary to examine in greater detail the ways in which Mexican DTOs have adapted
themselves to these circumstances as a means of understanding whether the MNV is in fact an
accurate description of the ongoing conflict there.
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Chapter 5: Examining Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organisations
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I. Introduction
In an exploration of the ties between insurgent groups and drug traffickers,  Phil  Williams
describes criminal organisations generally as Clauswitzian “in the sense that their criminal
activities are simply a continuation of business by other means.”330 This description is a useful
way  of  conceptualising  violent  non-state  actors  who  exhibit  rent-seeking  rather  than
ideological  behaviour,  and also  serves as  a  useful  measurement against  which to test  the
Market of Narcotic Violence theory: Is the violence in Mexico simply a result of the illegality
of  a  specific  type  of  significant  economic  behaviour,  or  is  there  a  greater  organising
principle?
Thus far this  thesis  has not  examined the behaviour  or organisational  strategy of specific
Mexican  drug  trafficking  groups  in  any  particular  detail.  This  is  intentional  –  as  was
established in Ch. 3, the Market of Narcotic Violence hypothesis is not dependant upon the
strategy or organisational form of the violent groups involved. Rather, it is the diversity of
organisational  strategies and the capacity of  those organisations to rapidly shift  form and
adapt that define an MNV. Decentralisation in the context of this hypothesis does not simply
mean that there is no central hierarchy; it also means that groups that compose the broader
structure are not beholden to one strategy or organising principle. Under this hypothesis, the
participants will display a range of characteristics, which evolve rapidly in response to stimuli.
From  a  macro  perspective,  such  an  arrangement  will  demonstrate  a  continual  form  of
emergent behaviour; in other words, it will demonstrate behaviour that could be described as
intelligent despite the lack of a central organising force or principle. Having established the
geographic,  political  and  economic  constraints  for  such  a  market,  it  is  now  necessary  to
examine the participants themselves. 
One  of  the main  questions  in  this  study  concerns  the  optics  of  violence  –  its  expressive
qualities and how the metaphor and rhetoric of war and crime encompass the ongoing reality
of  the conflict  in  Mexico.  The qualities that  have defined the conflict  to the public – the
330
 Williams, Phil and Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Drug Trafficking, Violence and Instability,” US 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012, p. 37
129
expressive brutality, the rapid surge of violence in previously peaceful areas, the use of new
forms  of  social  media  to  broadcast  brutal,  bloody  imagery  –  are  not  simply  inevitable
conditions in Mexico due to some cultural proclivity to extreme violence or the absence of
human rights norms. Rather, such extremes represent discrete choices made by individuals
and  groups  operating  in  an  environment  where  such  actions  are  perceived  to  be
advantageous. In order to understand why those choices have been made, and those strategies
and tactics adopted, this chapter examines a range of competitive trafficking organisations. 
While media reports and even government and NGO documents often reduce the conflict to a
battle between the state on the one hand and an amorphous group of “drug traffickers” or
“criminals” on the other, in reality, the violence is not simply two-sided. It is more accurate to
conceptualise the conflict as having a finite but indeterminate number of dimensions, with the
primary being violence between: 1) the Mexican security services and drug trafficking groups,
2)  between  drug  trafficking  groups  and  civilians,  and  3)  between  the  various  trafficking
groups themselves. This proliferation of actors has a variety of effects, including increasing
resilience by limiting the value of disrupting any individual group, and creating massively
higher possibilities for violence, as a greater number of actors results in a greater number of
potential conflicts. 
But this system of classification nonetheless begs further clarification, particularly since the
high  levels  of  casualties  incurred  by  DTOs331 have  not  limited  their  capacity  for  further
violence. Instead, murder rates in Mexico increased every year from 2006 to 2011, which was
accompanied by a spread in the geographic area affected.332 The violence is largely directed at
men, with 91% of victims identified as male by a Trans-Border Institute study in 2013. The
average age of those victims was 32. Citing data from the Mexican newspaper Reforma, the
331
The Mexican government has claimed that the vast majority of casualties in the conflict are persons 
involved in drug trafficking in some capacity, but this claim is extremely difficult to verify 
independently. See Molzhan, Cory, et. al., “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 
2012,” University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, February 2013, accessed from 
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf on 30 May 2013. I
332
 Data for 2012 is incomplete, but according to an analysis carried out by the University of San 
Diego's Trans-Border Institute, saw either a plateau or slight decrease in overall violence – though 
not enough to conclude that the conflict is ending. See Molzahn et. al. (2013).
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Trans-Border Institute also claims that 2,539 police officers and 204 military personnel were
killed  between  January  2008  and  November  2012  –  a  fraction  of  the  total  number  of
organised  crime  homicides  during  that  period  but  a  not-inconsiderable  number
nevertheless.333 
Of  the remaining  casualties,  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  conclusively  how many  were
actively involved in drug trafficking, how many were peripherally involved and how many
were completely uninvolved. It is worth noting that the methodology of violence in Mexico,
with  its  strong  emphasis  on  the  use  of  small  arms  rather  than  explosive  or  indirect-fire
weapons, means that there are proportionately far fewer civilian or collateral casualties than
in a civil war such as the one in Syria.334 Along similar lines, it is worth again noting that
taking  into  account  the  many  states  largely  unaffected  by  drug  trafficking  and  violence,
Mexico's  national murder  rate  is  below  that  of  many of  its  Central  and South  American
neighbours, and in particular does not approach the rate in Colombia during the peak of that
country's struggle with DTOs and insurgencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.335 
But the number of actors involved is  not the only factor that distinguishes the conflict  in
Mexico as a Market of  Narcotic Violence. Another critical  aspect  of  this  model is  that the
individual actors are not linked by any common ideology or cause beyond profit motive. The
lack of common ideology – or, in most cases, any discernible ideology whatsoever – means
333 Ibid., pp. 28-32. The much greater number of police killed relative to their military colleagues 
reflects a number of issues, including the much larger number of police officers than soldiers, the 
fact that they are “forward-deployed” amongst the population rather than staging in well-protected 
bases and their lower level of training and equipment to protect themselves against sophisticated 
threats.
334 Dodd, Henry and Perkins, Robert, “An Explosive Situation: Monitoring explosive violence in 
2012,” Action on Armed Violence, March 2013, accessed from http://aoav.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/An-Explosive-Situation-Explosive-Violence-in-2012.pdf on 9 January 
2014.
335 The exact casualty figures are, unsurprisingly, disputed. Between the partial media blackout 
imposed by the killings of journalists, the government's inconsistent reportage of casualties and the 
general difficulties in differentiating between general homicides and those related to drug 
trafficking, estimates of the total death toll vary widely. Molzhan et. al. (2013) give a range of 
estimates for total organised crime-related homicides between 2005-2011, with the government 
estimating 63,433, the newspaper Reforma estimating 49,784 and the newspaper Milenio estimating 
54,047. Researcher Diego Valle-Jones, using a slightly different timeline, estimated that there were 
63,000 “excess” or organised-crime related homicides, during the Calderón administration (see 
Valle-Jones, Diego, “Mexico's Drug War: 63,000 extra deaths in 6 years,” accessed from 
http://blog.diegovalle.net/2012/12/mexicos-drug-war-63000-extra-deaths-in.html on 10 January 
2014). Despite the methodological differences and slightly different total figures, the overall trends 
are highly similar across different estimates, with a substantial rise in 2006-8, a huge jump from 
2009-10 and a slight rise or plateau in the numbers afterwards. 
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that  the  relationships  between  the  different  trafficking  groups  are  defined  by  immediate
interest.336 That many of the relationships between trafficking groups are extremely violent,
which has not impacted the flow of drugs to the United States, demonstrates that violence
does not necessarily inhibit market operations; though particular operators in the market can
be completely destroyed and replaced in the process.
A full accounting of all the significant, violent drug trafficking groups operating in Mexico
would be extraordinarily difficult to compile, and – crucially – is not necessary to a thorough
understanding of the market dynamics at work. Instead, an examination of three of the most
prominent groups active in Mexico in the period from 2006 to 2012 will serve to demonstrate
the operational and organisational diversity of Mexican drug trafficking groups. These groups
are the Sinaloa Federation,  Los Zetas, and La Familia Michoacána (LFM), which represent
the two most powerful trafficking groups in the country, along with a strategically significant
outlier. The Sinaloa Federation, which historically has been considered to be the single largest
and  most  powerful  such  entity  in  Mexico,337 is  noted  for  its  corporatist  structure,  and is
perhaps  the  group  in  Mexico  with  the  best  claim  to  the  misleading  (but  extraordinarily
common) descriptor cartel. Los Zetas fulfil the second archetype, styled here as the “anarchic
franchise” model.  This model has two components:  an emphasis on extreme violence and
expressive brutality versus subtler means of coercion, and the combination of a “core” group
of violent specialists and loosely affiliated “franchises” who can carry out the mundane work
of drug trafficking, extortion and so on in lower-threat environments. Finally, LFM provide an
interesting  tertiary  example:  with  their  set  of  religious  and  political  guidelines,  strong
territorial claim and extensive network of social and state-replacement services, they are the
closest equivalent to an insurgent group present in the conflict – although following a string
of major setbacks, their future prospects are extremely unclear.338
336
 Kan, Paul Rexton, “What we're getting wrong about Mexico,” Parameters, Summer 2011, pp. 
37-48.
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 STRATFOR, “Polarization and Sustained Violence in Mexico's Cartel War,” 24 January 2012, 
accessed from www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-violence-mexicos-cartel-war 
on 21 May 2013.
338Ibid.
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These three organisations represent an important cross-section of the dozens of major and
minor drug trafficking groups operating in contemporary Mexico. Rather than being simply
generic  criminal  actors,  they  have specific  and unique characteristics  that  define them in
contrast to each other. These differences, and the violent competition between the groups,
have  the  effect  of  driving  innovation  and  adaptation  while  perpetuating  the  profitable
exchange of narcotics, firearms and money.
II. The Corporatist Model: The Sinaloa Federation339
The first  archetype to examine is  the traditional  “cartel”  structure.  To reiterate,  the term
“cartel” is not an accurate description of DTOs in competitive context. A cartel is not simply “a
criminal group making profit from the sale of drugs;” instead, the term refers to a group that
conspires  to  illegally  control  the  price  of  a  product.  Cartels  are  not  necessarily drug-
trafficking  organisations,  though  in  the  Latin  American  context,  the  term  is  extremely
evocative  of  the  narcotics  trade.340 Given  the extraordinary  breadth  of  the  contemporary,
transnational market for drugs, there are few groups that can be accurately referred to as
cartels. The Colombian Cali and Medellín cartels of the late 1980s and early 1990s could fairly
lay claim to this title, given their involvement in the trade at every stage from production to
end-user distribution, but few organisations before or since have had such control over an
international drug market. The existence of such a powerful, criminal organisation tends to
attract  government attention and result  in its  relatively  quick  disruption or destruction –
which is exactly what happened to the Cali and Medellín cartels.341 Within a small, limited
market, the term “cartel” might be analytically useful, but as the Mexican drug economy is
339 Like many other DTOs operating in Mexico, this organisation is known by a variety of monikers, 
though most contain the geographic reference to Sinaloa state. Beittel (2011) argues that the 
Federation terminology is outdated post-2008 thanks to splits between El Chapo Guzman's element, 
the Beltrán Leyva organisation and the Juarez Cartel, but given the group's continuing alliances and 
extremely large geographic coverage, it remains an appropriate descriptor of the group.
340
 Astorga, Luis and Shirk, David A., "Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug 
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context," Center for US-Mexican Studies Working Paper, USMEX 
10-01, 2010, p.  9.
341
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Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and Michoacán,” Brookings Institute Latin 
America Initiative, September 2011. p. 40.
133
inseparable from non-Mexican sources (primarily Colombian cocaine)342 and markets in the
United States, its use is of limited value to this case study.
Nevertheless,  even if  none of the actors in the Mexican drug conflict  can really be said to
exhibit  a  cartel-like  level  of  control  over  the  market,  the  idea  of  a  cartel  as  a  “criminal
business”  seeking  maximum power  by  means  of  price  manipulation,  with  violence  as  an
ancillary rather than primary tool, is at least somewhat relevant. Organisationally speaking, a
cartel is not simply an illegal mirror image of a white-collar business – licit and illicit markets
are simply too fundamentally different for identical structures to function in both343 – but
there  are  notable similarities.  Astorga and Shirk,  though avoiding the term “cartel” itself,
argue that Mexican smugglers in the 1970s and 1980s adapted to the Mexican government's
tolerance of their activities by operating according to a more or less transactional rather than
oppositional set of rules, at least until the mid-1980s.344 On the other hand, Michael Kenney
argues that even the paradigmatic cartels, Colombia's Cali and Medellín groups, were not the
unified, monolithic criminal forces they were made out to be: “In recent years the cartel myth
has been debunked by several scholars who argue that the Colombian drugs trade was never
dominated by a  single organization or association that  controlled enough cocaine to limit
production and fix prices in overseas markets.”345 The lack of control by any group over the
market is exemplified by the trend in cocaine street prices, which have steadily fallen since the
early 1990s, even as the amount produced in the Andean nations and successfully exported to
the United States has held roughly steady.346
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So while the term “cartel” is not analytically helpful with regard to contemporary Mexican
drug-trafficking organisations, the idea of an organisation which is run more or less along
business lines – a “corporatist” DTO – is certainly relevant.347 As with businesses that contract
out aspects of their operations, DTOs can enter into relationships with providers of specialist
services that might pertain to smuggling, extortion, the use of violence or virtually any other
aspect of the cartel's overall business. One particularly notable example here is the contract
that existed between the Colombian and Mexican trafficking groups in the 1980s, through
which Colombian groups were able to dictate prices and terms to the effectively subordinate
Mexican groups.348 Under this arrangement, the Mexican groups served as contractors, whose
assigned task was to arrange for Colombian-sourced cocaine to make it across the American
borders, while distribution in the United States was handled by Colombians.349 As discussed
in previous chapters, the disruption of the Colombian groups by the Colombian and American
governments in the early 1990s created a massive opportunity for the Mexican groups, who
quite  suddenly  found  themselves  in  a  position  to  become  the  senior  partner  in  the
relationship.
It  was  this  sudden  shift  in  power  that  laid  the  groundwork  for  the  emergence  of  the
contemporary Mexican drug smuggling structure. Until then, drug trafficking in Mexico had
worked on a localised basis: a corrupt government official (a mayor, governor, high-ranking
police official or the local military commander) would sell exclusive rights to traffic in their
territory (usually referred to as a plaza) in exchange for a cut of the profits, and would protect
their “business partner” from the justice system.350 This served both to control violence, since
excessive  bloodshed would  shatter  the illusion of  honest  governance,  and to keep dealers
347
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localised, since the cost of keeping local leadership paid off prevented drug traffickers from
amassing the capital they would need to take over rival  plazas.351 It was therefore a stable,
businesslike dynamic, but only while the particular external dynamics held. By the 1990s, the
PRI's hold on power had begun to slip as political reforms challenged the abilities of local
officials to sell the rights their  plazas.  Simultaneously,  the Colombian cartels  were falling,
creating expansion opportunities for Mexican groups. No group took greater advantage of this
than the Sinaloa Federation.
The Sinaloa Federation was arguably the largest and most powerful cartel operating in Mexico
throughout the Calderón administration. Some sources indicate that by the end of 2011, its
reach and power had been surpassed by the Zetas, although a spate of leadership losses and
internecine fighting in the latter group almost certainly restored the Federation to its leading
position  by  the  end  of  2012.352 Patrick  Radden  Keefe,  writing  in  the  New  York  Times
Magazine, described the Federation as “In its longevity, profitability and scope... [possibly]
the most  successful  criminal enterprise in history.”353 But  more than just a phenomenally
successful criminal enterprise, the Sinaloa cartel is in many respects the ultimate expression
of the traditional corporatist DTO model in Mexico. It accumulated influence and power using
the traditional tools of the trade: bribery and corruption in the first instance, but maintaining
the capacity  to  deploy extreme violence  if  and when those  tactics  failed.  Its  organisation
blends elements of a traditional hierarchy, a franchise model, and feudal/familial structure,
though given its size and the relative constancy of its top leadership, the best analogy might be
to a conglomerate or a holding firm rather than a standard corporation.
The question facing the Sinaloa Federation must be:  can a traditional, corporatist DTO stay
relevant in a rapidly evolving Market of Narcotic Violence such as Mexico?
351
 Ibid.
352
 The American strategic intelligence firm STRATFOR indicated that as of the end of 2011, Los 
Zetas had exceeded the Federation in reach and power (STRATFOR 2012), but subsequent 
infighting amongst Zetas leadership figures, as discussed below, seems to have curbed their rise. 
353
 Radden Keefe, Patrick, “How a Mexican Drug Cartel Makes its Millions,” The New York 
Times Magazine, June 15, 2012.
136
The group seems determined to test this hypothesis. It originated as part of the Guadalajara
Cartel, which rose to prominence around the middle of the 20th century. Originally a group of
contraband  traffickers,  the  group  grew  to  control  the  drug  production  in  the  “Golden
Triangle,”354 which includes the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Durango. Under
the leadership of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, the Guadalajara Cartel grew to unprecedented
size  for  a  Mexican  organised  criminal  group,  and  eventually  attracted  the  attention  of
American law-enforcement authorities.355 An American DEA agent, Enrique “Kiki” Camarena,
infiltrated the cartel, but his cover was blown and he was kidnapped, tortured and executed by
his  captors.  In  response,  the  American  government  demanded  that  their  Mexican
counterparts  track  down,  arrest  and  extradite  the  Cartel's  leadership.  This  operation
culminated in 1989 with the arrest of Félix Gallardo, who had remained free until then partly
due to the assistance of corrupt government officials, including (according to some sources) a
stay at the house of the governor of Sinaloa.356 In his absence, the Guadalajara Cartel broke
apart into three sections: one centred around Ciudad Juárez, one around Tijuana and one
around the Pacific coastal region, including Sinaloa. The former lieutenants who took over the
Sinaloa area of operations were Joaquim “El Chapo” Guzman and Hector “El Guero” Palma
Salazar.357 The Tijuana and Sinaloa branches, having become independent, soon turned into
rivals  and then enemies,  owing in part  to geography:358 while Sinaloa is  suitable  for  drug
cultivation,  it  does not  border  the United States,  and its  position to  the east  of  the Baja
California peninsula limits its value as a maritime transshipment point. The rivalry between
the organisations led to a major shootout at the Guadalajara International Airport in 1993,
which  lead  to  the  (apparently  accidental)  death  of  Juan  Jésus  Posadas  Ocampo,  the
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Archbishop of Guadalajara. In the aftermath, Guzman was arrested, convicted, and given a
lengthy jail sentence.359 
While Guzman was serving his  jail  term, his rival,  Amado Carrillo Fuentes,  of  the Juaréz
Cartel,  was revolutionising the practice of  cocaine transportation.  Whereas previously,  the
bulk  of  cocaine  coming  from  the  Andean  nations  was  transported  north  either  overland
(which was slow, expensive and involved a number of risky border crossings) or nautically by
either  the  Pacific  or  Caribbean  (which  was  increasingly  difficult  in  the  face  of  increased
American interdiction efforts, heavily supported by the U.S. Navy), Fuentes decided to simply
fly the shipments north in bulk. In order to do so, he purchased a fleet of planes, ranging from
light aircraft to business jets to Boeing commercial airliners.360 In doing so, he earned his
nickname, “El Señor de los Cielos,”  or Lord of the Skies. To protect his operations, Fuentes
successfully bribed the head of the National Institute for Combating Drugs, General Jesús
Gutiérrez Rebollo, and consolidated a large portion of the Mexican drug trafficking world into
one federated, if not unified, structure. However, in doing so, he became too high-profile a
target to ignore, and the United States issued a reward for his capture. Fuentes ultimately fled
to  Argentina,  and  died  in  1997  while  undergoing  plastic  surgery  to  make  himself
unrecognisable.361
Again, the fall of a major drug lord, rather than disrupting the flow of drugs, threatened the
fragile peace between trafficking organisations. Again, the centres of  gravity were Tijuana,
Sinaloa and Juaréz.  This  time,  the Gulf  Cartel,  which had never been part of  the original
Guadalajara  Cartel’s  orbit,  was  also  drawn  in.  It  was  during  this  period  of  increased
fragmentation that El Chapo Guzman escaped from the  Puente Grande  maximum-security
prison in which he was being held. The Mexican government claimed that he hid in a laundry
359
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truck  and snuck  past  the guards,362363 but the later  arrest  and imprisonment  of  the chief
warden of the prison for corruption supports the popular theory that El Chapo bought his way
out of the prison. Radden Keefe, citing the testimony of a former Guzman lieutenant, quotes a
figure of $3 million to secure his release.364
Once free, Guzman began to rebuild his empire. One of his first actions was to call a meeting
with the heads of other drug trafficking groups to maximise his reach. Juan Carlos Garzón
describes the meeting:
“[Guzman] set about using his organization, the Sinaloa Cartel, to ship hundreds of tons of
drugs, and he reactivated his relationships with the Juárez and Guadalajara cartels in order to
reconstruct  and  lead  what  had  in  former  years  been  the  empire  of  Amado  Carrillo.  His
primary ally was El Mayo Zambada, who supported Guzmán’s return to the world of drug
trafficking. Nine months after his escape from Puente Grande, El Chapo Guzmán and four
other heads of cartels held a summit in Cuernavaca (Morelos) in order to reach agreements on
how  to  manage  the  illegal  market.  Those  who  attended  the  meeting  included  El  Mayo
Zambada, his son Vicente Zambada Niebla, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes (Amado Carrillo’s son)
and the Beltrán Leyva brothers. A total of 25 people attended. The strategy was not only to
build ties between the organizations present, but also to work together more closely on an
offensive strategy to expand their presence in the country and maintain hegemony over their
criminal enterprise.”365
This approach – the broad outlines of which would be recognisable to a corporate executive –
exemplifies the strategy of the Sinaloa Federation during the last years of PRI rule and into
the term of the PAN's Vicente Fox (2000-2006). That said, while Guzman and his lieutenants
emphasised  cooperation  amongst  former  members  of  the  Guadalajara  Cartel,  they  were
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certainly not reluctant to use violence to grab territory from others. With a variety of armed
groups operating under the control of Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villareal,366 the Federation
pushed aggressively against the Tijuana and Gulf Cartels to expand its territory by force in
areas where it could not simply dictate terms to weaker groups. This approach allowed them
to become the dominant force in western Mexico over the first decade of the 21 st century, with
a zone of influence extending from the Guatemalan border to the edges of Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona and California in the north.367 
While  it  seems  as  though  the  Federation  prefers  to  pursue  profit-making  activities  by
collusion, corruption and co-optation rather than by brute force, its recent history has hardly
been peaceable. A 2005 conflict between the Sinaloa Federation and the Gulf Cartel around
Nuevo  Laredo  saw  violence  which  presaged  the  open  conflict  to  come,  including  the
assassination of Nuevo Laredo's just-inaugurated police chief and the murder in hospital of an
injured federal policeman.368 But the circumstances at the time were not ripe for an extended
conflict, and both the Federation and the Gulf Cartel eventually agreed to a cease-fire.
But the conflict with the Gulf Cartel – and its resumption in 2010 after the Gulf/Zetas split –
was a question of competition between unaffiliated groups. The Federation has also engaged
in factional fights, most notably with the Beltrán Leyva Organisation (BLO). Formerly one of
the major enforcement arms of the Federation, the BLO – originally run by four brothers,
Arturo (the original leader), Hector, Carlos and Alfredo. In January 2008, Alfredo Beltrán
Leyva was arrested, for which Arturo blamed Guzman. The BLO severed ties with the Sinaloa
Federation and launched a violent campaign against them, forming a strategic alliance with
the Gulf Cartel in the process. As the blood feud went on, both Arturo Beltrán Leyva's and El
Chapo's sons were killed, making it a particularly personalised conflict. However, the BLO's
significance was short-lived; Arturo Beltrán Leyva was killed by Mexican marines in 2009,
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and Carlos was arrested in 2010. Edgar “La Barbie” Villareal also made an attempt to take
over the leadership of the group, but his 2010 arrest ended that bid. The remaining Beltrán
Leyva brother, Hector, remains at large and likely in command of the group's remnants, but
by the end of 2010 the Sinaloa Federation had largely eliminated the threat posed by the
BLO.369
But as of the end of 2011, the Sinaloa Federation was struggling to maintain its position as the
most powerful drug trafficking group in the country. Its dominant position at the beginning of
the Calderón government's campaign afforded it enormous financial resources, but also made
it a unique target for both its rivals and the government. While El Chapo has remained at
large,  the  group has  suffered  other  major  losses  amongst  its  leadership,  with 10  leading
figures  arrested  or  killed  in  2011  alone.370 Given the group's  hierarchical  structure,  those
losses represent substantial  setbacks, testing its ability to restore itself without fracturing.
Despite  its  apparent  losses  of  territory  to  Los  Zetas,  its  deep  reserves  of  manpower  and
resources allow it to continue to expand its operations. Along with its continued outwards
expansion into new  plazas  within Mexico, the Federation has been taking an increasingly
active role in Guatemala and El Salvador,371 and exploring the sale of new drugs. In February
2012,  Mexican  authorities  raided  a  ranch  apparently  belonging  to  the  Federation  outside
Guadalajara, seizing a large quantity of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals – a new
drug for the group, which had previously focused on marijuana and cocaine – with a value
originally estimated at $4 billion (though subsequent investigations indicated that the true
figure was much lower).372373
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The expansion of the Federation is at least part due to its structure, which is both centralised
around a singular strategic  focus on drug trafficking (rather than other forms of  criminal
enterprise) and networked, with a strong emphasis on creating alliances amongst potential
rival factions in Mexico as well as with local criminal organisations in the United States 374 in
order to handle the retail aspect of the drugs trade.375 Often, using a process that would be
familiar to scholars of Renaissance Europe, these alliances amongst factions within Mexico
are  cemented  through  strategic  marriages  –  including  that  of  El  Chapo  himself,  who  is
married to a niece of the late Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, who was another major player in the
Federation hierarchy until his death at the hands of the Mexican Army in 2010.376 Throughout
its history, the Federation, true to its name, has forged alliances with a variety of groups by
marriage,377 personal allegiance or simply by shared interest.378 Furthermore, the experience
of the Guadalajara cartel, with its emphasis on bribery and co-optation over violent coercion,
gives the Federation an edge when it comes to paying off government officials.379 Bribery may
not be the primary medium by which different trafficking groups communicate with each
other, but in their dealings with the government, it remains an important tool, particularly at
municipal and state levels where salaries are lower and the attention and protection of the
federal government is more attenuated.380 
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The Federation was subject to persistent rumours that it was the favoured “partner” of the
Calderón administration;381 its less brazenly violent methodology led to speculation that in
order to limit the violence, the government might seek to resurrect the PRI-era truce. The
Calderón administration made unambiguous statements that they were not giving favourable
treatment to any particular DTO, and indeed several major Sinaloa figures were captured or
killed between 2006 and 2012.382 Moreover, the Calderón government's failure to apprehend
the Federation's top leadership – El Chapo in particular – is not proof positive that there was
any  organised  conspiracy.  Certainly,  given  the  extent  of  American  intelligence  support
provided to the Mexican government during that era, it is within the bounds of possibility that
a more concerted effort to kill or capture El Chapo might have been successful before the end
of 2012.383 But a strategic decision to focus on a broader spectrum of targets, while certainly a
fair topic of criticism, does not constitute a conspiracy or a dereliction of duty.
Should the violence regress to a pre-2006 level, particularly if the new PRI administration
attempts  to  stake  out  a  less  confrontational  approach  to  drug  trafficking  than  its  PAN
predecessors,  this  facility  with  bribery  is  likely  to  help  the  Federation  enormously  in  its
attempts to regain lost territory. Fundamentally, the corporatist structure is not ideally suited
to the levels  of  violence seen from 2006-2012.  Violence is  a necessary  component of  any
illegal marketplace, since it provides a means of contract enforcement where no others are
feasible, and certainly the Sinaloa Federation has not shied away from confrontation. Indeed,
due to its size, it is responsible for an enormous share of the total violence in Mexico. 384 But
has not made an institutional practice of innovative brutality in the same fashion as the Zetas
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or La Familia, thus limiting its structural advantage in a market of brutal competitiveness.
True to its corporate nature, the Federation operates best where competition and threats can
be managed by bribery, coercion and strategic partnerships, rather than ultra-violence.
III. “The Anarchic Franchise” - Los Zetas
As we have seen, the corporatist model, which was ascendent during the autumnal years of
PRI rule, remains relevant in the Mexican context thanks largely to the ongoing strength and
influence of the Sinaloa Federation. Yet this model, with its emphasis on traditional hierarchy
and the orderly running of plazas is now having to contend with a more informal competitive
system, described here as an “anarchic franchise.” This model bears some resemblance to the
hierarchical  corporatist  model;  it  employs  specialists  for  particular  tasks  (notably  the
provision of violence), and contracts out some of its functions to other organisations. But in
its final expression this model is quite different from the corporatist one, and is even less
deserving of the title “cartel.” 
Fundamentally, the idea of an anarchic franchise is one of maximised decentralisation based
around a  simple  organising  principle,  with some weak ties  binding the component nodes
together.  There  are  variations  on  this  phenomenon:  the  best-known  violent  franchise  is
almost certainly al Qaeda in its post-9/11 form, after it lost Afghanistan as a safe haven and
could no longer risk maintaining its  vulnerable  operational control  links from the central
authorities  to  its  far-flung  branches.  Instead,  a  variety  of  cells  in  agreement  with  its
Wahhabist,  pro-Caliphate,  anti-American views are  now using the name “al  Qaeda,”  with
extremely  limited  operational  coordination.  This  variety  of  al  Qaeda  prefixed-groups  (al
Qaeda in Iraq, al  Qaeda in the Maghreb, etc)  gave the group's central  leadership a useful
degree of  strategic  flexibility:  prefixed groups that  carried out  successful attacks  could be
presented as  part  of  a  broader  struggle,  while  those who strayed from the cause or  were
unsuccessful in their operations could be effectively minimised or sidelined.385
385
 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Jones, Calvert, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks 
Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security, Vol. 33, no. 2, 
Fall 2008, pp. 7-44.
144
But al Qaeda's specific ideological bent makes such a franchised arrangement workable – its
immediate political goals (causing harm to American interests and allies) do not necessarily
require  a  great  deal  of  coordination,  even  if  its  longer-term  ones  (completely  removing
American  influence  from  the  Arab  world,  destroying  Israel  and  restoring  the  Caliphate)
would. Furthermore, al Qaeda is an ideological organisation with a specific,  strict religious
outlook,  rather than profit-making goals.  As a result,  its  strategic  choices,  from tactics to
alliances,  are  dictated  by  a  completely  different  set  of  norms  than  any  drug-dealing
organisation under examination here.
A more useful comparative study is the “Chechen” brand in the post-Soviet Russian world of
organised  crime.  As  Misha  Glenny  points  out,  the  Chechens  were  enormously  successful
violent entrepreneurs in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, thanks to a
reputation for extreme brutality.  This reputation proved so fearsome that other groups of
criminals who were not Chechen in origin started to refer to themselves as Chechens in order
to intimidate  their  opponents.  The authentic Chechens saw an opportunity and started to
charge  other  groups  for  the  use  of  the  Chechen  name,  acting  as  a  “licensing  agency”  in
addition  to  pursuing  their  existing  criminal  endeavours.  In  doing  so,  they  only  allowed
themselves a limited amount of control over franchisees, extending largely to rent collection,
rather than operational control or collaboration.386  This model could be described as a “loose”
franchise arrangement. 
Los Zetas exist somewhere between the two models. The group consists of a powerful central
core with significant violent coercive capability that licenses the use of the group's name in
exchange for a measure of operational control and a share of the profits from the activities of
its franchisees. More importantly, the Zetas have become strongly associated with the worst
brutality in the Mexican conflict  due to both their  actual tactics and the image they have
cultivated around themselves. This brutality has to be understood in the context of the group's
founding and history.
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Despite their outsize influence on drug violence in Mexico and, particularly, on the public
perception of the conflict, the Zetas are a relatively new arrival on the scene. Their history is
inextricably entwined the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo, or CdG). The CdG were never part of
the Guadalajara confederation: their  home base of Tamaulipas, on Mexico's  north-eastern
coast,  was beyond its reach.387 As with the Sinaloa Federation, the CdG started as a small
smuggling  group,  specialising  in  cross-border  transit  rather  than  provision  of  a  specific
commodity  or  service.  During  the 1980s,  the group's smuggling  expertise  brought  it  into
contact with the Cali cartel, whose resources allowed it to grow and mature substantially until
1996,  when its  leader, Juan García Abrego,  was captured by the Mexican authorities  and
eventually extradited to the United States. In the wake of his arrest, the organisation suffered
from internal clashes over leadership succession. The eventual victor was a man named Osiel
Cárdenas Guillén.  Seeking to both consolidate  his  hold on power and enhance the CdG's
ability to take territory from rival groups, Cárdenas came up with what appeared at the time
to be a simple, elegant solution: instead of training a corps of professional violent specialists
from within his organisation, he outsourced the job. Using the prospect of high wages and
freedom of  action,  he convinced a  group of  commandos from Mexico's  Airmobile Special
Forces  Group  (Grupo  Airmovíl  Fuerzas  Especial,  or  GAFES)  to  defect.388 Somewhat
ironically,  GAFES  were  amongst  the  beneficiaries  of  the  slowly  improving  security
cooperation between the United States and Mexico, and had received operational training at
Fort Benning, Georgia, with the U.S. Army Special Forces.389 
Cárdenas, known as “El Mata Amigos,” or “Friend Killer,” had very little compunction about
betraying putative allies or using brutality to attain his goals. His friend and confidant, Arturo
“Z-1” Guzmán Decena, had been a lieutenant in GAFES before deserting from the army, and it
was he who suggested the idea of building up an enforcement group composed of ex-special
387
 Astorga and Shirk, 14.
388
 Krauze, 2012. 
389 It should be mentioned that while units of the GAFE were trained by the United States, it is not 
clear whether any of the men who would become the originators of the Zetas were ever enrolled in 
the American training programmes.
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forces deserters to Cárdenas.390 While the core group were ex-GAFES, the group also took on
deserters from other Mexican military and police units and the Guatemalan army as well.
Instead of simply integrating his new “hires” into his organisation, however, Cárdenas allowed
them to maintain a degree of autonomy. The original Zetas, as they came to be called,391 had a
military sense of comradeship and cohesion, which, coupled with their formal training in the
art  of  violence,  quickly  earned  them  a  fearsome  reputation.  In  addition  to  assassinating
enemies  and  perceived  enemies  of  Cárdenas  and  the  CdG,  they  also  killed  friends  and
associates of those enemies and even broke into prisons to rescue imprisoned confederates.392
It may be that Cárdenas feared of the consequences of an attempt to suborn them completely
to the CdG, or that he thought the benefits of a named group whose reputation as military-
trained killers outweighed the risks of potentially split loyalties. But his ability to keep the
Zetas in check was never really tested: in 2003, he was arrested after a shootout with the
Mexican army in Matamoros,393 and eventually extradited to the United States, where he was
convicted  of  multiple  charges  including  drug  trafficking  and  attempted  murder,  and
sentenced to 25 years' jail time.394 Guzmán Decena, the founder of the Zetas, had been killed
in  a  shootout  with  the  Mexican  military  in  2002;  he  was  briefly  succeeded  by  El  Kelín
González Pizaña, but he too was arrested in 2004.395
With Cardenas out of the picture, the Zetas moved towards independence, now under the
joint command of Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, an ex-GAFES soldier who was known as “The
Executioner,” and Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales,  a former Reynosa police officer with the
390 Grayson and Logan, 2012, location 420.
391
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nickname “El 40.” By 2008, they were offering their services to other DTOs,396 and in January
2010 the CdG and the Zetas began to openly clash.397 By 2011 the two groups were not only
separate,  but  savagely  opposed.398 Indeed,  with  their  violent  specialities  and  intimate
knowledge of the Gulf Cartel's operations, the Zetas rapidly ascended from subordinates to
the CdG to one of Mexico's most powerful violent groups.
At the outset of their independence from the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas faced the exact opposite of
the problem that Cárdenas had faced a few years earlier. The CdG had established trafficking
routes and a smuggling system in place, but not the violent specialists and coercive capability
to hold it. The Zetas, on the other hand, had perhaps the greatest coercive capability of any
non-governmental entity in the country, given their  military training and background, but
they were new to the trafficking aspect of their chosen profession and lacked the connections,
technical  expertise  and the local  knowledge necessary for  successful large-scale  smuggling
operations.399
Fortunately  for  the  Zetas,  they  were  operating  in  what  might  be  termed  a  permissive
environment for an organisation with significant violent capability. The declaration of war by
the government on drug trafficking and the fracturing of the large trafficking groups meant
that the old agreements that had kept the peace were no longer valid. Whatever the nature of
those  bonds  –  convenience,  mutual  self-interest,  family  or  friendship  ties  or  some
combination  thereof  –  few  survived  the  newly  belligerent  government  counter-narcotics
policy. In this environment, a bellicose organisation willing to aggressively challenge its rivals
and the state could prosper, whereas under more controlled circumstances it would be quickly
deemed a threat to the status quo, attacked from all sides and eliminated. 
396 Beittel, 2011, p. 10.
397 Williams, 2012, p. 270.
398
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92539 on 30 May 2013.
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In order to have any chance of success, the Zetas had to rapidly reinforce themselves in two
critical capacities: they needed recruits, and they needed weapons. For the former issue, the
Zetas have demonstrated remarkable forthrightness: in some instances, they displayed large
banners  directed  at  enlisted  members  of  the  police  and  military,  offering  high  salaries,
benefits  and  life  insurance  to  defectors.400 Their  recruitment  was  aided  by  substantial
turnover amongst Mexican security services, both by desertion and by normal attrition (police
officers quitting, soldiers finishing their terms of service, etc.).401 Given the poor economic
conditions  of  recession-era  Mexico,  and  the  difficulties  that  military  veterans  face
reintegrating into society, even in peaceful nations, it is not particularly surprising that the
Zetas have managed to persuade so many to join. Veterans are also a useful commodity for a
few other reasons: they often maintain contact with former comrades, who can provide useful
intelligence on the government’s operations, tactics and plans, and they are already familiar
with firearms and combat tactics. Given that Mexican drug traffickers have not struggled to
arm themselves, individuals with these skills an even more valuable commodity than weapons
themselves.402 Individual  cells  within  the  Zetas  organisation  are  only  connected  via  their
leadership – as Grayson and Logan note, at least part of the motivation for this disconnection
is to prevent particularly talented or valuable individuals from being recruited away to join
other cells within the organisation.403
But military and police veterans are not the Zetas' only source of manpower. These recruits
form the core of the Zetas' organisation, and give them a powerful striking force which enables
them to intimidate smaller, weaker groups, but skilled violent specialists are expensive to hire
400
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and maintain and more difficult to replace than other recruits.404 In order to support their
rapid expansion, the Zetas have in some places made arrangements with local street gangs,
who are much less expensive. They are also less combat effective, but for relatively simple
tasks such as killing suspected informants or intimidating journalists and civilians, military
training is an unnecessary asset. Through this strategy, the Zetas have created a two-tiered
system: a core of trained, professional fighters with the skills to overwhelm rival gangs or, if
necessary, intimidate or fight local security forces, and a more numerous, cheaper force of
loosely-affiliated street gangs capable of spreading the Zetas “brand” at minimal cost.405 This
strategy  has  unintended  consequences,  however;  competition  between  street  gangs  and
individuals without military or police training can lead not only to a downward spiral in price
but also in service quality. Instead of a relatively professional  sicario  (hitman), who might
charge several thousand dollars for an operation but who will have the equipment and skills to
eliminate a target with minimal collateral damage, local gangs and inexperienced individuals
are  of  inconsistent  quality,  and  are  more  likely  to  attack  the  wrong  target  and/or  cause
significant collateral damage in the process. While this may, from the contractor's perspective,
have a beneficial secondary effect of increasing local compliance through fear, it is also likely
to  result  in  significant  backlash  from  authorities. But  by  the  same  token,  the  inevitable
casualties suffered by such foot soldiers may also serve as a winnowing process – identifying
those  individuals  who  are  particularly  talented  at  violence  and  who  serve  as  valuable
recruitment prospects for DTOs.406
With respect to weaponry, the Zetas put a number of complementary strategies into place.
Acquiring  weapons  legitimately  is  difficult  in  Mexico,  which  has  strict  gun-control  laws.
Insofar as they permit civilian ownership of firearms, the laws impose significant licensure
requirements and limit the types of  weapons to those more suitable for hunting or target
404
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shooting than for combat.407 However, these laws have not prevented groups like the Zetas
from acquiring a formidable arsenal.  These weapons come from three sources, in roughly
ascending order: the government itself, the black market and the United States.
Stealing weapons from the government is a time-honoured tradition amongst insurgents and
violent non-state actors, particularly in regions where government forces are underpaid and
easily  corruptible.408 This  can  take  the form of  basic  corruption  (eg.  officers  selling  their
personal weapons or accepting a bribe in exchange for opening the doors to an armoury),
raids on government stockpiles and warehouses or the theft of weapons and equipment from
the bodies of soldiers and police officers killed in ambushes. As a source of weapons, this
probably accounts for a relatively small fraction, but it is a valuable source of police uniforms,
radio  equipment,  body  armour  and  official  vehicles  –  which  in  some  respects  are  more
valuable than weapons, as they permit deception, intelligence-gathering, false-flag operations
and surprise attacks.
Other weapons are trafficked in illegally from South and Central American nations. UNODC
estimates that there are an estimated 2.8 million unregistered firearms circulating in Central
America alone,409 many of which are military-grade weapons left over from the various civil
wars  of  the  1970s  and  1980s.410 The  availability  of  these  weapons  is  in  one  sense  an
unintended consequence of success: as those civil wars ended, the militaries of the various
407
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Central  American  states  downsized  their  forces  without  also  downsizing  their  equipment
holdings. With weapons sitting idle, and downsized soldiers suddenly in need of new sources
of income, the opportunities for illicit siphoning are numerous. Furthermore, these sources
present  the opportunity  to  acquire  more powerful  weapons,  including grenades,  mortars,
heavy machine guns and rocket launchers.  And, as the Zetas and other groups push further
into Central America, their ability to draw upon this rich source of weaponry deepens.
Nevertheless, the most important source of weaponry for the Zetas – and, to a lesser extent,
other DTOs – is the United States.411 American gun control laws notably less restrictive than
those in Mexico, but the United States is the world's largest civilian gun market, with roughly
300 million weapons in circulation – roughly one for every American citizen.412 Thanks to the
expiration,  in  2004,  of  the  Clinton-era  Assault  Weapons  Ban,  military-style  assault
weapons413 are  also  easy  to  obtain.  Like  other  DTOs,  the  Zetas  have  become  adept  at
navigating the various loopholes in American gun laws by using straw buyers (civilians with
no criminal records who are paid to buy guns and ship them to the cartels) or by buying
weapons at gun shows, which are not subject to the same background check requirements as
411
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gun shops.414 In addition to assault weapons, cartels shopping on the civilian market in the
United States can purchase tactical handguns, semi-automatic shotguns with high-capacity
magazines  and  sniper  rifles,  including  the  Barrett  M82,  a  military  anti-matériel  weapon
capable  of  piercing  armoured  vehicles  and  striking  targets  over  a  mile  away (and  whose
roughly $12,000 per-unit cost is unlikely to deter deep-pocketed DTOs).415 
Although less significant than their sourcing of traditional military hardware, it is also worth
mentioning that the Zetas have also demonstrated a high degree of innovative production
capability. For example, the Mexican military has captured a number of improvised armoured
vehicles,  which media reports (inaccurately) described as ‘tanks,’  manufactured by adding
steel armour to commercial heavy-duty trucks.416417  Their facility with improvised weapons
and tactical equipment stands in contrast to the Sinaloa Federation's emphasis on improving
the mechanics of smuggling.418 
But it  is not only military-grade weaponry that sets the Zetas apart.  Military training also
allows them to use these weapons in the most efficient fashion, and to challenge the authority
and tactical supremacy of Mexican security forces. Additionally, they developed sophisticated
communications tools and networks: at the end of 2011, the Mexican military announced that
they had been disassembling a Zetas radio network that stretched from Guatemala all the way
to northern Mexico.419 The network – apparently composed of a number of local  'cells'  of
414
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transmitters and repeaters, rather than a continuous single unit – is perhaps an even more
important signifier of operational capacity than the Zetas' armaments, as it demonstrates a
high level of organisation and coordination and a reflects of a degree of emphasis on combat
support and logistics out of step with the group’s image as an anarchic force of nature.
There is another significant difference between the Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation: where
the Sinaloas are primarily concerned with the trafficking of drugs, engaging in relatively few
other criminal activities (except where other activities are necessary to carry out the business
of drug trafficking), the Zetas are more opportunistic. They are much more willing to engage
in  a  broad  range  of  non-narcotics-related  criminal  activities,  including  extortion,  human
trafficking and cybercrime.420 This has led other writers to propose new terminologies for the
group,  calling  it  a  “transnational  criminal  organisation”  (TCO)  for  example,  in  order  to
emphasise its reach as well as the variety of  its criminal endeavours.421 This approach has
some  appeal,  but  despite  the  group's  proliferation  of  criminal  activities,  drug  trafficking
remains a central driver of its profits and activities and provided the original rationale for
their existence, so should not be minimised.
In and of itself, the fact that the Zetas are a non-state actor with sophisticated and diverse
tactics, a multinational reach and a high level of operational capability is not unique in the age
of hybrid wars and sophisticated non-state violent actors. Somali pirates created their own
stock exchange and use digital radios and military-grade GPS units to locate their targets, 422
while  Hezbollah managed to hold their  ground against  the most  powerful  military  in  the
Middle East using a combination of traditional fortification and ambush tactics423 and high
system-200251816.html on 29 May 2013.
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technology including communications  jammers  and anti-ship  cruise  missiles.424 The  Zetas
stand out in this  category because of the sheer speed with which they developed, with no
outside help, from a group of mercenaries into one of the largest, most powerful and most
influential drug trafficking groups in an extremely competitive field. The speed and totality of
this transformation indicates a sense of higher purpose belied by the group's reputation for
extreme and unrelenting violence.
And that reputation is fearsome indeed. More than any other group in Mexico, Los Zetas are
renowned for the brutality and expressiveness of their violence. Videos on the popular “Blog
Del  Narco”  site,  whose  anonymous  proprietor  posts  unedited  material  sent  in  from  any
trafficking group as a “public service,” show apparent members of the group interrogating,
torturing, and executing captive members of other cartels or police officers.425 The Zetas have
been linked to murders of competitors, the dumping of decapitated corpses in public places,
mass  killings  of  migrant  workers,  revenge  killings  of  police,  soldiers,  and  government
officials,426 among  other  similarly  heinous  crimes.  Some  of  these  reports  are  doubtlessly
exaggerated or misattributed, but the group has made no effort to disabuse the public and the
government of the notion that there are no lengths to which it will not go in pursuit of its goals
– or its enemies.
To be sure, those tactics are not unique to the Zetas. Other trafficking groups also post videos
of their members torturing and executing suspected Zetas,427 and not every mutilated corpse
found in Mexico was dumped by a Zeta. But the Zetas have set, and continue to increase, the
standard for ultraviolence, and in doing so, they have demonstrated the effectiveness of a
ruthlessly capitalist approach in a violent narcotics marketplace. With no apparent ideological
424
 Hoffman, Frank, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies, December 2007.
425
 “El Blog Del Narco: Información sobre el narcotráfico en Mexico,” accessed from 
http://www.blogdelnarco.com/ on 29 May 2013. 
426
 Turbiville, Graham H., “Firefights, raids and assassinations: tactical forms of cartel violence 
and their underpinnings,” in Bunker et. al. (2011). 
427
 The Blog del Narco website maintains a regularly-updated list of such videos; indeed, its 
content is largely composed of images of such extreme violence perpetrated by virtually every 
major DTO operating in Mexico.
155
goal  (and  therefore  no  ideological  allies),  no  supporters  outside  the  country  and  no
constituency, their strategy of maximal violence means that what cooperation they receive is
out  of  fear  or  sheer  necessity,  rather  than  allegiance  or  ideological  affinity.   The  Zetas
demonstrate that a group can be both omni-directionally, brutally violent as well as ordered
after a fashion – and that the latter can be a product of the former.
The future direction of the Zetas is unclear. In September 2012, the Mexican Navy captured
one  of  the  Zetas'  top  commanders,  Ivan  Velazquez  Caballero  (aka  El  Taliban).428 Shortly
thereafter, Navy troops also killed the group's putative leader, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, in
a shootout.429 Lazcano had been a critical figure for the Zetas, and his brutality was in large
part  responsible  for  the  development  of  the  Zetas'  most  brutal  tactics.  Somewhat
embarrassingly for the government, his body was subsequently stolen from the morgue by
gunmen, but despite the obvious potential for conspiracy theories arising from the theft, the
truth of his death has not been substantively called into question. 
When these events occurred, the Zetas had been engaged in open conflict on several fronts:
against the Sinaloa Federation on one side and against the remnants of the CdG on the other.
The death of Lazcano deprived the Zetas of one of their central, unifying figures. Caballero
had been fighting against Miguel Angel “El 40” Treviño, but the former's arrest is unlikely to
completely end the inter-Zetas clashes. Nor will decapitation strikes against the leadership of
the Zetas cause its complete collapse, or lead to a reduction in violence over the short term. As
Treviño  consolidates  his  newfound,  authority  within  the  organisation,  conflict  with  other
contenders  for  leadership  could  increase  intra-Zetas  bloodletting;  alternately,  other
organisations, seeing a sudden weakness in the previously terrifying Zetas, might be inspired
to  go  on  the  offensive.  What  remains  to  be  seen  is,  however,  is  whether  the  group  can
maintain its shared, if distributed, identity during the upheaval. 
IV. “The Insurgents” - La Familia Michoacána
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So far, this chapter has steered clear of one of the traditional provinces of conflict studies: a
political analysis of the participants. There is a specific reason for this: neither the Sinaloa
Federation and Los Zetas  are insurgencies in the traditional sense,  instead,  they are both
driven  by  economic  rather  than  political  motivations,  although  the  Sinaloa  Federation's
history of collaboration with the PRI gives it a slightly stronger claim to being considered a
political actor. That said, there is no evidence that the PRI's collaboration with traffickers was
based on ideology; instead, as explained in Chapter 4, it was driven by the fact that the PRI
were  the  undisputed  political  masters  of  Mexico  for  much  of  the  20 th century,  and  the
corporatist model of drug trafficking necessitated dealing with them in order to maximise
profits. 
As  established  previously,  there  are  ample  historical  and  contemporary  precedents  for
insurgencies becoming involved in the drugs trade. These cases are diverse, but they have a
very important commonality: in all of them, the insurgent movements were established before
they turned to drug production, which they used  instrumentally,  as a source of funds and
public support in their anti-government campaigns.430 By contrast, Mexico's only significant
political  insurgent  movement,  the  left-wing  Zapatistas  of  Yucatan  state,  have  not  been
involved in any way with the current drug violence. In fact, since their initial rebellion against
the government in 1994, they have only engaged in nonviolent forms of resistance, and have
not been linked to any drug trafficking activities.431 These factors make their entry into the
hyper-violent  drug  trafficking  business  at  this  late  stage  an  extremely  unlikely  scenario.
Mexico does have some history of political violence outside the Zapatistas, particularly during
the 1968 student demonstrations (suppressed by the PRI government with significant loss of
life), but there is little evidence of any significant ideologically or religiously motivated groups
mobilising violently in Mexico. In sum, there is no pre-existing insurgent group that could
enter into a cooperative relationship with drug traffickers in Mexico.432
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431
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 This is not to say that Mexico's politics are settled. The 2006 election, after all, saw significant 
disputes over the vote count, and the country remains politically divided between the left-wing PRD 
coalition, the centre-left PRI and the centre-right PAN. Nor is the emergence of insurgency a 
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That leaves the possibility of an existing DTO taking on insurgent-like characteristics. But no
explicitly political insurgent movement has yet evolved out of a drug-trafficking organisation,
even though the reverse has occurred. Of course, precedent is not proscription, so it is within
the  bounds  of  possibility  that  a  drug-trafficking  enterprise  could,  under  the  right
circumstances, take on insurgent characteristics, or even evolve into a full-blown political,
ethnic  or  religious  insurgency.  While  there  is  no  clear-cut  case  of  trafficker  to  insurgent
evolution, Mexico does provide a smaller-scale case study of traffickers with a religious bent
in the form of La Familia Michoacána (LFM).
La Familia Michoacána is something of an outlier amongst Mexican trafficking groups, and
although  as  of  the  beginning  of  2012  their  power  had almost  entirely  disappeared,  their
specific characteristics make them worthy examination in this study.433 The group's founder,
Nazario Moreno González, aka  El Mas Loco (“The Craziest One”), was killed in a shootout
with the Mexican security services in December 2010. La Familia's other top leader, Jose de
Jesus Mendez Vargas, aka El Chango (“The Monkey”), was subsequently captured by Mexican
police in Aguascalientes in June 2011.434 In the wake of those losses, the group  split apart and
lost ground to rivals based outside of Michoacán.435 Nevertheless, the history of LFM from its
inception in 2006 to its breakup five years later gives insight into the range of organisational
forms within a Market of Narcotic Violence, and also supports the claim that the form of the
conflict in Mexico is not amenable to traditional insurgent norms.
Mostly  unheard of  until  2006,  La Familia  chose a  morbidly  dramatic  way of  introducing
themselves to the world: they stapled a “statement of principles” to five human heads and
rolled  them  onto  the  floor  of  a  crowded  nightclub  in  Uruapan,  Michoacán  State.  The
predictable quantity; the point is more that there are no active groups in Mexico as of this writing 
which are or resemble incipient insurgencies. 
433
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435
 The major successor organisation appears to be a group whose name alludes to religious 
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statement was stark and, importantly, ideological: it read, “La Familia doesn't kill for money,
it doesn't kill women, it doesn't kill innocent people – only those who deserve to die. Everyone
should know: this is divine justice”436 (emphasis added.)  According to George Grayson, this
represented the first use of decapitated heads as a propaganda statement in Mexican drug
violence.437 
La Familia arose from a particular set of circumstances in its home state. An agricultural state
with a significant deepwater port at Lázaro Cardenas, the coming of NAFTA hit Michoacán
particularly hard.  With its  traditional farming economy disrupted by cheap American and
Canadian food imports, the state's levels of poverty climbed rapidly. Simultaneously, the port
brought precursor chemicals for synthetic drugs into Michoácan, which created a major local
addiction problem.438
In this environment, various DTOs began to take advantage of the easy availability of both
cheap labour and methamphetamine precursors. The Colima cartel were the early pioneers in
this  regard;  based  in  Michoácan,  they  served  largely  as  methamphetamine  middlemen:
converting  chemicals  into  saleable  drugs  and then selling  them in  bulk to other  DTOs.439
However, a combination of law enforcement actions and an intervention by the Gulf Cartel's
deployment of Zetas hitmen cleared the way for a new organisation to take a leading role in
Michoácan.440 La Familia quickly rose to the occasion, consolidating its power throughout the
first half of the 00's and announcing its presence publicly in 2006 with the aforementioned
use of decapitated heads.
Nazario  Moreno  González  was  reportedly  inspired  by  the  writings  of  American  Christian
theologian John Eldredge, and compelled LFM operatives to carry Bibles.441 This ideological
bent carried over into LFM's conduct in its home territory, where it constructed a network of
436
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drug rehabilitation centres and banned the use of narcotics – though this apparently religious
opposition to narcotics did not prevent them from enthusiastically producing and distributing
them northwards.  In doing so,  LFM moved away from traditional  criminal  approaches to
circumventing  state  power  into  more  developed,  insurgent  approaches  -  what  William
Finnegan describes as “state capture.”442 By this, he means that the local authorities in much
of Michoacán were unwilling or unable to take action unless essentially permitted to do so by
La Familia.  In this  sense,  state  capture is  an appropriate  term; but  LFM's creation of  an
alternate set of social services suggests that its ultimate goal may have been to replace the
state, at least in Michoacán.
The extent to which Gonzalez and the rest of the LFM leadership actually believed in their
rhetoric and religious orthodoxy is debatable, but its existence – in contrast to the absence of
any explicitly ideological rhetoric from comparable groups – is interesting in and of itself.443
That religious rhetoric, along with the provision of social services, locates LFM as the closest
thing  to  an  insurgency  as  exists  within  the  network  of  violent  drug  gangs  in  post-2006
Mexico.444 Notably,  this  does  not  make the group a  true insurgency:  it  is  not  nationalist,
ethnic-separatist or revolutionary, nor, per Stathis Kalyvas's work on civil wars and irregular
violence, has their rise come courtesy of the implosion of the Mexican state.445 Insofar as the
group had political or ideological goals, they were quite limited: attaining effective control of
Michoacán state and securing its potential drug-related resources, including not only the rural
areas  suitable  for  drug cultivation and methamphetamine lab sites,  but  also an extensive
442
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Pacific coastline ideal for receiving maritime shipments of cocaine from Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru. 
Commercially, LFM was innovative in its emphasis on the production and sale of synthetic
drugs. The traditional “triad” of natural drugs (opium, cocaine and marijuana) entail a variety
of  logistical  problems,  largely  related  to  the  difficulty  of  smuggling  large  quantities  from
locations where they can be cultivated cheaply and safety to the consumers who will pay the
largest  amount  of  money  for  them.  Synthetic  drugs446 are  a  potentially  game-changing
alternative to this triad for a number of reasons. First, meth labs are highly scalable, which
allows them to be sited anywhere, independent of climatic or geographic concerns. This also
increases flexibility – in areas with active, aggressive law enforcement, a larger number of
smaller labs form a more resilient production base; in places where law enforcement is weak
or corrupted, as in rural Michoacán, larger labs can maximise efficiencies of scale. Second,
they can be synthesised from a variety of normal, easily obtainable industrial and commercial
chemicals,  which  allows  their  production  to  be  hidden  within  legitimate  businesses  with
relative ease.447 Third, methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs can be tweaked precisely
by amateur chemists to produce specific  results,  which allows distributors to increase the
addictiveness  of  their  products  while  vastly  complicating  the  task  of  maintaining  a  legal
framework encompassing all narcotics in circulation.448 As with the Zetas and their use of
brutal tactics, the emphasis on synthetic drugs is not unique to LFM; indeed, as of early 2012,
the  Sinaloa  Federation  was regarded as  the leading Mexican producer  and distributor  of
446
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synthetics.449 But LFM was an early innovator in this field, and relied particularly heavily on
synthetic drugs, which seems a logical adaptation given its small size and lack of international
connections.450 
The major disadvantage faced by La Familia was that it occupied terrain that was politically
significant to the government. Specifically, Michoacán is the home state of Felipe Calderón,
and  allowing  the  state  to  remain  in  their  sphere  of  influence  would  have  undercut  his
administration's  strategy.  For  that  reason,  Calderón's  first  deployment  of  the  Army  and
Federal  Police  against  drug  traffickers  was  in  Michoacán,  and  the  military  has  focused
relentlessly on the state ever since. Perhaps inevitably, this resulted in violent confrontations:
in July 2009, the organisation responded to the capture of one of its high ranking officials by
ambushing  and  killing  dozens  of  soldiers  and  federal  policemen  in  a  variety  of  planned
attacks.  But  instead of  backing away from the state,  the federal  government increased its
deployments to the state with the intent of destroying the group.451 This attention resulted in
high  attrition  amongst  LFM's  leadership,  culminating  in  the  shootout  with federal  police
which killed El Mas Loco in 2010. As LFM had centralised a great deal of power within its
leadership,  these  strikes  proved  too  much  for  it  to  absorb,  and  the  group  had  largely
disappeared as of the end of 2011, with the remnants either replaced by or absorbed into the
Knights Templar, who have aligned themselves with the Zetas.452 It remains to be seen where
the balance of power in Michoacán will reside, but if the transition from trafficker to insurgent
is to be made successfully in Mexico, it will be done elsewhere by other groups.
V. Strategic geography
One further area of importance to understanding the dynamics of violent actors in Mexico is
the strategic geography of the conflict. While the belligerents in Mexico have varying degrees
of resemblance to warring parties in a more traditional conflict, as we have just seen, strategic
behaviours are dictated by geography just as in an insurgency or conventional war.
449
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The defining aspect of the drug conflict in Mexico is, as the last chapter demonstrated, the
border  with  the  United  States.  So  it  is  possible,  at  least  to  a  degree,  to  understand  the
dynamics of drug violence in Mexico as a function of proximity to the border. And indeed,
some of the most crucial battlegrounds – Juarez, Tijuana and Nuevo Laredo for example – are
border cities, where control of territory directly abutting the crossing points can be directly
linked to profit. 
But it is also an oversimplification to describe the border as the only relevant or contested
territory in Mexico. Michoacán, which is nowhere near the border, has seen extensive violence
as LFM first coalesced and then began to lose its grasp over the population and terrain. Like
Sinaloa  state,  Michoácan  is  both  fairly  remote  and borders  the  sea,  allowing for  discreet
transportation of illicit cargoes. Of the two, Michoácan has a better infrastructure for nautical
commerce, given its more favourable position south of the Baja California peninsula and its
major deepwater port at Lázaro Cárdenas.453 Remoteness is also a major factor in shaping
violence in both states: in both states, it is difficult for the government to exercise soft or hard
power – though as we have seen, the ways in which the Sinaloa Federation and La Familia
have capitalised on that relative freedom are significantly different for historical and strategic
reasons. 
On  the  whole,  Sinaloa  saw  lower  levels  of  violence  over  the  2007-2012  period  than
Michoácan,454 which  reflects  the  greater  level  of  control  the  Sinaloa  Federation  has
maintained over its heartland (not to mention its overall greater power). 
Monterrey is perhaps a surprising locus of violence in Mexico. Although not distant from the
border – Highway 85  allows direct travel between it and Nuevo Laredo and its crossings into
the U.S. – it is not a border city by any means. Not long ago, it was one of the safest cities in
Latin America, known for being Mexico's financial capital and consequently one of its richest
cities,  home  to  Ferrari  dealerships  and  gleaming  modernist  architecture.  Yet  from  2010
onwards violence there skyrocketed, not only in numerical terms but also in sheer visibility,
with decapitated and mutilated corpses publicly displayed in public spaces. Rather than being
453 Grayson, George W., “La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security,” U.S. Army 
Strategic Studies Institute, December 2010, accessed from 
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a  function  of  its  intrinsic  value  as  a  distribution  or  logistical  hub,  this  violence  reflected
Monterrey's position directly on the faultline between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel.455 This is
not to say that Monterrey did not have inherent value for criminal activity. Rather, it is to
emphasise that even in a highly unconventional conflict, there are territorially-driven front
lines. This territorial battle between the Zetas and their former patrons was not limited to
Monterrey;  the  rate  of  organised-crime  related  homicides  in  nearby  Torreón  and  Nuevo
Laredo also spiked over the same period.456
As examined in Chapter 4, Ciudad Juárez has been the most significant battleground of the
entire  conflict.  Molzahn  et.  al.  point  out  that  the  city  accounted  for  nearly  one  third  of
organised-crime style  homicides  using  the  Mexican  government's  statistics  from  2008 to
2011.457 Fundamentally,  the  battle  for  Juárez  has  been  a  battle  between  the  Sinaloa
Federation,  whose  core  territory  abuts  Chihuahua state,  and the Vicente  Carrillo  Fuentes
organisation, aka the Juárez Cartel. The Juárez Cartel, the much-diminished descendent of
the organisation run by the late Amado Carrillo Fuentes in the 1990s, is seeking to maintain
control  of  both  the  crossing  points  into  the  United  States  and  the  city's  own local  drug
markets. Rather than committing its own core forces to the fight, the Sinaloa Federation has
used local proxies to engage the Juárez Cartel and its affiliates locally.458 These local street
gangs represent a cheaper alternative, but the price is a loss of precision and control, which
leads to both a higher level of background and indiscriminate violence, and to events such as
the mass killings of innocents either in the course of assassinations or because of mistaken
identity.459 The astronomic levels of violence in Juárez have declined somewhat since 2011,
especially in the wake of the arrest of Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez, the leader of La Linea,
the  Juárez  Cartel's  proxy,  who  was  supposedly  responsible  for  ordering  roughly  1,500
murders. Nevertheless, both DTOs remain viable, which means that the decline of violence
there represents either a temporary lull or a recognition by both sides that the indiscriminate,
high-casualty approach is ultimately unsustainable.
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VI. Overall Assessment
The three DTOs examined demonstrate three very different organisational and operational
strategies within the context of Mexico's Market of Narcotic Violence. The Sinaloa Federation
exemplifies the pre-2006 corporatist strategy; Los Zetas compensated for their late start by
combining an extreme predilection for violence with a willingness to operate as a branded
organisation rather than a hierarchical one; and La Familia Michoacána tried to consolidate
their hold on a geographical base and replace the functions of the state in that area. So how do
these  approaches  compare,  and  what  does  their  simultaneous  presence  within  the  same
conflict tell us?
The situation remains in flux, though this could be said of any point during the conflict. At the
end of 2011, Los Zetas appeared to be ascendent, capturing territory and trafficking routes
largely  at  the  expense  of  the  Sinaloa  Federation,  and  spreading  southward  into  Central
America.  The  end  of  2012  saw  the  Sinaloa  Federation  in  a  relatively  stronger  position,
following the capture or killing of Zetas leadership figures. But the overall trend of the 2010-
12 period is one of polarisation: given the preponderance of territory and force available to the
two  largest  cartels,  smaller  actors  are  exhibiting  bandwagoning  behaviour  and  aligning
themselves with either the Zetas or Sinaloas, or are being reduced to local significance, as with
LFM. This state of flux is characteristic of the Market of Narcotic Violence theory: given the
qualities  of  such  a  market,  it  would  be  extremely  unusual  for  the  relative  positioning  of
different  actors  within the market  to remain static for  extended periods.  Nevertheless,  an
analysis of the fortunes of the three basic models from 2006 to 2012 helps bring the specific
market dynamics at work in Mexico into sharper focus.
The  corporatist  model  favoured  by  the  Sinaloa  Federation  offers  the  group a  number  of
advantages. With strong leadership, it provides for business efficiencies as part of a focus on
profit-making. It also permits the formation of strong alliances, given that there is a central
authority that can offer guarantees and negotiate on behalf of the entire organisation, on the
premise that internal dissent or rule-breaking will be severely and swiftly punished. The same
dynamic makes such organisations well-suited to illicit collaboration with the state, regardless
of whether the primary driver of such a relationship is the criminal enterprise or state officials
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(as  in  the  state-sponsored  protection  rackets  prevalent  under  the  PRI).460 The  Sinaloa
Federation  represents  the  purest  model  here  of  Olson's  stationary  bandit  –  by  seeking
established control over strategically important territories, particularly border crossings and
holding them primarily by means of corruption, patronage networks and strategic alliances,
Sinaloa approaches the maximal resource extraction model. 
However,  as  with  their  legitimate  corporate  counterparts,  groups  of  this  type  find  their
greatest expression in a minimally violent, semi-regulated marketplace. Violence forces such
hierarchical organisations to expend a substantial amount of resources on protection, which
slows and occludes internal communications channels.  Should those protective efforts fail,
leading to the arrest or killing of the leadership of such an organisation, the trust relationships
that permitted it to maintain its shape fail quickly and create a competitive vacuum. Such a
vacuum  elicits  immediate,  deadly  competition  amongst  former  lieutenants  and  other
aspirants to the highest level of authority, and can strain or break the alliances the previous
leadership guaranteed. In a more consistently anarchic environment, the trust networks are
strained by more mundane levels of violence, and the high level of attrition caused by rivals
and security forces makes it difficult to maintain the efficiencies and advantages enabled by
the corporate structure. The largest, most powerful corporatist structures – such as the Cali
and Medellín  cartels  in  the early  1990s – suffer  from another  problem: once they amass
enough power, they can no longer operate around the edges of the state's power. Instead, they
become a  direct  threat  to its  monopoly on  violence,  and only  a  truly weak state  will  not
eventually succeed in breaking them down. Mexico is not a weak state, and its authority is
further underwritten by the United States.  The U.S. would not tolerate the collapse of its
southern  neighbour  and  has  the  financial  and  military  wherewithal  to  buffer  Mexican
government  forces  or,  in  an  extreme  (and  highly  improbable)  scenario,  become  directly
involved itself.
The  decentralised,  branded  model  favoured  by  the  Zetas  bears  some  similarities  to  the
corporatist model.  As discussed, the Zetas are not simply a decentralised brand: they also
maintain a “core” that is organised along hierarchical lines, and which represents a similar
460
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point of vulnerability to that of the corporatist model (a weakness successfully exploited by
the Mexican government in 2012 with the arrest and killings of top Zetas figures). However,
the  Zetas  far  more  optimised  for  the  unregulated,  violent  environment  of  contemporary
Mexico.  The  provision  of  extremely  expressive,  hugely  brutal  violence  serves  as  a  force
multiplier for the large majority of their members and affiliates who are not military-trained
and equipped with the most powerful weapons. Those Zetas affiliates – loosely organised and
connected by weak ties – account for the group's ability to become one of the most powerful
criminal forces in the country within a short space of time. The relationship is premised on
the Zetas'  continued preponderance  of  force  and the threat  (implicit  or  explicit)  that  the
options available to a group approached by them are to accept a subordinate position or to
fight for their independence with a low chance of success.
In that sense, the Zetas represent something different to a stationary bandit. Rather, they
would seem to demonstrate Keen's notion that armed conflict can represent an alternative
form of  profit,  power  and protection.  For  an established corporatist  organisation like  the
Sinaloa Federation, violent disruption is undesirable – it incurs additional costs in blood and
treasure and threatens the established profit-making infrastructure. This is not to say that the
Sinaloa Federation is motivated by profit and the Zetas are not; quite the opposite. Rather it
demonstrates that for the Zetas, with their violence-focused skill set and initially subordinate
position in the marketplace, violent aggression is the most profitable strategic orientation. 
The  insurgent  model  of  La  Familia  Michoacána,  on the other  hand,  represents  a  notable
departure from the two main models, but one that has so far failed to gain traction. Some of
the blame for LFM's failures can be attributed to its particular situation and the symbolic
value of its geographic base, which presented a challenge to the authority and credibility of the
Mexican government that it could not ignore. Despite the group's current irrelevance to the
overall shape of the conflict, both its existence and its failure are telling in terms of the unique
nature of Mexico's conflict as compared to drug-linked insurgencies. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the insurgent model is fundamentally different than the
criminal model: criminals are concerned with profits above all else, while insurgents seek to
undermine and replace the functions of the state in order to win over the population's loyalty
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and  create  physical  spaces  in  which  they  can  operate.  Criminal  syndicates  only  need the
population to sufficiently tolerate their presence enough to stay neutral between the syndicate
and the state,  and for a small percentage of the people to join their ranks, thus replacing
losses  and  allowing  for  expansion.  That  tolerance  can  be  obtained  through  aggressive
coercion, which is cheaper than replacing the state's welfare and security provisions. But there
are  limits  on violent  coercion as  well:  the grassroots  movement  against  violence  that  has
already  spawned  a  number  of  major  demonstrations  across  Mexico461 could  create  hard
limitations on the effectiveness of violent DTOs by making it more difficult for them to recruit
and  operate,  but  such  limits  have  clearly  not  yet  materialised.  The  example  of  the
organisational  failure  of  LFM,  and  the  relatively  minor  role  played  so  far  by  its  clearest
successor, the Knights Templar, demonstrates that organisations which follow insurgent-style
strategies  from  the  outset  are  not  particularly  successful  in  this  context.  That  said,  the
possibility  that  apolitical  DTOs  could  evolve  into  more  ideological  groups  with  insurgent
characteristics in order to develop closer ties with populations alienated from the government
is an interesting, if as yet untested, possibility.
V. Conclusion
One of the central features of the Market of Narcotic Violence concept is the coexistence of
varied, highly competitive models of violent organisation whose only common feature is profit
motive. Given a set of stable constraints that allow for profit-making activity to continue in
the midst of high levels of violence, profitable violence does not depend on the continued
existence of a particular individual or group. Instead, those that successfully adapt to market
conditions are rewarded with profit, territory and increased authority or power, while those
whose strategies are sub-optimal are rapidly superseded or replaced. More traditional models
of criminal or unconventional military action would suggest that such pervasive,  dramatic
violence is a sign of desperation: in other words, individuals and organisations are driven to
competition by a diminishing number of opportunities. But the operations of the trafficking
groups examined here suggest that the opposite is true: the violence represents the  normal
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functioning  of  this  particular  market,  in  which “business”  models  are  tested  in  the  most
direct, aggressive ways possible, with immediate rewards for success. 
Despite the fluctuations in the overall power structure, a trend toward bipolarity has emerged
over the last few years, pitting the corporatist Sinaloa Federation against the Zetas' anarchic
franchise, with the insurgent model failing to achieve widespread success. But the conflict's
shift  from intense multipolarity toward imperfect bipolarity has not limited the death toll,
decreased the brutality or lessened the geographic area in which it is taking place. It should
therefore be seen as a phase – a reflection of tactical successes by two specific organisations –
rather than a fundamental shift in the underlying dynamic of the conflict. The continuation of
violence despite the constant state of flux in the overall power structure of different DTOs is
evidence of the existence of a Market of Narcotic Violence in Mexico.
The  continued existence  of  such  a  marketplace  is  dependent  upon an  external  constraint
preventing participants from assuming significantly more power. In this case, it is the coercive
authority  of  the Mexican  and American  governments  that  prevents  any  of  the  trafficking
organisations from evolving into forms that on their own are capable of seriously challenging
the structures of power in either nation. But, as discussed, they have failed to demonstrate the
ability to stem the level of violence or the flow of drugs. The next chapter will explore the
reasons why the two governments have had such a limited effect on the overall functionality of
this market.
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Chapter 6: Mexican and American
Counter-Narcotics Policy 
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I. Introduction
Moving forward from the examination of  different  drug trafficking groups,  the focus  now
shifts  to  the  other  major  participants  in  the  conflicts:  the  Mexican  and  American
governments. In a limited, tactical sense, the governments can be analogised to the DTOs: as
armed participants in the conflict, they have overall strategic objectives that they attempt to
achieve by means of violent and nonviolent actions. There are certainly conflicts  in which
there is little to differentiate government and irregular forces in terms of either legitimacy or
ability  to use  violence  – the West  African civil  wars  of  the 1990s and early  2000s  being
perhaps the most obvious contemporary example. But those cases involve exceptionally weak
governments, which is not a universal condition of irregular conflict. Most governments have
at least some measure of legitimacy and a preponderance of force giving them an advantage
relative  to  irregular  combatants,  which  inculcates  their  decisions  and  policies  with  the
potential to set, maintain or alter the constraints of violent markets. This is certainly the case
with  respect  to  the  governments  of  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  both  of  which  are
sufficiently stable and powerful to have a fundamentally different character than the DTOs.
The  purpose  of  this  chapter,  therefore,  is  twofold:  to  examine  what  role  Mexican  and
American official policies have played in setting the constraints for the conflict, and to analyse
how the two governments have responded to the upsurge of violence.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first and second sections focus on the policies
of the Mexican and American governments, respectively, from the late 20 th century to the end
of 2012. As established, while the violence has taken place entirely on Mexican soil, the United
States is intimately connected with the rationale for the violence and has been increasingly
involved  in  supporting  its  southern  counterpart  militarily  and  financially.  Similarly,  the
character  of  violence  in  Mexico  is  shaped  by  American  domestic  factors,  such  as  the
availability of small arms and the high value of retail drug sales in the United States. This
admixture of domestic and international causes and constraints situates the conflict outside
the  framework  of  traditionally-constructed  domestic  and  foreign  policy  spheres  for  both
governments. This complication, along with the fact that even within each government there
is  no single policy  – makes the assessment of  any particular policy as representative of  a
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“whole  of  government  approach”  meaningless.  Instead,  the  concept  of  intermestic
policymaking – as introduced in Chapter 2 – will be used as a yardstick against which the
scope and effectiveness of the actions of both governments can be measured. 
II. Mexican Government counter-narcotics Policy
The  history  of  the  Mexican  government  and  its  complicated  past  relationship  with  drug
traffickers has been discussed in preceding chapters in some detail, as well as the specific
limitations  related  to  its  geographic,  economic  and  political  positions.  As  a  result,  the
following analysis  focus on its  policy  from the election of Felipe Calderón in 2006 to the
beginning of 2012, with a brief analysis of the policies announced by Calderón's successor,
Enrique Peña Nieto, to follow in Chapter 8. First,  it  will examine the means by which the
Mexican government seeks to institute its policy, both in terms of “hard power” (eg. police and
military  forces)  and  “soft  power”  (eg.  its  non-violent  cultural  and  social  state-building
programmes and its relationship with civil society). Second, it will explore the changes and
overall direction of Mexican policy from 2006-2012 and assess whether those policies have
demonstrated effectiveness,  particularly  focusing on the extent  to which Mexico's  policies
have taken the intermestic nature of the conflict into account.
 III. Mexican government hard and soft power
Viewed through the lens of history, conflicts tend to generate iconic imagery. Whether or not
they represent the totality of the conflict accurately, such individual iconic images – American
Marines raising the flag over Iwo Jima, the execution of a prisoner on the streets of Saigon –
come  to  represent  historical  conflicts  in  the  public  eye.  In  contrast  to  these  famous
photographs, the iconic imagery that has emerged from the Mexican conflict so far follows
two familiar themes: images of dead bodies bearing the scars of torture at the hands of drug
traffickers,  and images  of  captured  narcotraficantes paraded by  masked members  of  the
Mexican security  forces  in  front  of  confiscated drugs  and weaponry.462 The latter  images,
while  clearly  intended  to  show  the  government's  resolve  and  its  supremacy  over  drug
462
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traffickers, also reveals a basic truth about the Mexican government's strategy: it is highly
reliant upon the country's military and paramilitary forces.
As  discussed,  President  Calderón's  term  commenced  with  a  deployment  of  military  and
federal police forces against drug traffickers in Michoacán. This was not, in and of itself, a
departure from earlier policies, as the Mexican military had taken on an increasing counter-
narcotics role since the mid 1980s.463 But the scale of the operation was unprecedented –
especially after the scope of the operation was broadened from Michoacán to other states.464
Calderón and his national security staff seem not to have planned for an extended conflict:
while the widespread military deployment saw early successes,465 including a temporary drop
in the overall national murder rate during the first few months of 2007,466  the subsequent
surge in violence caught the Mexican government off guard, and without a strategic plan or
sufficient resources to maintain the initial improvement in security.467 More importantly, drug
trafficking groups began to attack the military and federal police directly, ambushing patrols,
assassinating officers and generally responding with a previously uncharacteristic degree of
aggressiveness.468 The Mexican army, despite its history of participation in counter-narcotics
operations, suddenly found itself fighting an entrenched enemy for the first time.
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This was an unwelcome development for the Mexican Army. American Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld famously said of the American military in Iraq, “You go to war with the
army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” 469 This quite
accurately  captures  the  problems  the  Mexican  military  faced  in  carrying  out  Calderón's
strategy; it was not prepared for the scope of the violence it was encountered, nor for well-
equipped, well-trained and determined opponents.  The Mexican military was designed for
territorial defence and sovereignty-protection roles, explicitly avoiding power projection and
counter-insurgency capabilities and missions.470 Undertaking lengthy deployments against a
heavily armed, entrenched and nebulous enemy – a task akin in a tactical sense to counter-
insurgency471 – required some re-tooling. In effect, the military had to re-train, re-arm and
realign itself for the urban counter-insurgency operations it now faced.
Furthermore, the force was relatively small for the mission at hand. At the end of 2006, the
Mexican federal police had a total of 6,000 officers to cover a country with more than 100
million inhabitants.472 The Army and Air  Force together had roughly 194,000 officers and
enlisted personnel, with some 50,000 total in the Navy (including a few thousand Marines). 473
Prior  to  2006,  the  Mexican  military  had  extremely  limited  combat  experience.  The
government's  foreign  policy  historically  precluded  foreign  military  deployments,  so  the
military has no expeditionary experience,474 and the government also avoided deploying large
numbers  of  soldiers  for  either  UN  peacekeeping  operations  or  commitments  through  its
membership in the Organization of American States. This inward focus is apparent in the
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structure and equipment of the military. The Mexican Air Force has only ten combat jets, all
60s-era  Northrop  F-5  Freedom  Fighters,  and  otherwise  flies  only  cargo,  transport  and
surveillance aircraft  and helicopters.  The Mexican Navy maintains no surface  combatants
larger than a frigate and has no force projection capabilities in the form of landing ships,
replenishment vessels or aircraft carriers. The Mexican Army, which is by far the largest and
most  prestigious  of  the  services,  is  well-equipped  for  territorial  defence  and  sovereignty
missions, but has no heavy armoured vehicles (tanks or infantry fighting vehicles) and little
artillery,  which  limits  its  ability  to  overpower  sophisticated,  well-equipped  foes.475 These
forces  have  also  historically  had  significant  problems with  desertion,  as  discussed  in  the
previous  chapter,  which  not  only  squanders  expensive  training,  but  can  also  reinforce
criminal  organisations  by  providing  them  with  pre-trained  recruits,  and  in  some  cases,
equipment. 
The Mexican government's investments in the improvement and maintenance of its armed
forces  have  been  disruptively  inconsistent.  The  country's  military  expenditure  underwent
rapid and significant changes, tripling from 400 million pesos a year in 2000 to 1.4 billion in
2002, then falling to about a billion in 2005, before increasing again to 1.7 billion by 2008. 476
Such oscillations in funding have made long-term planning, maintenance of a professional
officer corps or fostering institutional memory difficult, which subsequently contributed to its
worsening human rights record.477 There is a correlation with intermestic policy here as well:
in its choice not to build a military capable of expeditionary or counter-insurgency operations,
one made to enforce a specific, civilian-led foreign policy, the Mexican government denied
itself a tool that it would later view as a necessity for domestic security.
Nevertheless, the military is a sound force compared to the Mexican police, especially at the
state and local levels. Partly, this has to do with the fact that state and local forces are organic
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to  their  operational  areas;  in  other  words,  a  municipal  or  state  police  officer  has  family,
friends  and  other  connections  in  the  area  in  which  they  work,  all  of  whom  function  as
exploitable vulnerabilities for a criminal organisation. National forces, on the other hand, can
deploy their personnel across the country, allowing them to minimise such vulnerabilities. At
the  same  time,  local  and  state  police  –  who  comprise  the  majority  of  Mexican  security
personnel – are far less well-paid and well-equipped than their federal counterparts.478 This
combination of factors renders them especially vulnerable to coercion and corruption. These
forces have been weak and unreliable for decades, and determined efforts to improve their
capabilities only began well  after  the beginning of  Calderón's  term.479 DTOs,  on the other
hand, have been improving their capacities since at least the late 1990s. As a result of this
disparity in readiness and reliability, the government viewed the military, despite its flaws, as
the only tool available to combat traffickers in the short term.480
The Mexican government appears committed to building up its local forces and has at least
some mechanisms in place for reporting and investigating human rights abuses.481 But both
remain significant challenges as of this writing. Notoriously, the government dismissed the
entire police force of Veracruz in early 2012 following allegations of significant corruption,
and replaced on a temporary, but indefinite basis, by the Marines.482 And ex-military officers
continue to be placed in police  and non-military  public security  roles across  the country,
which, as the case of Julian Leyzoala illustrates, carries the danger of exchanging corruption
for human rights abuses.483 In other words, none of the Mexican military or law enforcement
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agencies has the correct combination of coercive power and legitimacy to bring an end to the
violence.
The other means the government has at its disposal to limit the violence is grouped together
under  the  vague  heading  of  “soft  power.”  However,  this  part  of  the  effort  remains  less
developed than the hard power tools. The clearest examples in this category are the civil-
society building efforts that the Mexican government has undertaken explicitly to combat the
influence of drug trafficking groups. Programmes such as  Todos Somos Juarez  (We are all
Juarez) fit easily into the counterinsurgency framework, focusing as they do on restoring the
loyalty of the population to the government.484 These programmes tend to focus on building
up  the  institutions  and  services  of  government  in  areas  considered  particularly  at  risk:
schools,  drug  rehabilitation  centres,  community  centres  and  so  forth.  Indeed,  such
programmes are explicitly central to the Mexican government's strategic plan to reduce the
level of violence. Unfortunately, the existing programmes have so far had little impact. With
limited resources and scope, their effectiveness – outside of demonstrating the government's
commitment to non-military action – is arguable at best.485
Of  course,  these  types  of  programmes  are  not  the  only  aspect  of  soft  power.  Criminal
organisations operate most effectively where governments lack the authority, legitimacy or
power; as a result, the growth of a government's competence in those fields can significantly
limit the spread and effectiveness of organised crime. In this sense, the Mexican government
faces a significant constraint, largely inherited from the lengthy one-party rule of the PRI: the
corruption  and  dysfunction  of  many  of  Mexico's  governing  institutions.  The  system  of
patronage that empowers state governors (and permits large-scale corruption), for example, is
in  many  ways  unchanged  from  the  days  of  PRI  rule,  even  if  relatively  new  competition
between Mexico's three major parties has introduced an element of  discontinuity into the
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system.486 Indeed,  Melissa  Dell  illustrates  through  network  analysis  that  upticks  in  local
violence  correlate  with  close  elections  resulting  in  PAN  victories,  which  are  followed  by
crackdowns  on  the  local  trade,  a  spread  of  violence  and  negative  economic  trends  to
neighbouring communities.487
Meanwhile,  the  judicial  system  remains  highly  dysfunctional  throughout,  with  a  low
conviction rate for drug-related offences and a high proportion of prisoners who spend years
awaiting trial.488 Moreover, even in the event of a successful prosecution, Mexico's prisons are
hardly immune to corruption, as the escape of El Chapo Guzman and more recent stories of
prisons being  effectively run by high-ranking prisoners489 demonstrate.  Extradition to the
United States mitigates some of these problems, but – as in Colombia in the 1980s and 90s –
this is a low volume solution, with fewer than 200 Mexican nationals extradited to the United
States since 2005.490
These problems are compounded by the limitations of the Mexican media. As Jorge Casteñeda
points out, the Mexican press is still relatively limited in its political coverage, contributing to
a the process of governance that is still elite-dominated.491 More importantly, the violence has
itself  prevented  the media  from a  more  active  role  in  enabling  informed debate:  as  drug
traffickers  have stepped up their  targeting of  journalists,  Mexico  became one of  the most
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dangerous places in the world for them.492 The result is an inevitable chilling effect: at one
particularly  low  point,  El  Diario  de  Juarez published  an  open  letter  to  drug  traffickers
referring to them as “the de facto authorities of the city” and asking for them to make it clear
the topics on which it was and was not permissible to report.493 Elsewhere in the country,
reporting on drug violence tends to be tragically limited; newspapers frequently publish the
basic details of an attack, but refuse to investigate in detail or identify the perpetrators in any
but the most general terms (eg. “gunmen” or “assassins”).494 Social media has filled in to some
degree,  with Twitter  and Facebook users  disseminating  some information or serving as  a
rough analogue of an early-warning system for individual citizens, but such information is by
nature unverifiable, and even that reporting is fraught with risks.495
Finally, civil society in Mexico is woefully anemic. As Casteñada points out, the number of
civil society institutions in Mexico is low across all categories – religious, public service, and
trade unions – and the total number of civil society institutions, at roughly 10,000, is starkly
lower than the equivalent figure for Mexico's  neighbours.496 Casteñada pairs this  with the
observation that participation in Mexican elections is  substantially lower than other Latin
American nations, and below rates in other countries that have recently transitioned from
one-party  or  non-democratic  rule.497 If  such  institutions  were  more  widespread  or  well-
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established,  they  might  be  capable  of  promulgating  an  effective  counter-narrative  to  the
ubiquitous narcocultura, with its glorification of the drug trafficker lifestyle. But despite some
well-attended  rallies  and  peace  demonstrations,  including  a  2011  rally  that  drew  over
200,000  people  to  Mexico  City,498 no  peace  movement  or  civil  society  group  has  yet
demonstrated a measurable impact on the dynamics of the conflict. It should be said that this
is not directly a failure of Mexican government – civil society, after all, is not a product of the
state;  it  is  rather  the  opposite.  Yet  the  lack  of  an  effective  cultural  force  to  counter  the
influence and agency of the trafficking groups serves as a constraint on the government.499
In summary, Mexican policymakers are faced with a suite of tools ill-suited for the task of
confronting  drug  violence.  Their  ability  to  use  both  hard  and  soft  power  is  severely
constrained,  and  the  operational  environment  is  better  for  DTOs  than  it  is  for  Mexican
security forces or the types of public sector NGOs that might aid national counter-narcotics
efforts. Moreover, the Mexican government's foreign and domestic policies have often been at
cross purposes, particularly with regard to the development of its security forces. With those
limitations in mind, let us now examine how well the government has addressed the linked
problems of drug trafficking and violence.
IV.  Mexican government strategy and its effects
As discussed, the Calderón administration's strategy was focused heavily on the centralisation
of political authority to mitigate corruption and the use of hard power to confront criminal
groups.  This  is  commonly  seen  as  distinguishing  it  from  the  approach  of  previous
administrations,  but  in  important  ways,  it  was  less  a  break  from  the  policies  of  his
predecessors than the logical culmination of a decades-long securitising trend. While serious
steps  to root  out endemic corruption and collusion with traffickers  would not  come until
498
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Calderón's  term,  the  stage  was  set  long  before  his  election.  Following  President  Carlos
Salinas's  1988  addition  of  counter-narcotics  operations  to the  military's  responsibilities500
marked  a  shift  in  the  country's  security  policy  towards  narcotics-related  issues  to  the
exclusion of other priorities, particularly the suppression of domestic political violence and
unrest, which had been key facets of the nation's security posture beforehand. The American
government rewarded these efforts, demonstrating its willingness to underwrite significant
programmes of military aid to Latin America in the interest of its international anti-drugs
policy.501 Coupled judicial system reforms that the PRI undertook from the early 1990s, the
renaming and replacement of the entire federal police system in the later part of that decade
and purging of PRI-era government officials that accompanied the Vicente Fox's PAN victory
in  2000,  and  the  trend  was  clear:  the  structures  that  enabled  an  equilibrium  between
corrupted  officials  and  cooperative  drug  traffickers  were  crumbling.  The  final  push  from
Calderón ushered in a purely adversarial relationship between the state and the narcos that
led both sides to adopt a newly antagonistic, aggressive and bloody relationship.
That is not to say, that Calderón's strategy was a result of pure path-dependence. His tactics
unquestionably escalated tensions, a fact telegraphed when, in an early speech, Calderón, a
lifelong civilian, donned a military uniform with the logo of Mexico's Commander in Chief to
address  an  audience  of  soldiers.502 Such  overt  militarism  and  aggression  made  clear  to
observers, perhaps chiefly to the  narcotraficantes themselves, that the government was no
longer willing to collaborate with, or even tolerate, their existence. But the late 1980s to the
early 2000s saw a convergence between an increasing demand for narcotics in the United
States, the closure of the Caribbean maritime drug-smuggling route, the evolution of DTOs
and the economic and political upheaval in Mexico. So it is entirely possible that a conflict was
inevitable, and the result of Calderón's aggressive attacks on DTOs just accelerated, rather
than precipitated, widespread violence.
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The paramount aspect of Calderón's strategy was the rapid escalation of the military's role. As
Roderic Ai Camp notes, the Mexican military has a history of counter-narcotics operations
dating back to anti-hemp and opium production operations in the 1930s, but the period from
the late 1980s up until the end of the Fox Administration marked a slow but steady growth in
the  military's  domestic  security  and  counter-narcotics  operations.503 However,  President
Calderón's plan called for a “surge” of military forces, to either supplement the federal, state
and municipal police,  or in some regions, replace local forces viewed as untrustworthy or
corrupted. The deployment of  the Army and Marines  was also accompanied by the major
increase in the number of ex-military personnel assigned to local and state police and security
jobs discussed previously,  which constituted a more subtle but nonetheless potent form of
militarisation.504
Under most circumstances, such a major, open-ended domestic deployment of military forces
to  fight  a  shadowy,  ill-defined  enemy  would  produce  significant  and  immediate  public
backlash, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a contentious presidential election. But
the military enjoyed a uniquely trusted position in Mexican society. A 2009 survey showed
that of Western Hemisphere nations, only Canadians and Americans trusted their militaries
more  than  Mexicans.505 Moreover,  the  Mexican  military's  trusted  position  was  also
remarkable in relative terms; another survey cited by Camp showed the public trust in the
Army was only  exceeded by that  of  the Catholic  Church and the school  system, with the
presidency,  Supreme  Court  and  media  roughly  20  points  behind.506 Perhaps  most
importantly, only 29 percent of the population in that survey trusted the police. Camp cites a
third survey, taken in the early days of the Calderón administration, which puts the nature of
the public  mood into perspective:  while  89% agreed with the Army fighting against  drug
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traffickers, respondents were roughly evenly divided on the question of whether the Army or
the police should “protect the streets.” This could be understood logically as an endorsement
of  the  Army's  role  as  either  an  enforcer  in  areas  where  traffickers  outgunned  or  had
thoroughly co-opted police forces, or it could mark support for it to replace the police on a
temporary basis.507 
In  an  interview  conducted  for  this  thesis,  Eduardo  Medina  Mora,  the  Mexican  Attorney
General from 2006 to 2009, described the government's policy as institution-building and
security provision which brought the government into conflict with drug traffickers, rather
than a discrete attempt to target and defeat criminal organisations. Given the weakness of the
municipal  and  state  police  forces,  he  indicated  that  the  decision  to  increase  military
deployments was less an intentional strategy and more a recognition that the federal police
were not up to the task of securing the parts of the country where state and local forces were
underpaid and under-equipped.508 This is supported by accounts of the Mexican government's
for  U.S.  suppor  during  the  initial  negotiations  over  what  eventually  became  the  Mérida
Initiative: President Calderón, recognising the challenges presented by the gaps in his security
forces,  emphasised  the  need  for  security  assistance  rather  than  other  forms  of  aid,  and
appealed for such assistance to be delivered as quickly as possible. 509
Tactically speaking, the Mexican government's approach has been to opportunistically target
drug  trafficking  groups  as  resources  allow,510 instead  of  targeting  specific  groups  and
attempting to dismantle them from the top down (the so-called “decapitation” strategy).511
This  approach  allows  it  to  put  pressure  on  all  groups  simultaneously  and  avoid  the
appearance of favouring one group or another; however, spreading out limited state resources
more evenly means that individual groups (even those responsible for a higher proportion of
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the total violence) receive less attention and consequently have more space to replenish their
manpower and recover from their losses, rather than being pushed to the point of extinction.
Various commentators, particularly in the United States, argue that a sequential strategy, in
which groups are targeted until they are no longer capable of effective resistance, would be a
superior  choice.  Such  arguments  usually  cite  the  example  of  Colombia,  in  which  such  a
strategy successfully broke the Cali and Medellín cartels.512 However, this ignores the greater
proliferation  of  DTOs  in  Mexico,  even  accounting  for  the  recent  polarisation  toward  a
Zetas/Sinaloa  Federation  conflict;  furthermore,  it  is  unlikely  that  a  government  that  has
placed  so  much  emphasis  on  differentiating  itself  from  its  predecessors'  policies  of
accommodating drug traffickers would be willing to effectively ignore certain groups, even if
only temporarily. 
The strategy chosen by the Calderón administration has been criticised on a number of levels.
First, there is the question of whether the government has selectively ignored specific groups.
Given its  longevity,  its  history  of  pursuing its  ends through political  corruption ahead  of
outright violence, and the relatively good survival rate of its top leadership, suspicion here –
as previously outlined – has tended to fall upon the Sinaloa Federation. But the fact that the
Federation weathered the Calderón years more or less intact, and with its top leadership still
alive and free, does not in and of itself mean that the government was selectively ignoring it.
The Federation's links with state and local law enforcement and political figures, cultivated
over decades, help shield it from a more aggressive federal policy with more thoroughly than
newer and less established DTOs. The Federation is also (relatively speaking) protected by its
sheer size and by its image as an organisation whose primary purpose is transactional rather
than violent. Finally, it has – wisely – elected to avoid antagonising the government, either by
killing high-ranking officials or by killing soldiers or federal police officers  en masse.  The
speed with which La Familia was disassembled after it launched a frontal attack on federal
agents and soldiers demonstrates the government's  capacity to respond in kind to what it
perceives as direct, rather than indirect, threats to its interests. 
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Rather than illustrating a conspiracy on the part  of  the government to favour the Sinaloa
Federation, this illustrates a strategic choice on the part of the Mexican government to pursue
what H. Richard Friman calls the elimination strategy.513 Such a strategy seeks to exterminate
the  entirety  of  a  trafficking  network  from  top  to  bottom,  rather  than  targeting  the  top
leadership or the more vulnerable and exposed lower-level personnel. This strategy has been
applied reactively across Mexico, with deployments following upsurges of violence rather than
sequentially destroying successive DTOs before moving on to the next.
This strategy results in what Friman terms a “vacancy chain:” the group of available positions
in a criminal enterprise or network created by arrests or deaths. In the case of organisations
subjected to an elimination strategy, the vacancy chain extends beyond the group in question
and  creates  opportunities  for  entire  new  groups.514 Under  favourable  circumstances,  an
elimination strategy will eventually result in the complete disintegration of a criminal network
and an end to the harms that its activities cause – but in reality, such a strategy is only really
feasible when external conditions allow. In Mexico, the conditions which created the MNV
have not been favourable – the balance of Mexican state power and popular outrage at the
violence is not sufficient to overcome the massive structural advantages that work in favour of
drug traffickers. The Calderón government's use of hard power to maintain full sovereignty
over its territory were perhaps understandable given the extent and brutality of the violence,
but in the final accounting they were simply not well adapted to the threat it faced.
In terms of soft power, the Calderón administration's approach certainly paid more than lip
service to the idea of institution-building, but its execution strongly emphasised hard power at
the  expense  of  a  coordinated  national  plan  for  deploying  soft  power  to  counter  drug
traffickers. In theory, it used the military as a temporary stop-gap to pressure DTOs while the
police and civil society, which are ultimately the forces capable of undermining the rationale
for violence, were built up to a point where they could effectively challenge drug trafficking. In
practice,  the  hard  power  aspects  were  executed  to  a  relatively  successful,  coordinated
standard – evidenced by the capture and killing  of  a  number  of  high-ranking traffickers,
particularly  toward  the  end  of  Calderón's  term  –  whereas  soft  power  was  never  fully
513 Friman, H. Richard, “Forging the vacancy chain: Law enforcement efforts and mobility in criminal 
economies,” in Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 41, p. 59 (2004).
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mobilised. The PAN implicitly admitted the need for a more synchronised approach to soft
power after its loss in the 2012 presidential election: along with the victorious PRI and the
leftist opposition PRD, the party signed on to a wide-ranging society-building plan called the
Pacto por Mexico (the Pact for Mexico), which laid out a broad, ambitious agenda while also
de-prioritising the hard power elements central to Calderón's strategy. Ultimately, however, in
order to successfully manage a transnational problem, the government of Mexico needs more
than cooperation amongst its constituent parties – it needs the cooperation of its neighbour to
the north, whose policy now comes to the fore.
V. American Government Counter-narcotics Policy
This section examines the complementary role the United States plays in setting policy related
to drug violence plaguing its southern neighbour. It first probes the ways in which American
foreign policy interfaces with domestic counter-narcotics priorities before moving on to  the
domestic determinants of American foreign policy in Mexico. Finally, it briefly explores the
growing direct involvement of the United States on the ground in Mexico, which sets the stage
for the closing discussion of intermestic policy.
VI. America's War on Drugs as a Foreign Policy and the Mérida Initiative
In many ways, American domestic drug policy dictates the mechanisms of drug trafficking
and  drug  violence  in  Latin  America.  Of  course,  American  policymakers  are  not  directly
responsible for the high level of demand that drives the drug trafficking mechanism stretching
from the Andes to the United States.  But  prohibitionist  policies – despite  some transient
successes  –  have  failed  to  eliminate  that  demand,  while  producing  violent  effects  on the
security  and  foreign  policies  of  the  other  nations  in  the  supply  chain.  While  American
domestic drug policy is not exported on a like-for-like basis to foreign countries, the United
States has exerted significant influence on the international drug control consensus – almost
always in a prohibitionist direction.
Over the past four decades, the United States has increasingly institutionalised prohibition as
a cornerstone of its foreign policy vis-a-vis its southern neighbours. Since 1986, the president
of the United States has had to certify that major drug-producing countries are cooperating
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with American counter-narcotics efforts before they can receive foreign aid.515 American aid
packages  to  Latin  American countries  between  the Andes  and  the  American  border  have
historically  prioritised  military  and  law  enforcement  aid,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on
developing drug interdiction and eradication capabilities. 516
The prohibitionist bent of American policy in the Western Hemisphere is emphasised by its
language and underlying assumptions. This is evinced by the addition of the prefix “narco-” to
nouns describing violent  groups and actors,  creating  “narco-guerrillas,”  “narco-terrorists,”
and so on. Such rhetorical devices inextricably link the commercial and violent aspects of the
narcotics trade. In doing so, it legitimates – and even necessitates – a policy centred around
the  use  of  force  as  a  countermeasure  to  a  form of  commerce.  The  resulting  aid  covered
everything from fairly  limited  programmes  of  military  support  (such as  training  for  elite
troops,  or  donations  of  used  military  hardware)  to  more  extensive  and  aggressive
programmes, such as Plan Colombia, which included a semi-permanent presence of American
contractors,  law  enforcement  liaison  officers  and  military  trainers.517 The  extreme  end  is
represented  by the American  invasion of  Panama in  1989,  which was,  at  least  in  part,  a
reaction  to  General  Manuel  Noriega's  open  flouting  of  the  drug  control  consensus  and
collaboration with Colombian DTOs.518
The militarised approach to drug commerce has sharply mixed effects. On the one hand, the
United States has developed a powerful coercive capability that allows it to reinforce allied
governments  and enable  them  to  capture  or  kill  many  of  the  most  powerful  and  violent
traffickers.  For example,  the U.S. was integral  to the ultimately  successful  hunt  for  Pablo
515
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Escobar in Colombia,519 and to the Peruvian government's arrest of the Shining Path's Abimael
Guzman.520 On  the  other  hand,  these  heavily  securitised  counter-narcotic  policies  can
undermine other foreign policy goals, especially in fields such as democracy promotion, the
rule of law and human rights.521 There is also some evidence that American military aid can
exacerbate, rather than diminish, violence.522
This process through which American foreign counter-narcotics and security policies have
become synonymous is certainly self-reinforcing, particularly in the post-9/11 era, when the
military  and  national  security  budgets  rapidly  ballooned to  the  highest  inflation-adjusted
levels  since World  War II.523 But  the mechanisms for  centralising  and coordinating  these
policies  have  not  necessarily  kept  pace  with  the  increases  in  funding,  size,  and  effective
jurisdiction. There is no single coordinating “shop” for American foreign counter-narcotics
policies: the Office of National Drug Control Policy does produce an annual National Drug
Control  Strategy,  which  contains  general  guidance  for  the  foreign  aspects  of  American
counter-narcotics  policy,  but  as  a  coordinating  office,  it  has no formal  authority  over  the
agencies that carry out those policies.524 Administratively, the separate agencies involved are
only answerable to Congress and the president. And there are dozens of agencies involved,
split across four federal departments (State, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security) that do
not cooperate readily. A list of all the relevant agencies within those departments would have
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to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border
Protection, the Coast Guard, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Guard, the CIA, and USAID
– just to name the most prominent. Even at the higher level of federal departments, inter-
agency cooperation has historically been extraordinarily difficult and fraught with rivalries
and turf battles.525 Absent a clear and compelling directive from the executive and legislative
branches (a rare commodity when different political parties control the two, as has been the
case throughout most of the last four decades), this complexity serves to limit the ability of the
federal government to outline and execute a coherent single policy. The effect is a few broad
policy  imperatives  (eg.  drugs  are  a  security  concern;  apply  the  tools  of  forcible  coercion
against  those  responsible  for  their  trafficking)  carried  out  in  notably  different  ways  by
different actors526 – a dynamic clearly at work with regards to policy in Mexico.
This  broad  policy  imperative,  differently  interpreted  via  a  profusion  of  departments  and
agencies, is useful for understanding the progression and implementation of U.S. policy in
Mexico. As discussed, the bulk of the United States' efforts in Mexico are conducted through
the Mérida Initiative, which is coordinated out of the State Department, with contributions
from various law enforcement and military agencies relevant to their particular specialities.
Though the U.S. government is careful to highlight the non-security aspects of the Mérida
Initiative, it is first and foremost a security assistance programme. In written testimony to the
U.S. House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs dated October 4, 2011, Assistant
Secretary  of  State  for  International  Narcotics  and  Law  Enforcement  Affairs  William  R.
Brownfield indicated that the strategy embodied by the Mérida Initiative was based on four
pillars: “1) Disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate; 2) institutionalize reforms to
sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights; 3) create a 21st-century border; and 4)
525
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build  strong  and  resilient  communities.”527 Two  of  those  pillars  (the  first  and  third)  are
entirely law-enforcement/security goals, while another (the second) mixes security and rule of
law.  Only  the  fourth  is  unambiguously  a  long-term,  soft  power  goal.  Furthermore,  while
Assistant Secretary Brownfield indicated that the Mérida Initiative is moving away from “big-
ticket  items”  and toward a  more cooperative  and multilayered engagement  with Mexican
agencies and society, so far American money continues to tilt in favour of military and law
enforcement  aid.  In  the  same  testimony,  Brownfield  listed  some  of  the  achievements  of
Mérida, including the training of 50,000 Mexican state and federal law enforcement agents,
the delivery of 14 helicopters,  the arrest of 33 “high level priority targets,” the killing of LFM
founder  Nazario “El  Mas Loco” Gonzalez  and the seizure of  thousands of  tons  of  opium,
heroin, marijuana and cocaine.528 
In  the  context  of  irregular  violence,  defining  useful  metrics  of  success  is  a  complex  and
difficult  task.  Soft  power  successes  are  even  more  difficult  to  quantify  or  link  to  the
expenditure of American taxpayer dollars. That said, given that the purpose of Brownfield's
testimony was to establish the effectiveness of the Mérida Initiative in creating security across
a broad spectrum, enumerating such metrics is somewhat self-defeating, as it emphasises the
U.S. government's preoccupation with hard power elements at the expense of soft power ones,
and  the  securitised  view  of  foreign  counter-narcotics  policy  which  remains  dominant  in
American policy. That focus is not simply a product of inter-agency Washington rivalries and
tensions; it is also determined by a number of domestic constraints particular to the United
States. 
VII. Guns, Drugs and Immigrants: Domestic determinants of American
policy in Mexico
In making policy with respect to violence across the border in Mexico faces a particular set of
domestic policy constraints. These largely concern American attitudes toward guns and drugs,
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the two most important non-monetary currencies of the conflict, but the zeitgeist surrounding
illegal  immigration is  also increasingly intertwined with debates  over border security  and
policy toward Mexico.
The United States, as established, is home to the world's largest number of privately owned
firearms. The federal judiciary, up to the Supreme Court, has repeatedly upheld a right to
individual arms ownership based on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. At the
legislative  and executive  levels,  the last  two decades  have  seen remarkably  little  effort  to
change  existing  gun  control  statutes.  The  most  recent  major  federal  gun  control  law,  the
Assault Weapons Ban,529 was passed for a 10-year term in 1994, and was not renewed by the
Congress in 2004. At the state and local level, the picture is somewhat more complicated, with
significant  variations  in  the  regulation  and  oversight  in  the  various  states,  counties  and
municipalities.  In any case,  this  patchwork of federal,  state and local regulations contains
numerous loopholes, ranging from the so-called “gun show” exemptions, which allow firearms
purchases without background checks or waiting periods from temporary exhibitions, to the
simple expedient of driving across state lines to purchase weaponry and ammunition in more
laissez-faire areas.  Furthermore,  the  federal  judiciary  has  demonstrated  a  willingness  to
overturn state bans it views as overly restrictive: in 2008's District of Columbia vs. Heller, the
Supreme Court overturned the District of Columbia's ban on handguns purchased after 1975 –
one of the country's most aggressive pieces of gun control legislation – finding that it imposed
undue burdens on the Second Amendment's guarantee of a right to individual gun possession
unconnected to service in a militia.530
Gun buyers in the United States therefore face fewer restriction in terms of the scope and
power of the armaments available to them than buyers in Mexico, or indeed those in nearly
any other country. While the U.S. National Firearms Act of 1934 severely restricts availability
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of fully-automatic weapons, silencers, “destructive devices” (eg. rocket or grenade launchers,
military-grade  explosives,  extremely  large-caliber  firearms,  and  so  forth),  and  other
particularly  powerful  weaponry,531 rifles,  shotguns  and  handguns  are  relatively  easy  to
acquire532 –  and,  indeed,  quite  cheap.  An AR-15 (the civilian version of  the US military's
standard-issue M16 rifle) is available new for less than $1500,533 while shotguns and semi-
automatic handguns cost even less. 
This  system  is  backed  by  a  powerful  firearms  lobby,  personified  by  the  National  Rifle
Association (NRA). With roughly 5 million members, a massive lobbying budget and a record
of opposing virtually every new regulation on firearms ownership from the 1980s onward, the
NRA (which  is  heavily  supported by  firearms manufacturers)  has  succeeded in  sidelining
most efforts to enact more restrictive firearms laws at either state or federal levels. 534 The
effectiveness of their strategy can be seen in the general retreat of the Democratic Party from
gun control advocacy. Democrats, who have been associated with contemporary gun control
efforts to a greater extent than Republicans,  won presidential and Congressional  elections
since 2006 due in part to victories in states such as North Carolina, Virginia and Montana,
whose populations are generally opposed to gun control measures, making it difficult for their
elected representatives to back new restrictions. This incomplete polarisation of gun control
politics in the United States is  actually a relatively new phenomenon; into the 1970s, gun
control  was  championed  by  members  of  both  parties.535 While  mass  shooting  events  –
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especially those which take place at schools, whether Columbine High School in 1999, Virginia
Tech in 2007 or Sandy Hook Elementary in 2012 – often create a short-lived surge of support
for new gun legislation, but not always in favour of additional restrictions on access to guns:
the Virginia Tech massacre, for example, was followed by calls for laws to permit individual
students to carry weapons onto campus, on the grounds that armed students would serve as a
more significant deterrent to attackers than the presence of armed police.536 And after  the
Sandy Hook massacre, the head of the NRA demanded that armed guards be stationed in
every school in the country on the grounds that “the only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun
is a good guy with a gun.”537 
The inevitable outcome of this combined socio/cultural/political resistance to gun control is
that the United States government's ability to control the crucial flow of armaments south into
Mexico is extremely limited. Its  challenges in this  sector are underlined by a scandal that
unfolded in 2010 involving the ATF's “gun-walking” operations, which allowed known DTO
associates to purchase thousands of weapons, on the grounds that doing so would allow the
agency to track the weapons to DTOs and arrest their leadership.538 But no arrests from these
operations materialised, and many of the weapons were subsequently used in crimes, with
one turning up at the scene where an American border patrol agent was fatally wounded in a
cross-border gunfight (though it is not clear that the weapon in question killed the agent). 539
This represents a significant obstacle to cooperation between the two governments; as former
Attorney General Medina Mora indicated, he would trade all the American aid provided under
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the aegis of the Mérida Initiative for a resumption of the Assault Weapons Ban.540 But the
obstacles to doing so are high enough that the American government cannot or will not do
so.541 
The obstacles to changing American drug policy are starkly different. Rather than a socio-
cultural/political  nexus  restraint  on  government  action,  as  with  firearms,  the  federal
government has  actively  sought  to maintain  the status quo and has suppressed efforts  to
liberalise or significantly alter drug laws. Pressure from the outside has increased in both
scope and intensity in recent years: first, 19 states have decriminalised or legalised marijuana
for medical use, and more significantly, in 2012, Colorado and Washington states both passed
ballot  initiatives  legalising  the  production,  sale  and  use  of  recreational  marijuana.  The
significance  of  the  Colorado  and  Washington  initiatives  is  that  they  represent  true
regularisation, providing a legal framework for the entire product life-cycle of marijuana. In
doing so, they leapfrogged the famously marijuana-tolerant Netherlands, whose laws permit
sale and use but stop short of creating a completely legal market for marijuana.542
It should be noted that despite the relaxation of marijuana controls in some states, it remains
classified as a Schedule 1 narcotic (along with heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine) by the
DEA, which means that even in those states,  growers, sellers and users are in violation of
federal law. In short, where growers, sellers and users operating legally in the eyes of local and
state laws are still vulnerable to arrest and prosecution by the DEA and federal courts. The
state of limbo is likely to be temporary; as public opinion and individual states increasingly
support  marijuana  decriminalisation,  the  federal  government's  ability  to  enforce
contradictory drug laws will be increasingly strained. This leads to one of two possibilities: the
federal government could seek to overturn more permissive state marijuana laws in federal
540
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541
 At the end of 2012, in the wake of the Sandy Hook shootings, the Obama Administration 
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No. 5, May 2004.
194
court, or it could accede to the growing consensus and tacitly leave marijuana governance to
the  states  or  roll  back  its  own  prohibitions  to  coincide  with  them.  Thus  far,  the  federal
government  remains adamantly  opposed to marijuana  legalisation;  a  2009 release  by the
head of  the Office  of  National Drug Control Policy bluntly referred to it  the possibility  of
legalisation  as  “a  non-starter.”543 And  while  other  assessments  of  the  social  harms  of
marijuana place it at or below the level of legally available tobacco and alcohol (making it a
“soft” rather than “hard” drug),544 the DEA continues to classify it as a Schedule I Controlled
Substance, with “...no currently accepted medical use in the United States, a lack of accepted
safety for use under medical supervision, and a high potential for abuse.”545
Of course, while marijuana is an important revenue stream for Mexican DTOs,546 it is only one
of  many,  and  efforts  to  decriminalise  their  other  major  income  sources  (cocaine,
methamphetamine and heroin) are far less feasible. Legalisation would also not necessarily
undercut the rationale for transit or local market drug violence, at least for drugs that cannot
feasibly be produced in the United States, such as cocaine and heroin.  Additionally, other
criminal enterprises such as extortion, human smuggling, arms trafficking and other forms of
illicit economic activity are already contributors to the bottom lines of  specific  DTOs, and
market  competition for  marijuana would  likely  drive  them further  into  those activities.547
Nevertheless, American decriminalisation of marijuana holds out at least the possibility of a
market-based disincentive to Mexican traffickers.
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Finally, the American debate on immigration, particularly illegal immigration, is also germane
here.  Mexico  has  long been the primary pathway by which immigrants  from Central  and
South America  make their  way into  the United  States;  as  a  result,  illegal  immigrants  are
heavily concentrated in states on or near the southern border.548 The U.S.  Department of
Homeland Security's  Office of  Immigration Statistics estimated that  the number of  illegal
immigrants in the United States at the beginning of 2010 was 10.8 million, 549 or roughly 3.5%
percent  of  the  entire  U.S.  population.  While  there  are  a  substantial  number  of  illegal
immigrants  from  southern  and  eastern  Asia,  the  vast  majority  are  of  Central  or  South
American origin  – and,  of  those, the bulk (an estimated 6.6 million)  are  Mexican. 550 The
presence  of  so  many  illegal  immigrants  has  led  to  a  sizeable  anti-immigrant  political
movement in the United States, whose rhetoric blends border security concerns and economic
nationalism. The border would be nearly impossible to secure entirely, given its length, the
hostility of much of the terrain it occupies and the geographic and cultural linkages between
many of the Mexican and American communities straddling it. Despite the apparent slowing
of the immigrant flow to the United States (thanks to the recession and its impact on the
economic  sectors  most  likely  to  employ  unskilled  immigrants,  such  as  construction  and
manufacturing),551 the security/economic narrative of “border security” continues to exert a
major influence on American politics at both the state and national levels.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the so-called “Minutemen” movement, in which American
civilians take up “volunteer” patrol positions on or near the border to report illegal crossings
to the authorities. These groups, whose members are frequently (but not always) armed, have
made frequent references to the drug violence in Mexico, and their language is infused with
the terminology of “narco-violence,” allowing them to present themselves as private security,
548
 Hoeffer, Michael et. al., "Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the 
United States: January 2010,”  
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf 
549
 Ibid.
550
 Ibid. 
551
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protecting against  an invasion by Mexican drug gangs.552 This  contention is  supported by
some well-established individuals, such as former U.S. Army general (and former drug czar)
Barry  McCaffrey,  who,  along  with  fellow  former  U.S.  Army  General  Robert  A.  Scales,
produced a report for the Texas Department of Agriculture arguing that Mexican DTOs were
seeking to create an American “sanitary zone” one county deep in order to facilitate their
operations.553 This seems unlikely, based on available data: McCaffrey and Scales cite their
belief that many Texans living on the border do not report crimes out of fear, but the vast
disparity  between  crime  rates  north  and  south  of  the  border554 indicates  that,  as  far  as
measurable  data  are  concerned,  the  bulk  of  violent  drug  trafficking  crime  in  the  region
remains almost entirely confined to Mexican territory. 
That is not to say that there is no linkage between drug violence and illegal immigration. It is
possible that there is some expertise-sharing between smugglers of drugs and human beings,
since many of the techniques and tactics are held in common between both trades.555 Given
the dangers and difficulties of crossing the U.S.-Mexican border illegally and the potential
economic advantages of living in the United States, a market exists for specialists in border
crossing. Commonly known as “coyotes,” these guides usually charge several thousand dollars
for the service of assisting aspiring migrants across the border. Given that they are providing a
highly lucrative, but illegal, service in an economy rife with powerful, multifaceted criminal
organisations,  it  is  not  surprising  that  DTOs  have  become  involved  in  this  trade  –  with
sometimes horrific consequences for the migrants.556  But thus far, there is little evidence that
552
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the illegal movement of labour into the United States has contributed to a direct extension of
drug violence north of the border.
Nevertheless,  immigration  is  a  politically  charged  emotionally  resonant  issue  for  many
Americans, especially in the border regions. The increasing conflation of immigration and
drug trafficking, exacerbated by diversified transnational criminal organisations that profit
from  the  smuggling  of  both  drugs  and  human  beings,  has  created  a  border
security/immigration nexus, with substantial political implications. At the state level, officials
seeking to pass restrictive immigration laws, or defending those laws after they have gone into
effect, have argued that they are enforcing immigration laws where the federal government
has failed to do so in order to protect their communities.557 This creates an upward channel of
popular pressure to “do something on immigration” on the federal government, which in turn
incentivises it to exert overt influence on Mexico. To an increasing degree, that has included
direct intervention in Mexico.
VIII. American direct involvement in Mexico
In a  televised  debate  amongst  Republican presidential  candidates  in  October 2011,  Texas
Governor Rick Perry said, “[The drug conflict] may require our military in Mexico working in
concert with them to kill these drug cartels and to keep them off of our border and to destroy
their networks.”558 Though the Mexican government immediately rejected this possibility,559
Governor Perry's comments did not form in a vacuum. Since 2006, the United States has been
rapidly increasing its direct involvement in Mexico. While the prospect of American “boots on
the ground” in Mexico a la Iraq or Afghanistan remains a distant one, the fact that it a serious
(if  ultimately  unsuccessful)  candidate  for  the  highest  office  in  the  land  discussed  it  at  a
557
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nationally televised debate indicates that U.S.-Mexican relations have entered a very unusual
phase.
There are a number of  inherent limitations with respect  to direct military  involvement in
Mexico. One relates to the American public: the United States has been at war in a variety of
theatres (primarily Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya) since September 11, 2001. These increasing
unpopularity  of  foreign wars  amongst  the  American public,  along with  the polarised and
divided government, considerably decreases the probability of a major new foreign combat
operation of uncertain length and severity.560 The attitudes of policymakers presents another
obstacle: aside from Governor Perry's comments, there is little willingness, even amongst the
most hawkish mainstream American observers,561 to put American soldiers into combat in
Mexico. Finally, and most importantly, the Mexican government is unlikely to accept such a
prospect, except in the extremely unlikely scenario of total breakdown.562
Nevertheless, American presence and involvement in Mexico is steadily, if quietly, increasing.
The years  from 2006 to 2012 seen Mexican and American military  and law enforcement
agencies develop arguably the closest, most cooperative working relationship they have had in
history.563 This extends from increased military cooperation at a number of levels564 to the
increased number of embedded American law enforcement agents, intelligence officials and
560
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contractors in Mexican agencies565 to a proliferation of information-sharing between security
agencies on both sides of the border.566 These intelligence-sharing operations are somewhat
fraught  on  both  sides,  though,  as  the  American  agencies  withhold  information  on  the
suspicion of corruption within their Mexican counterparts, drawing the ire of the Mexican
agencies.567 
That  collaboration is  at  its  most  intense directly  along the border.  There, the situation is
complicated by the overlapping jurisdiction of not only federal law enforcement and military
agencies of both nations, but also by state and local law enforcement bodies. With so many
armed agents from separate command structures working in an environment of heightened
danger, violent incidents unrelated to drug trafficking are inevitable.568 Meanwhile, American
state law enforcement agencies concerned about the conflict spilling over the border have
become increasingly militarised in response.569
Perhaps  most  tellingly,  the  skies  over  Mexico  are  now  patrolled  by  American  drones,
providing  persistent  surveillance  of  areas  believed  to  be  used  by  drug  traffickers.570
Importantly, the drones operating over Mexico are unarmed, unlike those used in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Yemen under the rubric of the War on Terror (or, to use its current and more
anodyne  name,  Overseas  Contingency  Operations).  The  drone  use  both  links  and
differentiates the unconventional American campaigns against terror and drugs. From the
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perspective  of  the  American  political  and  military  establishment,  both  rely  upon
unconventional  military  capabilities,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  surveillance  and
reconnaissance.  But  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  exhibited  relative  restraint  in  its
pursuit of Mexican drug trafficking figures, compared to the borderless powers it has claimed
to track and kill terrorists in the Middle East demonstrates that it views the threat posed by
drug  trafficking  gangs  in  a  fundamentally  different  way  than  it  views  the  threat  from
international terrorists of the al Qaeda variety. The Mexican and American governments do
not – and historically have not – seen eye to eye on every issue, and this could be a constraint
on the ability  of  the United States  to employ lethal  force  in  Mexico.  Yet  the relationship
between  the  United  States  and  many  of  its  putative  counter-terrorism  allies  (Pakistan,
Afghanistan  and  Yemen,  for  example)  is  considerably  more  fraught,  and  this  has  not
prevented U.S. drone strikes on their territories. Clearly there is some other dynamic at work
here. 
Part  of  the  difference  is  geography,  which  matters  even  in  a  globalised  age.  Yemenis  or
Pakistanis radicalised by American attacks on their soil might be inspired to retaliate, but they
face substantial  dangers  and difficulties in doing so,  including the distance to the United
States, the relatively small community of potential allies they would find once they arrived,
and the language and cultural barriers to successfully carrying out an operation. In contrast,
lethal  force  employed  directly  by  Americans  against  Mexicans  carries  the  danger  of
radicalising a community with easy access to the continental United States,  fluency in the
second most commonly spoken language in the country and a large, geographically diverse
base of potential sympathisers. The appropriate metaphor here is risk management: drone
strikes against suspected members of al Qaeda and their supporters are viewed as a means of
limiting the group's capability to arrange another mass-casualty attack on American targets,
with a tolerable risk of  blowback. The low danger posed to American citizens by Mexican
DTOs and the high risk of blowback from the use of lethal American force (whether delivered
directly by soldiers or remotely by drones) effectively reverses those calculations.
Realistically,  a larger reason why American direct involvement remains a distant prospect
relates to the Mexican government, and specifically the perceived threat to it as viewed by the
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Mexican  and  American  governments.  The  Mexican  state,  at  least  under  the  Calderón
Administration, viewed drug trafficking as a profound national security threat – but not an
existential  threat,  as  the Pakistani,  Yemeni  and Afghan governments  view  radical  Islamic
extremism. Neither the U.S. nor Mexican governments, even in confidential communications,
have given credence to the idea that DTOs could threaten the existence or central functioning
of the Mexican state.571 The DTOs have not exercised particular restraint in their targeting
decisions, their choice of targets has evinced some limits: officials of the federal government
have  so  far  not  materialised,  nor  have  intentional  attacks  on  American soil  or  American
citizens.572 This  was  not  the  case  in  Colombia  in  the  late  1980s,  when  drug  traffickers
assassinated judges, federal officials,  high-ranking military officers and even a presidential
candidate. This state of affairs is highly informal, and therefore potentially fragile, but it has
remained constant for the duration of the conflict so far. The as-yet unrealised potential for
escalation against American targets adds a final constraint to possibility of American direct
involvement, and complicates the formulation of policy yet further.
IX. “Intermestic” policy?
The complexity of responding to drug violence is inextricably linked to the fact that in both
nations, the relevant policies involve departments and agencies with responsibility for both
foreign and domestic affairs. This creates an extraordinarily complex environment for both
policymakers and also impedes a straightforward study of policy. Given that the conflict is as
yet unresolved, and that an extremely complex matrix of harms to public safety and health are
involved, it would be exceedingly difficult,  if  not impossible,  to make a substantiated case
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  specific  policies  thus  far.  Instead,  the  two  governments'
strategies will be examined using a more carefully delimited, nuanced standard.
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Following Bayliss Manning, the appropriate frame of reference here is  policy that actively
takes account of both domestic and international ramifications. Manning combined the words
“domestic” and “international” to create a portmanteau: “Intermestic affairs.”573 Writing in
1977 (an era of  increasing global trade),  he was mostly referring  to economic rather than
security issues, but this broadly applicable concept has become more relevant in the following
decades. Essentially, he argued that the factors that influenced the making of domestic and
foreign policy were increasingly interrelated, but that the political structures responsible for
those respective fields of endeavour had not evolved to compensate, and were hamstrung in
their  efforts  to  create  effective  intermestic  solutions  by  internal  rivalries,  bureaucratic
inefficiencies  and  outdated  institutional  designs.  Despite  the  various  changes  in  the
bureaucratic structure of the Mexican and American governments since 1977, this remains
broadly accurate. While many of the domestic agencies of the U.S. federal government have
offices dedicated to international affairs, these are subordinate to the primary mission and
largely serve to advise  the agency's  leadership and liaise  with foreign governments  where
necessary.574 Similarly,  Mexico's  government agencies are divided along fairly conventional
domestic  and  foreign  affairs  lines  (albeit  with  the  consideration  that  Mexico's  military  is
constitutionally permitted to use force on its own territory, whereas the American military is
legally limited to providing support for lawfully constituted domestic agencies on American
soil).575 Bayliss lays out the fundamental problem, relating to the Constitutional construction
of the American government: 
“The inherited constitutional structure of the United States certainly does little to help the
nation arrive at and conduct a consecutive foreign policy. Having ordained a government of
separate branches,the Constitution says virtually nothing about how foreign policy is to be
formulated or conducted by them. Treaties are to be made by the President with the consent
of  two-thirds of  the Senate;  war is  to be declared by majority  vote of  both houses  of  the
Congress;  the  President  is  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  armed  forces;  tariffs,  as  revenue
measures, are legislated by the Congress; the President appoints ambassadors by and with the
573
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consent  of  the  Senate;  further,  the  Constitution  saith  not.  One  can  clearly  see  in  these
provisions a mirror reflection of the simple classical agenda of international affairs dealing
with treaties (for the most part about boundaries) representatives abroad (ambassadors) and
national security.”576
Indeed, the Constitution has not been substantially amended with respect to foreign policy
since  its  inception.577 However,  in  that  time,  foreign  policy  has  become  massively  more
complex. Most importantly, it has spread from war, diplomacy and treaties (as provided for
explicitly in the Constitution) to a wide variety of aspects of governance, from basic economic
functions in a globalised economy to the ability of domestic security agencies to adequately
respond  to  transnational  nongovernmental  networks.  As  a  result,  many  foreign  policy
mechanisms are ad hoc – set up by organisational fiat and enforced by tradition or dictate,
rather than law. In theory, the lack of Constitutional binding enables flexibility to create new
structures or alter existing ones to keep pace with evolving threats; in practice, as Manning
points out, the lack of structure allows individuals to amass power contrary to the greater
interest. Describing how this dynamic plays out in Congress, he writes, “Each congressional
committee is a barony, protective of its independence, jurisdiction and prerogatives. Subjects
that are complex and interrelated – such as the appropriate U.S. political posture toward,
trade with and military and economic assistance to a particular foreign nation – are chopped
up  among  several  independent  committees  and  are  never  reassembled  to  make  up  an
integrated whole for consideration or action by the Congress.”578 This problem in Congress is
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only  magnified in  the case  of  a  government divided on party  lines,  as  has  been the case
frequently since 2000.579
As previously described, this dynamic also applies to the executive agencies. Agents of the
ATF, viewed it as their agency's prerogative to use gun-walking to trace firearms smuggling
into Mexico, regardless of the impact that it would have on broader U.S.-Mexican relations.
Meanwhile, the State Department indicated in a leaked memo from 2010 that they were “no
longer fixated on capturing high-value targets, even though that remains necessary.  Now we
are moving to assess and penetrate the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) as corporations,
and to build the civilian institutions to enforce the rule of law.”580 Meanwhile, the Department
of Defense continued to focus on providing military training and logistical support, while the
DEA and FBI centre their efforts on interdiction and counter-supply approaches. While in
theory, these varying elements could form a coherent overall counter-narcotics strategy, the
existing implementation has not lived up to that potential.
Mexico, with its stronger tradition of centralised government, should be in a better structural
position to have a  unified  strategy.  Arguably,  the incentives  for  Mexico  to do so  are  also
higher, given that the violence that defines the problem is taking place on its soil and against
its  citizens.  The  Mexican  government's  policy  endeavours  have  come  closer  to  that
comprehensive ideal than the disjointed American efforts. And as discussed, Mexican citizens
remain broadly supportive of their military, which, along with more permissive Mexican laws,
grants the government relatively broad latitude in its deployments. While the police are not
generally trusted – particularly not the municipal and state forces – the public is behind their
mission, which helps support a unified strategy. And though members of the PRI and PRD
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criticised  the  Calderón  Administration's  strategies  and  priorities,  the  post-election  period
showed that the three major parties are willing to at least speak the language of cooperation
and agree on a detailed set of guiding principles, even if that plan has yet to be executed.
Despite this, and despite the notable successes of the Mexican security services in tracking
down, arresting and killing leading drug trafficking figures, the logic of market-driven drug
violence remains strong enough to overpower the Mexican government's strategy.
The Mexican government's  heavy focus on domestic factors,  has  not  rendered the foreign
policy aspect irrelevant. While the reasons differ, Mexico's ties to the United States are at least
as important to it as ties to Mexico are for the U.S. government. For Mexico, this is largely due
to economics: it is economically dependant upon the United States, which is far and away its
largest trading partner.581 Moreover, remittances from Mexicans living inside the U.S. have
historically provided a substantial boost to the Mexican economy, and although the number of
migrants has declined the wake of the 2007-8 recession, this is likely to remain the case for
the foreseeable future. 
Fundamentally, Mexico is combatting a domestic security issue that has transnational roots,
while the United States faces a foreign policy issue complicated by domestic economic drivers
and political constraints. Both countries, in other words, are tackling an intermestic challenge.
While their  policies have in some ways acknowledged this crucial  truth, Mexico's  are still
fundamentally designed to address a domestic security problem while those of the United
States are set up for international relations and foreign aid.
Despite the substantial complications, there are some signs that policy might evolve in a more
intermestic direction. One of the few universally agreed-upon views in interviews conducted
for this research and in the relevant literature is that the official relationship between the two
countries has improved markedly over the last decade, particularly with respect to security
matters. The first half of the 1990s saw an improved relationship between the two countries,
spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and Mexican Defence Secretary Gen.
581
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Mexico,” Central Intelligence 
Agency, 7 May 2013, accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mx.html on 1 June 2013.
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Enrique  Cervantes  Aguirre,  characterised  by  the  creation  of  a  multi-faceted  U.S.-Mexico
Bilateral  Working  Group,  increased  training  and  officer-exchange  programmes  and  the
transfer of 73 surplus American UH-1H Huey helicopters to the Mexican military. However,
with  the  retirement  of  Secretary  Perry  in  1997,  the  relationship  began  to cool  again:  the
number  of  high-level  meetings  decreased,  the  Mexican  government  determined  that  the
donated Hueys were in excessively poor condition and returned them to the United States and
the Bilateral Working Group was gradually abandoned.582 
The following decade, however, saw a series of turnarounds. First, the elections of Vicente Fox
and George W. Bush in 2000 put two men in office with greater-than-average connections to
each other's country.583 Second, the 9/11 attacks prompted a massive re-thinking of security in
the United States, and eventually forced American security officials to take their relationships
with bordering nations more seriously. 
But the most important turning point was the increase in drug violence that marked President
Calderón's  term.  To  a  certain  extent,  this  was  driven  by  necessity:  the  Mexican  security
services, faced with a threat they did not believe they could handle on their own, turned to the
United States, which as the world's leading exporter of arms, military training and support
services, was in a unique position to help rapidly build capacities that could otherwise take
decades to grow. The United States could also share share information gathered by its well-
funded  intelligence  community.  In  meetings  with  their  American  counterparts,  Mexican
diplomats admitted the various weaknesses in their intelligence-gathering capabilities, and
proffered insight  into  the internal  rivalries  between  the services.  For  example,  in  a  cable
relaying the news that the Mexican Navy's special forces had killed Arturo Beltran-Leyva in a
gunfight  along with several  of  his  bodyguards,  American  diplomats  noted that  the Navy's
success  would  be  seen  as  a  further  blow  to  the  prestige  of  the  Army,  which  had  been
comparatively  slow to  act  on tips  and  less  aggressive  in  its  pursuit  of  high-ranking  drug
582
 Deare, (2010), pp. 3-4.
583
 Fox attended Harvard Business School and had worked for Coca Cola, eventually rising to 
become the company's head for all Latin American operations, while George W. Bush had been 
governor of Texas and supervised that state's significant border interactions with Mexico.
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traffickers.584 Despite  these  internal  rivalries,  Mexican  agencies  at  all  levels  are  taking
advantage of this closer relationship, and security forces are not the only benefactors. For
example, Mexican and American prosecutors at the state and local levels have also taken to
sharing best practices, leading to the adoption in some Mexican municipalities of the drug
court model585 used successfully in various American jurisdictions.586 
This is not to say that the official relationship is perfect. Intelligence-sharing is still somewhat
spotty,  due  to  American  worries  about  infiltration  or  corruption  amongst  their  Mexican
counterparts.  And while Mexican security services accepted American aid to support their
efforts against the traffickers, residual institutional and historical rivalries between the two
countries have been resilient. Furthermore, the PRI's return to power in late 2012 could limit
the cooperation:  one  of  President  Peña  Nieto's  first  announcements  was that  all  contacts
between  American  and  Mexican  agencies  would  be  routed  through  the  Ministry  of  the
Interior, a bottlenecking likely to limit the breadth of operational cooperation.587
In  any  case,  effective  intermestic  policy  in  this  instance  requires  more  than  an  amicable
working relationship between two governments. Indeed, given the lack of a formal Mexican-
American bilateral security body – a NATO equivalent, or a NAFTA for security – the direct
relationship between the two is  less important  than the question of whether  the separate
policies  adopted  by  each  government  are  responsive  to  the  intermestic  nature  of  the
challenge.  At  this  level,  the  signs  are  less  promising.  Despite  its  acknowledgement  that
demand from American users drives the drugs trade, the U.S. federal government has not
been willing to challenge that or any other domestic constraints; the American government's
inability  or  unwillingness  to address  the ubiquity  of  high-powered weapons  is  one of  the
584
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major points of disagreement between the two countries. Meanwhile, the lack of coordination
between American agencies  and the absence of  a  singular strategy diminishes  the overall
direction and effectiveness of the strategy. Despite the public health/security risks posed by
drugs, the fact that the violence does not immediately impact American citizens hinders the
development of a political exigency sufficient to overcome those domestic constraints. 
The Mexican government, on the other hand, faces an inverted type of intermestic challenge.
The constraints that set up the conflict, as outlined, are beyond its immediate control. Both
ends of the profit engine that drives the DTOs are outside its territory, and it  has limited
coercive power to influence the relevant foreign entities.  Having dismantled the symbiotic
relationship between its government and drug traffickers, Mexico now finds itself effectively
at war with them. And, by fracturing the networks of drug traffickers, it also eliminated any
central authority with whom it could negotiate or bargain. Whether or not the confrontation
was inevitable, it is effectively irreversible, pushing Mexico and the United States together as
the former tries to manage it. But it would be unrealistic to expect Mexico to influence U.S.
domestic policy in any significant manner. Given the peculiarities of American politics, for
example, it would be virtually impossible for a foreign government to outmatch the NRA's
opposition to the Assault Weapons Ban,  given that gun control opponents in the U.S. often
evince  a  significant  resistance  to  multilateralism  or  domestic  policies  based  on  foreign
concerns.588 
In  summary,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  American  policy  toward  Mexico  is  either
formulated or carried out in a way that reflects a unified, intermestic approach. The Mexican
government's  strategy,  which from the outset  was more constrained by its  circumstances,
comes closer to that mark, and there is at least some evidence that its various agencies and
parties  are  moving  toward  a  more  unitary  strategy,  in  stark  contrast  to  the  American
government. But the difficulties faced by both governments in coming to terms with a direct
threat to stability, peace and legitimate commerce along their shared border demonstrates
that while the constraints that bound the theorised Market of Narcotic Violence are in some
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respects the  result  of government policies,  they do not necessarily generate the conditions
under which those policies can be changed.
210
Chapter 7: Analysis and Conclusions
211
I. Introduction: The Mexican Drug Conflict in Perspective
In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker presents an argument that violence at all
levels from the individual to the international has been declining throughout history for a
combination of evolutionary, environmental and societal reasons.589 While Pinker attributes
this decline not to a “grand unified theory,”  but to a convergence of causes ranging from
philosophy to economic self-interest,590 the idea that human civilisation is becoming steadily
less violent dovetails with various other contemporary theories of politics and international
relations. The decline in overt conflicts worldwide since the end of the Second World War has
also been attributed to factors ranging from the spread of liberal democratic government591 to
the  to  the  so-called  “CNN  effect”592 to  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  and  their
associated security umbrellas.593 While the precise causation is disputed, there appears to be a
broad cross-disciplinary consensus that the world has passed through the age of widespread
inter-state wars and into an age of more diffuse types of conflict and organised violence – if
not Francis Fukuyama's “end of history” than at least an end of an age of warfare.
Yet while the prospects of major inter-state warfare appear to be diminishing, a glance at the
headlines demonstrates that in many ways the world remains a fundamentally violent place.
From street crime to political demonstrations to ethnic violence and insurgent campaigns,
there are practically no regions on Earth that have completely immunised themselves against
violence,  even  if  the  apocalyptic  vision  of  an  atomised  world  ruled  by  street  gangs  and
irregular  combatants  predicted  by  Robert  D.  Kaplan,  Herfried  Münkler  and  others,  as
described in the first chapter, not materialised. Contrary to the over-enthusiastic predictions
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by military futurists of “fourth-” and “fifth-generation” warfare, few if any of these types of
violence  is  truly  new. But  what  such  theorists  get  right  is  that  the  wide  availability  of
devastatingly  powerful  small  arms,  combined  with  a  globalised  world  economy  and  the
diffusion of communication over mobile networks and the Internet, democratises the ability
of non-state actors to challenge the power of the state in ways previously unimaginable.
That potent mix of technology and economic trends was crucial in the formation of this thesis,
which began as an examination of the evolution of warfare from the modern era into the
future. While it sharpened into an analysis of violence in Mexico, it is important to view this
topic  in  the  broader  context  of  organised  violence.  This  is  incontrovertibly  an  era  of
unconventional war. The “conventional” wars of  the last two decades – the Gulf War, the
Kargil War of 1999, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 – have been
of historically small scale, and are dwarfed in terms of length and casualties by the irregular
conflicts of the same period: the civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, the Syrian and Libyan uprisings of
the 2010s and the Colombian insurgency/narco-violence of the 1990s and early 2000s. As a
result,  there  is  a  clear need for  a  more accurate typology and system of classification for
irregular  conflicts;  simply  labelling  each  of  these  disparate  outbreaks  of  violence  an
“insurgency,”  with  or  without  a  modifier  such  as  “narco-,”  is  not  particularly  helpful.  In
Mexico, the constraints on the conflict, the motivations of the participants and the rationale
for violence are all fundamentally different from those of a politicised insurgency; it therefore
stands to reason that the appropriate counter-strategy would be different than in a traditional
political, ethnic or religious insurgency.
This concluding chapter will summarise the findings of this thesis, with particular reference to
the Mexican case,  and will  further illustrate where that case fits  in a broader typology of
contemporary organised violence. It will then discuss policy implications for the Mexican and
American  governments,  along  with  implications  for  international  narcotics  prohibition
mechanisms, before offering general conclusions.
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This thesis set out to determine the nature of violence in Mexico; specifically whether or the
ongoing  conflict  there  fit  the  theorised  model  of  a  Market  of  Narcotic  Violence.  The
conclusions are as follows:
- From 2006 to 2012, certain regions in Mexico demonstrated the essential characteristics of
a Market of Narcotic Violence.  Broadly speaking, these constraints fit into two categories:
those specific to Mexico and those generalisable to other instances of  drug transit market
violence. 
The general factors are: the illegality of narcotics that divorces their sale from any legitimate
regulatory mechanism; the globalised bifurcation of the drug market into production in poor
countries  and  consumption  in  rich  ones;  the  ease  of  moving illicit  goods  across  national
borders; the increased ease of organised violence by means of ever-more powerful small arms
along with sophisticated communications and surveillance equipment, all of which serve as
force multipliers for  irregular combatants;  and the relatively constant level  of demand for
narcotics (with the caveat that demand for specific drugs rises and falls depending on a variety
of non-controllable and often non-quantifiable factors, such as whether they are perceived as
“fashionable”594). 
Specific  factors  to  Mexico  include:  its  lengthy border  with the United  States,  the  world's
largest  consumer of drugs;  the gaps in its  security  forces'  abilities to deal  with organised
violence on the domestic front; economic conditions that brought millions of migrant workers
to  the  northern  border  before  leaving  them  with  few  economic  options;  the  (mostly)
contemporaneous movement of the majority of cocaine trafficking from the Gulf of Mexico to
overland  routes  and  the  restructuring  of  the  Mexican  political  establishment;  and  the
difficulties both Mexican and American governments faced in crafting intermestic policy to
deal with border issues. 
Most  of  these  constraints  cannot  be  affected  in  any  meaningful  way  by  the  Mexican  or
American governments, even if the two worked in perfect coordination with each other and
internally  – which they are  not.  Even  under  the best  possible  circumstances,  there  is  no
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reason  to  believe  that  government  action  by  either  state  that  does  not  address  these
constraints can do more than marginally manage the level and scope of the violence. 
That said, there are significant caveats to this conclusion. The fact that the violence has been
ongoing – indeed, increasing – for six years does not in and of itself demonstrate resilience.
Furthermore, the conflict has becoming increasingly polarised, with the Zetas and the Sinaloa
Federation  gaining  ground  at  the  expense  of  smaller  operations.  While  flexibility  of
participant identity is certainly part of the theory of Market of Narcotic Violence, were the
conflict to evolve into a straightforward battle for territory and resources between the state
and one or two all-encompassing criminal organisations, it would no longer be an accurate
way to characterise the conflict. This potential for evolution brings us to the next conclusion.
- Drug violence in Mexico is evolving rapidly. At the outset of the Calderón Administration's
campaign against drug traffickers, there were between seven and fourteen major independent
trafficking organisations, some in alliances or truces with each other,  but each pursuing a
basically independent set of interests. In the subsequent six years, that number has steadily
decreased due to attrition at the hands of competitors and the action of Mexican security
forces, even as the total number of violent incidents has been climbing. The overall complexity
of the marketplace remains high – DTOs,  even at their  most hierarchical,  represent loose
confederations of similarly interested individuals and groups rather than strict, formal units –
but increasingly the conflict in Mexico is transforming from a multi-sided, multi-tiered one
into a simpler battle between the government, the Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation and their
respective affiliates. These two groups, as outlined, represent differing approaches to survival
in a Market of Narcotic Violence (the corporatist, transactional model for the Sinaloas and the
anarchic franchise  for  the  Zetas);  other  archetypes,  including  the  insurgent  model  of  La
Familia and the smuggling-centred model of the Gulf Cartel, were tested in the marketplace
and failed. 
The absence of overt political aspirations on the part of either organisation means that as of
the end of the Calderón Administration, the violence is still market-based. But the evolution
in the participants and the character of the violence demonstrates that this is not a stable
form. Instead, the evolution of the Mexican conflict has exhibited a form of emergence theory,
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whereby complex systems without a central directing agency can exhibit semi-intelligent or
“strategic” characteristics.  In this  case,  a market dominated by a variety of  actors,  and in
which violence is a means of enforcement, a profit-making service and a means through which
participants communicate has produced large organisations with transnational reach and the
ability to absorb significant shocks without disruption to their commercial activity. 
Emergence – or at least the spread of operational concepts and tactics consistent with the
Market of Narcotic Violence theory – is also seen in the rapid spread of techniques and tactics
across  diffuse  and oftentimes antagonistic  organisations.  The use of  expressive  violence  -
“corpse messaging,” video recordings of interrogations, torture and execution spread via the
Internet, public dumping of bodies and body parts – may be primarily associated with the
Zetas, but is by no means unique to them. Instead, what might in previous conflicts have been
secretive brutality has become a mode of communication not only between the Zetas and the
public but between DTOs of all sizes and descriptions. This rapid spread of information is also
seen in what might be termed smuggling tradecraft – the means by which the commercial
aspects of the DTOs operate. Instead of remaining the intellectual property of one specific
group,  innovative  logistical  techniques,  ranging  from  the  use  of  ultralight  aircraft595 to
improvised marijuana-firing catapults596 and even cannon597 are spread widely and join the
repertoire of multiple trafficking groups. The overall effect, despite the competitive aspect of
the market, is to preserve the high profit margins that make operating a trafficking enterprise
in  the face  of  brutal  rivalries  and aggressive  opposition from the state  possible  and even
appealing.
The  current  form of  these  organisations,  and of  their  particular  techniques  and styles,  is
unlikely to be the last. Instead, the groups and their techniques are likely to continue to evolve
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into new forms and adopt fresh commercial and violent strategies; in doing so, they could
come to challenge the authority of the state in a more direct, aggressive fashion. It is also
possible  that  the conflict  will  continue to evolve  toward a  bilateral  battle  rather  than the
multilateral  fracas  seen  so  far.  But  absent  a  change  in  the  underlying  constraints  of  the
conflict, the level of violence is unlikely to change significantly – even if its character does.
- The particulars of the spread of violence are driven heavily by trends in drug consumption .
Mexico's value as a transit state – indeed, the entire logic behind the conflict – relates to its
geographic  monopoly  as  the  last  link  in  the  smuggling  chain  to  the  uniquely  valuable
American narcotics market. Per the theory of global anomie, drug production largely occurs in
poor countries with relatively weak coercive power, and the maximal value is extracted from
those resources by selling them to consumers in the richest countries. In the case of Mexico,
this  is  a  particularly  important  dynamic with regard to cocaine,  given it  sits  between the
biggest global producers in the Andean region and the world's largest user base, the United
States.  To  a  lesser  extent,  the  dynamic  holds  true  for  marijuana,  methamphetamine  and
heroin,  all  of  which  Mexico  produces  in  significant  (but  not  world-class)  quantities.  But
Mexico is only an irreplaceable link in the chain for cocaine. Marijuana is also produced in
significant quantities in Canada and domestically in the United States598 – and, as American
states  increasingly  loosen  their  marijuana  laws,  domestic  production  will  likely  become
increasingly competitive on price. Heroin is a niche product in the United States, representing
only a small fraction of DTO profits.599 And methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs can
be produced virtually anywhere that has access to precursor chemicals (though states with
substantial coercive capability do have the ability to restrict access to these chemicals). 
DTOs, especially in a competitive market context such as Mexico, are enormously flexible and
adaptive. As demand for cocaine in the United States has remained relatively static, they have
sought out new markets in Europe, and in the process, transformed West Africa into a transit
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hub  along  the  same  lines.600 Meanwhile,  as  Americans  consume  a  greater  quantity  of
amphetamine-type drugs, Mexican DTOs have aggressively moved into this area. However,
trafficking  groups  are  under  significant  pressure  to  monopolise  this  market  before
competitors  do,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  synthetic  drugs  can  be  produced  locally  and
conceivably tailored to local market demands at the smallest possible scale. Therefore, DTOs
must either provide services (such as industrial-scale production, particularly potent formulas
or  a  highly  efficient  trafficking  and  delivery  system)  that  potential  American competitors
cannot. Otherwise, they must be willing to escalate the violence on American territory – a step
they  have  thus  far  consciously,  scrupulously  avoided.  The  question  of  which  borders  are
relevant to transnational violence brings up the final conclusion:
- The borders of the market in question are sharply defined by the U.S.-Mexico border, but
spread a considerable depth into other countries south of Mexico. To be clear, Mexico has
unique characteristics with regard to the Market of Narcotic Violence – not only its exclusive,
lengthy and smuggler-friendly border with the United States, but also the extensive cultural
ties with Americans (particularly in the border region itself). These are of irreplaceable value
to organisations seeking to transit  drugs into the United States.  While nautical  smuggling
remains a factor – and the rapid evolution from normal commercial ships to go-fasts to semi-
submersibles  to  true  submarines  demonstrates  that  there  is  significant  investment  and
innovation  in  this  area  –  its  nature  makes  interdiction  easier  and  necessitates  a  smaller
number  of  larger  shipments,  increasing  the  potential  losses  from  individual  interdictions
considerably. As a result, the land border remains a uniquely valuable asset for traffickers.
The United States, despite the overall inconsistency of its Mexico strategy, maintains a world-
leading coercive capacity and has demonstrated a willingness to use unilateral and lethal force
against  irregular  enemies  regardless  of  their  nationality  or  location.  This  incentivises
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traffickers  to  keep  violence  north  of  the  border  (or  against  Americans  generally)  to  an
absolute minimum. 
No  such  restrictions  apply  to  Mexico's  other  neighbours,  who  all  lack  the  magnitude  of
coercive  power  exhibited  by  the  United  States.  Although  the  strategic  value  to  DTOs  of
Guatemalan,  El  Salvadorean  and  Belizean  territory  is  less  than  that  of  Mexican  territory
abutting the American border, the ability to construct support facilities and stage operations
outside  the  reach  of  Mexico's  military  is  of  not  insignificant  value.  Furthermore,  these
countries have their  own strategic assets,  including their  large reserves of  underemployed
violent specialists and their caches of military-grade weaponry left over from the civil wars of
previous decades. The United States has made a concerted effort to shore up the defences of
these governments, and in doing so it faces far fewer institutional limitations than in Mexico,
enabling it to send small law enforcement and military units to engage in direct combat with
DTOs (an unthinkable option in Mexico). Nevertheless, its existing commitment of resources
is  not  sufficient  to  have  more  than  a  moderate,  tactical  effect.  While  Central  American
governments,  led  by  the  current  Guatemalan  administration,  have  responded  to  rising
violence by proposing to lift legal restrictions on drug trafficking and use, such proposals are
unlikely  to  affect  the  course  of  the  violence  absent  a  broader  regional  or  international
solution, given the limited value of their consumer markets and the nature of their territories
as links in a longer chain supply rather than a unique, irreplaceable asset.
Specific policy recommendations are not the function of academic research. Nevertheless, this
study, and the trends apparent in Mexican and American counter-narcotics policies, behoove
an examination of the ways in which an evolution of those policies might could impact the
Market of Narcotic Violence.
II. Implications for the Mexican government
Mexico stands at a critical junction with respect to the drug conflict raging in its territory. The
conflict has largely crystallised around the two largest trafficking organisations – the Sinaloa
Federation and Zetas – and metastasised to new locations within the country and across its
southern  border  into  Guatemala,  Belize,  Honduras  and  El  Salvador.  The  rate  of  violent
219
incidents related to the participants in this conflict has increased every year since 2006, and
the mass killings of migrant workers, the random slayings in cities including Ciudad Juarez
and the murders of journalists, aid workers and law enforcement officers have undermined
the government's  claim that the vast majority of  those killed were directly involved in the
drugs trade. Meanwhile, the country's politics are transforming: the victory of Enrique Peña
Nieto in the 2012 presidential elections brought the PRI back into power 12 years after its
expulsion from the executive branch by the PAN. Peña Nieto has not pledged a radical shift
from  President  Calderón's  security  strategy;  his  administration's  two  most  important
proposed changes are to replace the state and local police with gendarmes reporting to the
central government (following the British model of policing rather than the American one),
and to create a 10,000-strong paramilitary police force to take the place of the military in
counter-narcotics operations nationwide.601 His party, aware of its historical reputation, has
been at pains to distance itself  from either a formal or informal negotiated truce with the
country's DTOs, although it has begun to re-negotiate some of the security agreements with
the United States made under the PAN.602
If successfully implemented, these steps could limit the scope or scale of violence, but they are
by themselves unlikely to bring the murder rate back to pre-2006 levels, break the power of
the largest DTOs, undermine the rationale for violence or alter the fundamental constraints
on the illegal marketplace in question. Mexico is in many ways at the centre of a perfect storm
of conditions which account for the persistence and extremity of the violence and the limited
ability of the government to manage the conflict. Furthermore, there is no ideal model that
guarantees a quick and successful resolution – calls from Americans to “Colombianise” the
situation by helping the Mexican government adopt the same strategies used against the Cali
and Medellín cartels in the early 1990s fail to account for the vastly different nature of the
geographic, economic, social, cultural and political factors at play here. Furthermore, while
the DTOs have as of yet generally stayed away from politics  on a national or regional level
601
 Peña Nieto, Enrique, et. al., “Pacto por México,” Government of Mexico, 2013, accessed from
http://pactopormexico.org/ on 2 June 2013.
602
 Priest, Dana, “U.S. role at a crossroads in Mexico's intelligence war on the cartels,” The 
Washington Post, 28 April 2013, accessed from http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
role-at-a-crossroads-in-mexicos-intelligence-war-on-the-cartels/2013/04/27/b578b3ba-a3b3-11e2-
be47-b44febada3a8_story.html on 2 June 2013.
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(excepting their bribery and coercion of local and state officials to guarantee safe harbour for
themselves and safe passage for their products), additional pressures placed on them and the
communities in which they are active could create unpredictable results, possibly resulting in
a politicisation of the drug warfare (as distinct from the narcotised political insurgencies seen
in the Andes or in Afghanistan). 
The Mexican government's federal structure complicates the task of making unified, effect
policy  which  counteracts  the  influence  of  drug  traffickers  extremely  difficult.  Even  if  the
federal government agrees upon a policy  and implements it  single-mindedly, much of  the
reality of politics in Mexico is not within its direct control. The workings of local judicial and
law enforcement systems, the honesty and transparency of local finances and the provision of
social services and economic opportunities to people by local authorities can all reinforce or
stymie the federal government's efforts. It is here where the Mexican national government
faces  a  challenge  most  similar  to  its  American  counterpart:  crafting  a  strategy  which  is
potentially effective but could also be feasibly implemented by state and local governments. 
But it is also at the local level where the DTOs do, in fact, engage in politics. They may not be
political in the sense that have a strategic goal of creating a new political unit or taking control
of the existing one – but they certainly engage in politics at the state and local level through
co-optation, intimidation and in some cases murder of political figures. The cost of bribing,
threatening or murdering a local or state politician is likely to be cheaper (potentially vastly
cheaper) than the cost of bribing, threatening or murdering a national political figure, and
local politicians in strategically useful districts can potentially offer more useful services than
their national counterparts. The vast majority of Mexico's various police forces are answerable
to their local and state authorities – a problem exacerbated by the fact that the military and
federal police are not large enough to permanently deploy across every contested region. In
short, the federal government faces not only the direct challenge of DTO violence but also the
challenge of determining which state and local forces are loyal to its goals and which are
actively undermining them.
There is little disagreement on the ultimate solution to drug violence in Mexico. The Mexican
government, the American government and a broad group of academic and policy experts
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agree that the eventual resolution will come with the development of legitimate economic
opportunities for Mexican citizens. In the interim, the militarisation that marked Calderón's
strategy must be rolled back, with the country's various police agencies taking the lead on
counter-narcotics  operations.  Those  forces  must  be  sufficiently  well-paid and equipped to
defeat the most organised and sophisticated trafficking groups, and they must be backed by
significantly more empowered, less corrupt judiciary and penal systems, to ensure successful
prosecutions that truly remove captured drug dealers from their networks. Most important is
the project  of  making vast  improvements in economic opportunities  for  Mexican citizens,
particularly  those  living  in  areas  adjacent  to  the  American  border.  Only  viable  economic
alternatives can combat the calculation of interest which leads many to choose working in the
drugs  trade  over  a  legitimate  occupation.  Granted,  these  are  all  long-term,  remarkably
complicated goals; even given absolutely optimal conditions, it would be reasonable to expect
that they would take decades to achieve in any meaningful sense, and progress over time is
not  guaranteed. That  all  said,  the fact  that  Mexico's  three major  political  parties have all
signed the  Pacto por Mexico,  which lays out a broad set of shared guidelines for long-term
social development, demonstrates that at least the political obstacles to such a solution may
be falling away.
Mexico's current strategy has been reactive rather than proactive: deploying the federal police
and military to areas that have seen spikes of violence and attempting to suppress it largely
through shows of force. Some degree of reactivity is necessary, but a strategy for suppressing a
Market of Narcotic Violence would require substantially greater force than Mexico possesses.
Instead of spreading its most valuable resources such as the Navy's special forces units and
the  intelligence  generated  by  joint  Mexican-American  “fusion  centres”  nationwide,  the
Mexican government could develop and institute a coherent strategy to successively eliminate
the most violent groups, even at the cost of temporarily ceding ground to others. This does not
necessarily mean decapitation strikes against the leading figures of the Sinaloa Federation or
Zetas at all costs; indeed, it might mean intentionally leaving leadership figures alone, at least
temporarily. Callahan et al. have demonstrated a methodology for reducing the effectiveness
of networks based not on decapitation, but on “shaping” through selective elimination of the
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most central  nodes, thus isolating leadership prior to their elimination.603 This research is
theoretical  and  based  on  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  a  single  network,  rather  than  a
marketplace of competitive networks, but it demonstrates that there are credible alternatives
to the current Mexican government strategy worthy of exploration. 
Such  a  strategy  –  especially  if  it  emerged  that  security  forces  intentionally  passed  up
opportunities  to  capture  a  wanted  DTO  leadership  figure  –  could  be  enormously
controversial, and could open the PRI administration to charges that it had revived the narco-
truce  of  its  forebears.  But  many  areas  are  under  effective  DTO  control  regardless,  and
selectively penalising extreme violence would at least give more transactional drug traffickers
some incentive to minimise violence. This in turn could allow some breathing room for the
development of better institutions and civil society groups.
III. Implications for the American government
While virtually all the violence occurs in Mexican territory, the United States bears significant
responsibility for the conflict. This is partly owing to its failure to successfully address the
demand for drugs from its own citizens, and in part due to its pressure on Mexico to adopt
militarised counter-narcotics strategies. While the U.S. government is constrained in a variety
of ways, it does have a preponderance of both hard and soft power at its disposal to exert
influence over the violence. 
For the reasons discussed in Chapter 5 that relate to the structure of the American federal
government and domestic politics surrounding gun control, significant change to current laws
is unlikely in the near term. Nevertheless, the American domestic gun market is an important
– possibly the most important – source of weaponry for Mexican DTOs. The ATF's “Fast and
Furious” scandal drew attention to the role of American guns in Mexican violence, but it did
not lead to serious discussion of the legal environment in which gun purchasers operate. Even
as Republicans and Obama administration officials fought during the investigation into the
603
 Callahan, Devon and Nielsen, Jeffrey, “Shaping Operations to Attack Robust Terror 
Networks,” West Point, United States Military Academy, 6 November 2012, accessed from 
http://www.usma.edu/nsc/SiteAssets/SitePages/Publications/Shaping%20Operations%20to
%20Attack%20Robust%20Terror%20Networks.pdf on 2 June 2013.
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operations, neither paid any heed to the fact that American law enforcement agencies have
little  legal  ability  to  regulate  the  purchase  of  weapons  destined  for  the  use  of  Mexican
traffickers.  Short  of  intercepting  significantly  more  shipments  transiting  the  border  –  a
virtually impossible task – gun purchasers working on behalf of Mexican DTOs have wide
latitude, and in many border states can purchase effectively unlimited numbers of military-
style weapons with no legal barriers.
With  respect  to  violence  in  Mexico,  this  is  a  policy  failure  on  the  part  of  the  American
government. The types of weapons used by cartels – primarily assault rifles, combat shotguns,
sniper  rifles  and anti-materiel  rifles  – are  notably  different  from those  used  for  hunting,
target-shooting, personal defence and other legitimate civilian purposes, and could easily be
regulated separately (as the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban attempted to do).
There is clearly room for additional American aid to Mexico, but the kind of aid the United
States has largely offered thus far – eg. “hard power” aid dedicated to improving the tactical
abilities of Mexican security forces – needs to be rethought in order to achieve the desired
policy outcomes. This is not to suggest that military and police aid should be terminated, but
such  aid  is  useful  only  in  the  short  term,  when  the  Mexican  authorities  appear  able  to
maintain  the status  quo and to protect  the state's  ability  to exist  and,  for  the most  part,
function.  Fundamentally,  the  United  States  faces  a  long-term  strategic  challenge  in  the
Mexican drug conflict, and needs a coherent long-term strategy to address it. The Market of
Narcotic Violence that has taken root in Mexico cannot be destroyed by better-armed, better-
trained state forces; indeed, to some extent the emergence and rapid spread of the Zetas (and
other groups emulating their  hyper-violent  methods) point  to the dangers  of  approaching
drug traffickers in such a market as a tactical problem with a tactical solution.
This is a problem with both external and internal dimensions. The United States does not
have a unified policy on Mexico; as a result, the various departments with mandates extending
to law enforcement, domestic security, military planning and foreign affairs are all pursuing
parochial interests, which means they are at best duplicating efforts and at worst working at
cross purposes to one another. This problem is exacerbated by the partisan split in the federal
government, exemplified by the dispute over the Fast and the Furious scandal. While policy
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cannot rectify partisanship, there is no fundamental obstacle to the United States centralising
Mexico  policy  and  creating  a  coherent  programme  of  aid,  possibly  overseen by a  special
appointee of the executive  branch with coordinating authority,  and instituting cooperative
agreements with the state governments and law enforcement agencies from the border states
of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. 
To some extent the shift  to a soft power emphasis is already happening; during the most
recent  Congressional  hearings  on  Mérida  Initiative  funding,  the  Department  of  State
emphasised the increase in funding for Mexican institution-building,  especially in the law
enforcement and penal sector. While these are laudable goals, and while functional courts and
prisons are a necessary component of any counter-narcotics strategy, the need goes beyond
government activities that directly support front-line law enforcement. Development of the
Mexican  economic,  educational  and  civil  society  sectors  will  help  overcome  the  financial
calculation  that  otherwise  law-abiding  citizens  make  in  choosing  illicit  over  legitimate
employment. If properly executed, it could have the tertiary benefit of helping to overcome the
influence  of  the  so-called  narcocultura  on  Mexican  youth.604 As  well-intentioned  as  the
current aid package is, it represents a mere drop in the bucket relative to the need. In order to
have an impact, the American government would have to invest billions of dollars over the
next decade, in cooperation with American industries willing to pay living wages to Mexican
workers  and  make  lasting  investments  in  the  country,  rather  than  creating  and  then
abandoning factories when lower-cost alternatives become available elsewhere, as happened
with the maquiladora industry. 
The Obama administration has taken small steps toward the goal of changing American drug
policy,  largely in terms of its rhetoric:  dropping the “war on drugs” terminology in 2009,
responding  in  a  measured  way  to  the  proposals  of  the  Guatemalan  and  Colombian
governments to study prohibition alternatives in 2012, emphasising treatment and prevention
in its National Drug Control Strategies and responding quietly to Washington and Colorado's
marijuana  legalisation  initiatives.  But  the  primary  differences  between  Obama  and  his
predecessors have been relatively minor, and the federal government still exhibits interest in
604 Sullivan, John P., and Elkus, Adam, “Barbarization and Narcocultura,” Small Wars Journal, 31 
August 2011. 
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aggressive  enforcement,  as  with  its  campaigns  against  medical  marijuana  dispensaries  in
California.605 
The United States is unlikely to decriminalise narcotic consumption by its own citizens at any
point  in  the  near  future,  even  if  other  nations  abandon  the  international  prohibition
consensus.  In  the United States,  which has  long been the world's  leading promulgator  of
prohibitionist  norms,  the  domestic  constraints  against  any  significant  regularisation  are
massive, and unlikely to be overcome in the near future. The one exception here is marijuana,
which numerous American states have begun to take action to decriminalise or regularise in
the last decade. Further regularisation to some degree in the near future is highly probable.
But given the proliferation of different narcotics trafficked by Mexican gangs, along with the
fact that they have always competed with American and Canadian marijuana growers, means
that  even  widespread  legalisation  of  marijuana  would  not  by  itself  fatally  undercut  DTO
profits or rationales for violence – and cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine regularisation is
extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future.
American demand for specific drugs is out of the control of policymakers, relying as it does
upon local conditions on distant production zones as well as less quantifiable factors such as
whether  a  certain  drug  is  considered  attractive  by  the  drug-using  population.606 To
countenance experimentation with the norms of drug control abroad in order to gather data
on how different legal conditions affect  drug production and transit markets and violence
would usher in the controversial question of drug legalisation, one of the few feasible options
for  challenging the norms upon changing the constraints that  enable  Markets of  Narcotic
Violence.
IV. The Question of Regularisation
One of the biggest changes in the political landscape of drug violence during the writing of this
project was the potential for some form of narcotics regularisation.607 When this project began
605 Downing, Stephen, author interview, Long Beach, California, 13 October 2011.
606
 The operative examples here are probably the sudden rise in popularity of cocaine in the 
United States in the 1970s or the crack epidemic of the 1980s, although the current rise in the 
popularity of methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs is also germane.
607
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in 2009, drug legalisation seemed a distant possibility, at best. The international narcotics
prohibition  system – though  a  subject  of  persistent  criticism,  especially  in  left-wing  and
libertarian  circles  –  appeared  to  be  an  essentially  permanent  fixture  of  the  international
system. But criticism of the war on drugs – regardless of its current appellation – has spread
widely, to the point where the ranks of critics now include current and former Latin American
heads of state and high-ranking former law enforcement personnel.608 These developments
could be  seen in stark detail at the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartageña, Colombia,
where Latin American leaders confronted President Obama with requests to reconsider the
American approach to the narcotics trade. For his part, the American president – while not
giving  ground  on  the  broad  direction  of  American  policy  –  at  least  acknowledged  the
legitimacy of the requests. Of course, these developments are not incontrovertible evidence
that a change is inevitable, but they represent a striking shift of elite opinion in a very short
period of time, which will inevitably impact future anti-narcotics policy. 
The structure upon which the drugs trade (with all its attendant consequences, such as the
Market  of  Narcotic  Violence  in  Mexico)  is  based  is  prohibition.  There  is  no fundamental
reason  why  narcotics  could  not  be  regulated  and  controlled  in  the  same  way  as  other
potentially  hazardous  consumables  such  as  alcohol,  tobacco  or  caffeine.  The  prohibition
system is a result of an international consensus that the harms of aggressive prohibition are
preferable  to the harms of  an unregulated  or regulated-access  system. But  given that  the
current prohibition system is effectively universal, and has been since 1961 – or throughout
virtually the entire development of the modern globalised economy – gathering usable data
on how an alternative would function is virtually impossible. Small-scale experiments with
decriminalising  possession  and  usage  of  certain  drugs  in  small  quantities  suggest  that
regulation,  education  and  treatment  of  problematic  drug  use  –  the  “demand  reduction”
 An important semantic note here: “Regularisation” refers to the full spectrum of possible 
public policy approaches to narcotics less aggressive than the current system of enforcement-
centred prohibition. Regularisation and prohibition are, however, not points on a binary scale – 
“decriminalisation” refers to the process by which law enforcement and judicial systems are given 
the authority to ignore individual drug use so long as it does not coincide with other criminal 
behaviours (eg. operating a vehicle or robbing a store while under the influence), whereas 
“legalisation” refers to the process by which drug use would be made no longer a crime at all, in 
much the same way that drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes are not crimes.
608 Global Commission on Drug Policy, “War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy,” June 2011, accessed from http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/ on 26 June 
2013
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method – can be effectively limit public health hazards from narcotics. But these instances
represent relatively small sample sizes, and more importantly, they have only been tested on
an effectively ad hoc basis in individual nations, rather than as a coordinated, international
effort. In short, they do not model the international nature of the contemporary drugs trade. 
The  repeal  of  Prohibition in  the United  States  presents  a  better  model  of  what  could  be
expected. Alcohol is for all intents and purposes in the same category as any narcotic drug,
and  during  the  period  in  which  it  was  illegal,  organised  crime  groups  moved  into  the
marketplace and fought pitched, internecine battles over distribution territories, products and
trafficking routes. With the repeal of  Prohibition, many of those groups found themselves
without a market, and diversified into other illicit activities, but the overall level of violence
was  diminished.  Nevertheless,  there  are  significant  differences  between  the  American
experiment  with  Prohibition  and  the  potential  end of  international  narcotics  prohibition.
First, Prohibition was not an international phenomenon; while the United States was not the
only nation to attempt the elimination of alcohol by legal controls during the first few decades
of the 20th century, the Prohibitionist consensus was never anywhere as strong as the current
international drug control consensus. Especially significant is the fact that neither Mexico nor
Canada made alcohol illegal, which meant it could be produced and transported to the border
legally, only becoming illegal while crossing into America. This prevented the emergence of
violent production or transit markets outside the United States. 
More importantly, Prohibition was a singular legal structure operating within the borders of
one nation, and it  was undone with a single Constitutional amendment. The international
drug control consensus is not nearly as simple; it relies not on a single piece of legislation but
on  an  interdependent  system  of  national  laws,  binding  international  treaties,  individual
government policies and multilateral foreign aid agreements. Unlike Prohibition, there is no
single legal step that could overturn it – and the complexity of the international system is an
order  of  magnitude  greater  than  the  complexity  of  1930s-era  American  government.  So
should this structure be overturned, it would likely be done by a succession of small steps
rather than one all-encompassing legalisation framework. 
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Finally, it is of paramount importance to note that total prohibition and legalisation do not
exist in binary fashion. Despite the international complexities at issue, there are a variety of
scenarios for legalisation. These can helpfully be thought of on a spectrum, arranged roughly
in the following order:
(1) Harsh 
penalties for 
all stages, 
including 
user 
targeting 
[the 
Prohibition 
model]
(2) 
Criminalisati
on of use, 
production 
and 
trafficking 
[the current 
system in the 
U.S.] 
(3) Public 
health 
approaches 
to use; 
criminalisati
on of 
production 
and transit
(4) Public 
health 
approaches 
to use; mild 
penalties for 
production 
or transit
(5) 
Prescription 
model for 
use with 
commercialis
ed 
production 
and transit
(6) 
Legalisation 
of use with 
restrictions 
along the 
model of 
alcohol or 
tobacco
(7) Complete, 
unrestricted 
legalisation
Using such a spectrum, it is clear that the range of possible policy options for drug legalisation
are largely unexplored. Since the passage of the Single Convention in 1961, national counter-
narcotics policies have almost entirely clustered between (1) and (3). Moreover, nations such
as  Holland  and  Portugal,  which  roughly  fit  into  group  (3),  have  only  decriminalised  a
relatively  small  fraction  of  substances  (usually  cannabis,  sometimes  certain  synthetic
compounds  such  as  MDMA).609 There  is  therefore  little  to  no  data  about  what  effects  a
widespread adoption of the norms expressed in groups 4-7 would entail. However, the rapidly
shifting elite dialogue on prohibition suggests that there is significant and growing willingness
to experiment with more regulatory-focused options.
The difficulty of  continuing to enforce a prohibitionist  norm is  reinforced by the growing
popularity  of  synthetic  drugs,  especially  amphetamine-type  stimulants  (ATS).  Such
substances can be produced virtually anywhere from widely available precursor chemicals,
and modified to a virtually infinite degree to confound government regulators and police. The
609
 The marijuana legalisation initiatives passed in Washington State and Colorado in the 2012 
election are actually considerably farther to the right on this spectrum, most closely aligned with 
(6). However, given that as of this writing they have only been in effect for a few months, and that 
there is an unresolved tension between these states and the federal government, it would be vastly 
premature to draw public policy conclusions from these examples.
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growing popularity of such substances – the World Drug Report now lists ATS as the second
most  widely  used  category  of  drugs  worldwide,  behind  only  cannabis610 –  indicates  the
possibility that future drug markets could be completely atomised and essentially immune to
even the limited forms of influence nations maintain over drug production and transportation
within the prohibitionist system.
The question of  whether the deleterious public health effects of  legally available  narcotics
would be greater or less than the effects of prohibition is beyond the methodology and scope
of this project. But a discussion of decriminalisation's prospects for changing the constraints
that  enable  Markets  of  Narcotic  Violence  is  not.  Certainly  decriminalisation,  even  if  it
occurred  universally  and  simultaneously,  would  not  eliminate  the  interactions  between
organised crime and drugs; criminals worldwide find profit and compete for market share in
products that are at least partially legal (pirated software, smuggled cigarettes, bunkered oil,
conflict diamonds, etc.). But if legitimate corporations moved into the production, marketing
and supply of  narcotics,  criminals would find themselves  competing for a  smaller  market
share. In the short term, this could result in a significant increase in levels of drug-linked
violence, as existing traffickers fought each other for the market share for unregulated or still-
illegal  drugs.611 The  precise  size  of  this  leftover  market  would obviously  depend upon the
extent of the regularisation: if  only the “least-harmful” drugs (say, MDMA and marijuana)
were legalised in the United States, there would remain a thriving criminal market for cocaine
and  methamphetamine.  Such  markets  exist  for  regulated  products  such  as  tobacco  and
alcohol.  As governments levy taxes to discourage excessive or problematic use,  a criminal
black market emerges; one survey estimated that roughly a third of all cigarettes produced
worldwide are smuggled across borders to avoid taxes.612 It is worthwhile to note that these
are markets of considerable size and value, but in no case does the violence associated with
610
 UNODC 2012, p. 2.
611
 If regularisation followed the model of alcohol and tobacco, this could include providing 
narcotics to those deemed too young to purchase them, supplying cheaper “knock-off” drugs, and 
providing substances deemed too hazardous to public health to permit at all (methamphetamine, for 
example, in a country which had only legalised marijuana and cocaine).
612
 Joossens, Luk, and Raw, Martin, “Smuggling and cross border shopping of tobacco in 
Europe,” British Medical Journal, No. 310, p. 1394.
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them  approach  the  scale  or  the  singular  brutality  that  characterises  violent  transit  drug
markets.
In public policy, there are no perfect solutions. No realistic option available to policymakers is
without some drawbacks, and narcotics regularisation is no exception. Indeed, given how little
is known about how an international narcotics market would function if drugs themselves
were to be at least partially legitimised, proponents of prohibition can quite reasonably point
to what Donald Rumsfeld might have termed the “unknown unknowns” of regularisation as
an argument in favour of maintaining the current system. This thesis has not discussed the
public  health  harms of  drug use due  to its  focus  on the violence  of  narcotics  trafficking.
Prohibition advocates argue that narcotic drugs have significant public health effects and that
any efforts to disrupt or interdict supply save lives; opponents argue that the overall rates of
usage would not be manifestly affected by regularisation and that the second- and third-order
effects of prohibition are significantly worse than the potential effects of regularisation. Given
that both sides are arguing over a one-sided set of data, there can be no satisfactory resolution
to  the  question  of  which  option  would  result  in  less  overall  harm  unless  some  form  of
international regularisation comes to pass.
Nevertheless, in an international system in which, at the very least, narcotics could be legally
transported from their country of origin to the border of their final destination, transnational
DTOs and violent transit markets would both be irrelevant. Under such a system, it would be
far  cheaper  and  more  efficient  to  ship  drugs  directly  from  origin  to  sale;  or  even  for
production to occur as close to the point of sale as possible (as would be possible for synthetic
or “designer” drugs, which could be customised at the user's behest to produce a particular
effect).  Since a completely  laissez-faire approach is  almost certainly the least likely  of  all
possible  results  for  the evolution of international  drug control,  there will  almost certainly
remain prohibited classes of drugs, and as a result black markets will continue to exist. But
the type of resilient violence seen in Mexico depends on a massive income stream from the
sale of narcotics to withstand the response of the state; smaller black markets (such as those
that currently exist for alcohol and tobacco) simply do not provide the kind of profit margin
necessary. 
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Drug regularisation, therefore, would change one of the fundamental constraints upon which
violent drug transit markets are built – though the extent of that change would depend on the
type and scope of the regularisation regime. The public health effects of such a regime are a
matter of dispute, but the existence of Markets of Narcotic Violence flows directly from the
illegal nature of drugs. Changing that nature is likely the most effective feasible method of
ending  the  existing  MNVs  and  preventing  the  emergence  of  new  ones.  The  eventual
regularisation  of  the  drugs  trade  is  not  a  guarantee.  The  current  trend  toward
experimentation with less severe drug laws may fail to take root amongst the largest consumer
countries,  rendering  smaller  nations'  experiments  with  less  severe  laws  irrelevant  to
international narcotics policy or trade. Alternatively, the world might divide into blocs, with
some  nations  rejecting  regularisation  and  others  embracing  it,  which  could  lead  to  the
development  of  a  hybrid  black-market/legitimate  drugs  trade,  with  truly  unpredictable
consequences  for  all  nations.  The  emergence  of  Markets  of  Narcotic  Violence  is  an
unquestionably negative consequence of the current prohibition regime, but a transition to a
different system will require deliberation, balance and a careful weighing of legal and public
health harms in order to prevent new forms of violence or other societal ills from emerging.
V. Overall conclusion: Mexico and the Future of Drug Violence
But returning to the present,  where does the violence in Mexico stands in relation to the
existing  set  of  international  norms?  With  prohibition  still  in  place,  there  are  two  fairly
assumptions about the worldwide drug market and its potential for creating violence. The first
is  that globalisation is,  broadly  speaking,  a durable  phenomenon: in other words,  barring
worldwide cataclysm, most states will continue to keep their borders open to flows of goods
and services, and that there is no technological or political “silver bullet” that could separate
licit from illicit flows to an extent that the latter could be effectively controlled or eliminated.
This assumption relies on the continuation of pre-2008 trends toward greater interlinkages
between global economies, and the accordant difficulties in monitoring cross-border trades.
Given this,  smugglers' oldest tools – coercion and corruption – will remain amongst their
most  useful.  Interdiction will  continue to put a  price  premium on transnational  narcotics
smuggling, but – with the exception of specific cases, such as the U.S. government's Caribbean
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efforts – it will not curtail the overall trade. The development of a “wonder weapon” capable
of dramatically tilting the balance in favour of the interdictors is unlikely, partly for basic
reasons relating to the relative ease of concealment, partly because the means to cross borders
with illicit payloads are limited only by human imagination and partly because the additional
costs  of  shipments  lost  by  traffickers  is  easily  passed  on  to  the  consumers,  who  have
historically demonstrated no fungibility in demand relative to rising prices.
The second assumption is that demand for narcotic drugs, which has not shifted substantially
in  decades,613 remains  constant.  As  illustrated,  the  markets  for  specific  drugs  is  in  flux;
individual  drugs  gain  and  lose  popularity  at  different  rates  in  different  regions.  But  the
demand for drugs generally – for the consumption of substances that alter brain chemistry
and perception – appears to be basically constant under a prohibitionist system. 
Neither  insurgencies  backed by drug money,  nor local  violence in  end-user  drug markets
appear to be on the wane. Drugs remain an appealing source of income for rural insurgencies,
thanks to their portability, ease of production and high profit margins. The details of specific
drug markets may be altered by new production and distribution structures (synthetic drugs
and anonymised Internet-based sales), and new markets may emerge as middle classes with
the disposable income for illicit drugs arise in China, India and elsewhere, but illicit  drug
markets generally are likely to remain regulated by the combination of explicit and implicit
regulatory  violence.  Fundamentally,  the  engine  that  drives  the  drug  market  –  and  the
different types of violence engendered by it – is demand. The current and historical statuses
of drug trafficking demonstrate clearly that DTOs are extremely capable of profiting despite
extensive, well-funded state counter-narcotics efforts; this state of affairs is unlikely to change
even as the specifics of drug markets shift with global economic fortunes. Narcotics traffickers
have demonstrated an uncanny ability to adapt and penetrate new markets, piggybacking off
discord  and  weakness  to  capitalise  on  conditions  that  characterise  Markets  of  Narcotic
Violence.
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In this environment, Mexico serves as a cautionary example: a relatively strong state with
mostly functional central institutions that has nevertheless lost its monopoly on violence and
been unable to suppress a dynamic of violent entrepreneurialism that, in the span of just a few
years,  has  come  to  dictate  much  of  its  security  strategy  and  international  image.  While
Mexican policymakers must bear some responsibility for this  state of  affairs,  many of the
factors that led to the development of this particular Market of Narcotic Violence were not
unique to Mexico, and therefore could serve as a template for future MNVs. In a world where
traditional  inter-state conflicts  and large-scale  warfare  are  becoming rarer,  the success  of
Mexican  drug  traffickers  in  generating  and  sustaining  a  resilient  profit-making  network
fuelled  by  extreme  brutality  in  an  otherwise  relatively  peaceful  and  stable  nation
demonstrates the type of challenges to existing state and international structures the world is
likely to see in the coming decades.
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